INTRODUCTION

Waste Management, Inc. (WMI) is the largest waste-hauling firm in America; its total revenues exceeded six billion dollars ($6,000 million) in 1990. Obviously, managing waste is an exceedingly lucrative business. The very name of the company - Waste Management - suggests that wastes can be safely controlled after they are created. Unfortunately, history reveals that this is not true. Once they are produced, dangerous wastes cannot be managed safely. No incinerator, landfall, or other method of waste disposal can protect future generations and the environment from hazardous chemicals, including the hazardous chemicals used in our homes every day (oven cleaners, paint thinners, pesticides, and so forth). The laws of physics dictate that disposal equals dispersal. Everything must go somewhere, and sooner or later, all wastes that are created will be released into the environment; waste disposal has caused steadily increased contamination worldwide. The deepest oceans are contaminated; wildlife in remote Antarctica is contaminated; human breast milk is contaminated. While still in the womb, babies are contaminated. Pesticides, heavy metals, industrial solvents, and a dazzling spectrum of toxic halocarbon compounds are now being measured in living creatures everywhere, and their concentration throughout the earth's environment is increasing relentlessly. Some of the damage caused by this widespread contamination has been documented in scientific reports. Much awaits to be learned from future study. But this much is clear already - dousing our children, and all living things on the planet, with steadily increased types and quantities of toxins cannot be beneficial. If humans are to survive, we must diminish our releases of chemicals into the environment. This means we must rely less and less upon waste disposal technologies and eliminate the creation and use of these harmful substances to begin with.

 

This report is intended to help citizens understand the problem of waste disposal as it is practiced by one company, Waste Management, Inc., a leader in the waste-hauling and disposal business. The report is intended to help people protect their community not only from bad actors, but also from bad ideas. The lessons learned from this company have to do with the nature of the waste disposal industry as a whole - the use and promotion of dangerous technologies and the abuse of economic and political power. As we come to recognize that  state-of-the-art" waste disposal technologies don't work, even when practiced by the nation's wealthiest waste hauler, we must eventually recognize that the very idea of disposal is premised on a flawed approach to protecting our natural resources and ourselves.

 

People across America are taking direct action to protect themselves against companies like WMI. For example, in 1982, the Chickasaw Community Affairs Group in Alabama mobilized and successfully stopped a proposed WMI toxic waste storage facility in the neighboring port of Mobile. Citizens worked to change local laws to close loopholes that EPA had used to help WMI establish its new facility. Since then, grassroots groups around the world have been stopping or stalling WMI with increasing success as the company's dismal record is exposed when the company seeks opportunities to operate in new communities. (see Fight the Power that Pollutes: Examples of Victories over WMI.)

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People are willing to sacrifice momentary convenience for environmental wellbeing, as poll after poll has shown. But the choice--and the information to understand that choice, both in the marketplace and the political arena--must be available. The grassroots movement for environmental justice works to protect the environment by practicing democracy. By producing this report we hope to provide citizens and decision makers with information in a form they can use.

It is our hope that this report will help generate even more pressure to end WMI’s attempts to site new disposal facilities and force decision makers to look at the real solutions to the waste crisis. A well-informed, well-organized group of citizens can keep even a powerful adversary like WMI out of a community. This report, along with reports issued by other environmental organizations (such as the Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, which published their WMI Corporate Profile in 1988) is intended to provide information about the company to grassroots groups, enforcement officials, public employee unions, and others who are faced with the company's operations in their community. In fact, without a lot of hard work by such people, our report would not have been possible. More and more, grassroots groups are cooperating with others, sharing information, and organizing strategies to prevent WMI from gaining a foothold in their communities.

 

WASTING AWAY

 

Promoted as an enterprise that "profits by protecting the environment" WMI has become a primary actor in, and accessory to, the process of global contamination. The technologies employed by WMI are all inherently destructive; the company's only major line of business-waste disposal-severely damages the environment. Even wastes that are "recycled" eventually reenter the environment, causing pollution through remanufacturing processes and ultimate disposal. Because Waste Management thrives on the production of waste, the company spends enormous resources promoting the myth of "safe" waste disposal, which it usually calls "state-of-thee waste disposal technology." The myth of safe disposal is used to persuade government agencies to allow WMI to create new dumps and incinerators or expand the capacity of old ones.

 

Even if WMI operated as a model corporate citizen, its daily operations would contribute in major ways to the destruction of the environment. However, evidence suggests that WMI is not run as a model corporation. In fact, an in-depth study of WMI's corporate conduct reveals a history of environmental and antitrust law violations, a history of attempts to gain illegitimate political influence, and a history of disrespect for the communities where the company conducts business. In this sense, WMI not only destroys the natural environment, but also undermines democratic decision-making at the local level. Many local grassroots leaders can attest to the truth of this latter point.

 

As used in WMI’s public relations campaigns, ''the environment'' is often an abstract concept. But the environment is a tangible and diverse

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ecosystem that is integral to the lives and neighborhoods of real people-in real communities where WMI has demonstrated disregard for the concerns of residents. This Greenpeace report documents WMI’s track record in many of these communities, focusing on the company's operations in the United States, where the company has built an unrivaled waste disposal empire.

 

Reports of environmental damage from landslide, incinerators, deep well injection sites, and other "state-of-the-art waste disposal operations" have become commonplace. Several years ago, concerned citizens began to ask, " If these problems are happening at so many facilities, could there be something wrong with the use of all waste disposal teclnologies?" That general concern has grown into a widespread recognition that "disposal equals dispersal"-all waste disposal technologies release contaminants into the environment--and a powerful grassroots environmental protection movement now confronts WMI and other waste disposal companies wherever they turn.

 

Meanwhile, the federal government has been going down a different track--trying to curb environmental destruction by creating a complicated web of rules and relations to govern the generation and disposal of waste. Naturally, this government effort has been joined enthusiastically by waste haulers like Waste Management, Inc., who profit from every pound of waste produced and who would be put out of business by serious efforts at waste reduction. Together, the coalition of waste haulers and government officials has created the myth of "safe" disposal, a myth bolstered by a vocabulary of catch-phrases such as "integrated waste management," "negligible risk" "state-of-the-art" and "best available control teleology (BACT)." These phrases are employed to promote unproven technologies, to hide the truth about the failures of existing technologies, and to divert attention away from the real solution to these problems: to reduce the use of toxic materials with an eye toward eliminating them entirely while employing cleaner, more efficient production processes.

 

All "state-of-the-art waste disposal technologies" have failed to work as promised. Furthermore, phrases like ''state-of-the-art'' work against democratic decision-making because they invite the public to trust ''the experts.'' These experts are usually company officials or hired consultants who have an interest in seeing the waste disposal industry expand or regulatory officials who feel justled in granting any permit if it meets written standards, no matter how inadequate those standards may be. One result has been a massive loss of faith in government's ability to protect the public from polluters.

 

The unholy alliance of waste haulers and government officials is now deeply entrenched in the fabric of American life. The myth of safe disposal has become entrenched over the last two decades as the U.S. government has written sweeping waste disposal regulations. It is no coincidence that Waste Management, Inc.'s growth skyrocketed during this period. Many current Waste Management employees helped write federal and state environmental regulations when they worked as regulatory officials or as congressional staff members. The general con-

 

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concept is so common, it has been given a name: the revolving door, through which government regulators become highly paid employees of the firms they used to regulate. Knowing that the future promises a lucrative pass through the revolving door, government denials would be foolish to urge strict enforcement against violations by the waste-hauling industry. Probably the best-known example of the ''revolving door'' is the career of William Ruckelshaus, who has twice served as chief of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and now is chief executive officer of Browning Ferris Industries (BFI), the second largest waste hauler in America. But Mr. Ruckelshaus represents only the tip of the iceberg. (See Appendix L for examples of people who have passed through the revolving door.)

 

The web of government rules on waste disposal has not prevented massive contamination of the environment, but it has benefited companies like Waste Management and BFI enormously. Waste producers who can't meet on -site disposal regulations now hire commercial waste disposal farms, such as Waste Management, Inc., to take wastes off their hands, instead of looking for ways to eliminate wastes entirely through prevention. By playing hardball with communities, Waste Management finds locations often in sparsely populated rural areas where the local people are naive, politically weak, and financially needy-to disuse of unwanted, dangerous wastes.

 

The existence of a politically powerful, slick, and wealthy waste ( - disposal industry has encouraged the generation and disposal of increasing amounts and types of waste. Despite (in a sense, even because or 10,000 pages of rules and regulations now governing waste disposal, annual generation of hazardous waste in the U.S. is doubling every 12 years. As a result, incentives for waste reduction have actually diminished because the oversight of more and more commercial waste dumps and incinerators has sapped the resources of government agencies. Although some waste generating companies have gained a competitive advantage by eliminating- mg wastes and have even proofed in the process, most companies have come to rely upon the waste disposal industry in order to comply with en- environmental regulations. As a result, the waste disposal industry is one of the fastest growing sectors of the U.S. economy. In the aggregate, the cost for waste disposal and pollution control in America amounted to $90 billion in 1987 and is expected to more than double by the end of the 1990s.

 

The myth of safe disposal has prevented government officials from look- ing into the manufacturing processes where wastes originate. Govern- ment officials ignore raw materials and manufacturing techniques-the fundamental sources of pollution. The myth of safe disposal has also allowed regulators to avoid banning toxic materials and unsafe technologies. WMI has played a major part in maintaining the myth of safe disposal and in helped political officials see things in the same light. The great size of WMI's political contributions and the pervasiveness of its advertising reveal how important maintaining the myth of safe disposal is to the company's growth and survival.

 

During the 1988 elections, WMI had the seventh largest corporate PAC in America. So long as WMI and other waste industry giants are allowed

 

 

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to influence elections, elected officials can be expected to avoid fundamental solutions to the waste crisis, no matter how tragic the consequences in terms of public health, economic cost, and environmental damage.

 

Contamination by toxic chemicals is increasing relentless. But there are exceptions to the rule. Where unsafe materials have been banned, contamination levels are diminishing. The banning of DDT, lead (in gasoline), and PCBs has taught us that prevention and the precautionary principle work. The great gaps in knowledge about the effects of pollution (gaps that III never be closed, so long as we allow between 1,000 and 2,000 new chemicals to enter commercial channels each year) should lead to a cautious approach to expanding the use of dangerous materials and polluting technologies. Global warming, destruction of the planet's ozone shield, acid rain, loss of many wildlife species, and indisputable evidence of widespread contamination of humans should serve as stark warnings. It is becoming increasingly clear that long-term sustainability requires a resolute commitment to clean technology and safe materials- and to drastically reduced reliance on waste disposal.

 

WMI is the leader of an industry inherently at odds with such positive approaches to the tonics crisis. Without waste, the industry would have no business. Without increased waste generation, these companies could not grow. To maintain its status as one of the best buys on Wall Street, WMI requires a constant increase in waste. It's main line of business is at odds with the continued well-being of humans and other forms of life on earth.

 

Waste Management's growth has also resulted from predatory behavior as the company has devoured its economic competition-smaller waste haulers and disposal firms- exerting its influence from the streets of small town America to the halls of Congress. In many instances the company has reportedly used illegal competitive tactics- bid-rigging, price-fixing, and allegedly even physical threats-resulting in criminal and civil suits. In other instances, the company has simply bought out its competition or has positioned itself to underbid and squeeze out it's competition for waste disposal services. Antitrust enforcement agencies are understaffed and usually lack the political will to stop WMI from moving toward a monopoly. Even when the will exists, current laws provide an inadequate deterrent to the company's practices. For a giant like WMI, environmental penalties, antitrust penalties, and legal fees (many of which can be written off against taxes) are easily absorbed as normal costs of doing business oven when those penalties run into millions of dollars. The result of monopolization is that the company s customers, both householders and businesses, suffer artificially inflated costs. In this respect, the company's operations cause not only environmental deterioration but also economic decline.

 

WMI's aggressive expansion strategy has been exceedingly lucrative for its directors and stockholder. Waste management's top executives are among the U.S.'S highest paid. The corporation's growth has paid WMI's executives handsomely. WMI's president, Philip Rooney, earned $14,276,000 in 1987. Donald Flynn, a WMI senior vice president, received $13,217,000 in 1987, and Dean Buntrock, the Chief Executive Of-

 

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officer of WMI, was the highest paid CEO in Illinois in 1988. (771). The company's growth-now increasing at a billion-dollar-a-year clip has thrust the firm toward the top of the U.S. corporate charts.

 

In the 1990s, the company expects to increase its growth through international expansion and diversification into specialized services. Chemical Waste Management (CWM) the hazardous waste disposal subsidiary of WMI, for instance, expects to make Superfund site cleanup, and the cleanup of military bases and of contaminated nuclear weapons production sites, a big part of its business in the 1990s. Growth and profits in this business require the shipment of contamination from one community to another. CWM's Superfund cleanup division-the Environmental Remedial Action division (ENRAC)-is handsomely paid for moving waste from contaminated sites around the country to other contaminated sites: to the Emelle, Alabama, landfill, for example, which continues to receive the largest share of Superfund waste in the country, even though it has been shown to be leaking.

 

 

This shell game allows the government to claim that is has the situation under control and is ''doing something about it,'' allows Waste Management and other companies like it to become fabulously wealthy (wealth which they then use to support re-election bids by sympathetic political candidates), and moves wastes out of middle-class communities into poor communities (and more often than not into communities of racial and ethnic minorities). The last advantage of this shell game is that it allows responsible government officials-politicians and regulator alike- to avoid having to confront the real source of the waste problem -the manufacturing places where raw materials are selected, where manufacturing techniques are devised, and where products are made. Government does not want to reach its hand into this arena, which corporate management has traditionally viewed as entirely its own. So, instead, government forms coalitions with the polluters against the local citizenry, runs interference for the polluters so they never have to confront the victims of their handiwork, helps the waste haulers develop and license new dumps and incinerators, and enthusiastically promotes the myth of safe disposal.

 

Until government abandons the myth of safe disposal and begins to recognize that companies like Waste Management, Inc., are a major part of the problem, and not part of the solution, global environmental destruction will continue to accelerate.

 

WMI AT A GLANCE

 

Waste Management, Inc. is the world's largest waste disposal company. It's annual revenue grew from 76 million dollars in 1971 to 6 billion dollars in 1990. It ranks 19th in the Fortune 500 list of the largest diversified service companies in the U.S. It hauls garbage from almost 8 million households in the U.S., in over 1,350 communities. It operates over 128 landfills in at least 36 states. (767) Each landfill is a time bomb in the earth, waiting to poison future generations when it begins to leak.

 

According to a Prudential-Bache securities analyst, WMI's subsidiary,

 

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Chemical Waste Management (CWM) is the largest hazardous waste disposal company in the U.S. CWM controls up to one-third of the entire U.S. commerce hazardous waste treatment and disposal capacity. CWM's revenues doubled in the late 1980s, and the company earned over one billion dollars in revenue in 1990. (767)

 

WMI also controls the largest nuclear waste disposal firm in the U.S. (Chem-Nuclear), owns 49 percent of the U.S.'S largest asbestos removal company (Brand Industries), and owns 55 percent of the U.S.'S largest garbage incineration firm (Wheelabrator Technologies).

 

ECONOMIC MALPRACTICE FOR PROFIT

 

Mere fate and providence have not guided the transformation of an obscure regional garbage hauler into a powerful global waste disposal juggernaut. To create an empire, the company has mixed business acumen and foresight with strong doses of deception, corruption, and monopolism. The company, its subsidiaries. and its employees have faced antitrust law suits or government investigations in at least 17 states. Since 1980, WMI, its subsidiaries, and its employees have paid more than $28 million in fines or settlements for price-fixing, bid-rigging, and other allegedly illegal means of discouraging competition. (This figure includes out-of-court settlements in which WMI pays its adversaries what they ask but does not admit any wrongdoing.) Here are some examples:

 

• In 1990, WMI and rival Browning-Ferris Industries (BFl) settled the largest civil antitrust lawsuit in the industry's history for almost $50 million. Plaintiffs in the suit alleged that top corporate officers ''were directly involved in price-fixing activities throughout the country'' that local whistle-blowing efforts were rebuked by top executives, and that officials in the companies involved in the conspiracy were promoted rather that penalized.

 

• In March 1989, WMI of California was fined, $1,000,000 for conspiring against trade. Los Angeles' district attorney described this as the biggest criminal antitrust case in California's history. WMI of California conspired with other haulers to eliminate competition, to not touch each others' business and to use below-cost ''blitzes'' to lure customers from businesses that did not go along with the trade conspirators. (319)

 

 

- In 0ctober 1988, the supervisor of garbage disposal for the city! of New Orleans alleged that officials of WMI's New Orleans subsidiary warned him and a colleague that they would wear 'cement boots'' and 'meet their maker'' if they persisted in investigating garbage disposal overcharges. After investigating the allegations, the U.S. Attorney did not file charges. (418, 482)

 

In October 1987, subsidiaries of WMI were fined $1,000,000 by the

U.S. Justice Department for conspiring with Browning-Ferris Industries-the second largest waste hauler in America, after WMI-

to fix prices and divide markets in the Toledo, Ohio, area. The

companies involved, including Waste Management of North

 

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America, also split a $700,000 fine paid to the state of Ohio. (403,482)

 

- In April 1986, David Hoopengardner, the manager of WMI's Florida subsidiary, United Sanitation Services, was sentenced to two years probation and fined $10,500 for price-fixing and customer allocation(that is, illegally divvying up customers with other haulers). WMI then transferred him to a Caracas, Venezuela, subsidiary, where he could avoid having to report to probation officials. Later he was fired. (269, 482)

 

In January 1988, a subsidiary of Waste Management, Inc. of Florida was fined $1,000,000 after pleading ''no contest'' to charges of involvement in a conspiracy to keep prices fixed at artificially high and non-competitive levels and for other antitrust activities. This case stemmed from the same facts charged against Hoopengardner. (228)

 

The victims of these criminal activities are the people who pay WMI to take their trash away. Ira Reiner, the district attorney for Los Angeles, has said, ''the crime here amounts to a theft from the public...who are paying artificially high fees to have their trash hauled away. The high prices are ultimately passed along to the public'' (701)

 

Records in the 1988 antitrust case that led to a $1,000,000 fine for WMI alleged that the company and other haulers in southern Florida ''carted off more than 2.5 million dollars in the past ten years through overcharges and other suspect billings,'' according to newspaper accounts. In Toledo, Ohio, where WMI was convicted of an antitrust conspiracy and fined $1,000,000 in 1987 for price-fixing and other antitrust violations, customers included dozens of schools and even a convent. (225, 292)

 

Because of pressure from government officials concerned about public health and recent public attention to environmental issues (especially by grassroots environmental groups), WMI has attempted to ''greenwash'' its image in a variety of ways. In its 1989 Annual Report, for instance, WMI set out a corporate environmental policy for the first time. We urge you to read the company's environmental policy along with this report; we have included it as Appendix K. The contrast between the company's ''environmental policy'' and its daily operations demonstrates that in many instances the appearance of careful management is merely the careful management of appearance crafted by WMI's public relations experts.

 

In the text that follows are brief descriptions of problems caused by certain theologies employed by Waste Management, Inc. These descriptions are by no means complete. Such information is amply provided in other materials available from environmental organizations, universities, and government. Rather, the goal of this report is to reveal examples of real-world evidence of the shortcomings of these technologies so the public and its decision makers will have the necessary information to guide them.

 

Soon after the publication of the first edition of Waste Management, Inc.: A Greenpeace Report in 1987, WMI executives began circulating a rebuttal entitled, ''The Greenpeace Report: A commentary'' The 27 page rebuttal had no cover sheet, no date, and no identifiable author. But, since WMI widely circulated the document, we must assume that it

 

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speaks for the company:

 

''The so-called Greenpeace report on Waste Management, Inc.... reflects the extent to which its author and other contributors were willing to distort and deceive in order to malign the company and its people...lt is a sorry document given the total absence of ethical discipline or fair play employed in its preparation.''

 

In response we can only say, of course the truth can hurt. Green-ace's Waste Management report simply lists facts disclosed by federal and state government agencies, conventional media, and Waste Management's own documents. Observations based on first-hand investigations at numerous WMI facilities by Greenpeace, public employee unions, and other environmental activists are also included. Greenpeace recognizes that there are limits to research: we believe we have barely scratched the surface of environmental and antitrust violations committed by WMI, and we call on law enforcement officials to further investigate the company's operations and for everyone to work for better solutions to the toxic waste crisis. Whenever the opportunity presents itself, Greenpeace will continue to investigate the corporate behavior of WMI and will make public its findings.

 

This is the third edition of the full-length Waste Management Encyclopedia. In addition to new data on WMI activities, typographical revisions and corrections of errors have been included. We have tried to include relevant and current information, but it is impossible for us to monitor all segments of WMI's operations. We must rely on residents, officials employees, and journalists in communities where WMI operates to provide us with the latest information. Please send us any documented information that you believe should be shared with anyone in the world who is hypnotized by the Waste Management mythos (for example, please send us relevant newspaper clippings with the date and page number included).

 

Because clean technologies to dispose of waste do not exist, Greenpeace and Citizens United for Environmental Justice are presenting the following demands to public officials:

 

1. Publicly elected officials must enact an immediate moratorium on all new types of disposal facilities. As this report goes to print, legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House of representatives to place a ten- year moratorium on construction of new garbage incinerators with strict conditions after that; the legislation would also place strict conditions on sitting of new hazardous waste incinerators, including implementation of significant tonics use reduction programs. This includes a moratorium on landfalls and incinerators. Pollution prevention, not pollution management, must guide government policies if we are to roll back the tide of tonics. Congress and regulatory officials must close loopholes in current environmental regulations that allow the injection of wastes into deep wells and allow sham recycling practices such as the use of hazardous wastes as fuel in industrial boilers and cement kilns.

 

2. Industry and government must recognize that disposal of hazardous waste is unsafe and must respond by enacting policies that reduce the use of persistent toxic materials in manufacturing and place new emphasis on

 

 

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cleaner, more efficient production technologies. Bans and phaseouts of chemicals such as organochlorine solvents and other halogenated hydrocarbons must be enacted to turn the toxic tide toward preventative solutions to the toxic substance crisis.

 

 

3. Industry and government must enact policies to reduce the volume of solid waste (garbage) and to reduce the toxic materials commonly found in garbage. This would include bans on single-use disposable products, packaging restrictions, recycled content standards for a variety of materials, and bans on toxics in consumer products that typically end up in the solid waste stream, e.g., mercury in batteries.

 

4. Citizens must be allowed meaningful participation in decisions about the environment. Public officials must refuse money from waste disposal industry political action committees and enact tougher legislation governing contacts of interest.
5. Public officials at all levels must enact and enforce laws that preclude government from conducting business with companies, or with any of the subsidiaries of companies, that have been convicted of a felony. In addition, whistle-blowers --company employees who speak out about environmental abuses or other criminal activity by their employers--need strong protection under the law.

 

 

Note: To avoid confusion, this report often refers to WMI subsidiaries as WMI, except in the case of Chemical Waste Management (CWM) the largest of its subsidiaries and the nation's largest hazardous waste processing company. Where some confusion may exist, we have tried to be clear about the relationship of the WMI subsidiary or affiliated division and the parent corporation. (Most of WMI's subsidiaries and affiliates are listed m Appendix D.) In effect, WMI and CWM are the same company. Though the two companies trade separately on the New York Stock Exchange, as of August 31, 1989, WMI owned 78,836,641 (79 percent) of CWM's 100,028,000 outstanding shares. WMI officers and executives are the largest individual shareholders of CWM stock, and CWM executives are accountable to WMI through their dual roles as WMI officers and executives.

 

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EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

 

Waste Management, Inc. (WMI) is the world's largest waste disposal company and also one of the world's biggest polluters. The technologies that WMI employs to dispose of industrial and household wastes-including landfalls, incineration, and deep will injection-fail to protect the pubic from contamination by hazardous materials. The existence, growth, and influence of WMI work against effective preventive solutions to toxic waste, such as activities that promote the use of clean technologies and safe materials.

 

This Greenpeace report documents instances of environmental and economic violations committed by WMI and describes how the company has often sacrificed public health, democratic political processes, and the environment to the profit motive.

The evidence speaks for itself.

 

CONTAMINATED

POLITICS

 

o As of December 1990, the company, its subsidiaries. or employees have been sued or indicted for antitrust violations in at least six states, investigated in at least ten, and convicted in three. Greenpeace estimates that the company, its subsidiaries, and employees have paid at least $28 minion in penalties and settlements arising from civil and criminal antitrust lawsuits.

 

o WMI employees have been charged with bribery, price-fixing, and fraud by the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Justice, Securities and Exchange Commission, and state enforcement agencies.

 

o The company's antitrust history extends back to 1962, when, a Wisconsin suit linked the Chairman of WMI, Dean Buntrock (then with another company), and others to alleged physical threats to competing waste haulers. The suit was dropped years later, after an ''injunction'' against such practices had stood for eight years; by this time Dean Buntrock and other defendants had combined their companies under WMI's banner.

 

o WMI officials met privately with EPA chief William Reilly at a breakfast in March of 1989 where company officials lobbied the EPA chief in an attempt to roll back strict environmental legislation initiated by the state of North Carolina. A judge ultimately rebuked Reilly's subsequent attempt to undercut the North Carolina standards. The scandal was never fully investigated by the Justice Department or by Congress.

 

o A private suit, filed by Cumberland Farms and other plaintiffs in 1988, alleged that WMI and Browning Ferris Industries (BFI) have been involved in a cartel, a nationwide conspiracy to reduce competition and fix prices; the suit was settled in 1990 with WMI paying the plaintiffs $19.5 million. (743)

 

o Some mainstream environmental organizations have mistaken WMI's support for new waste disposal regulations with corporate and environmental progressivism, when in fact those regulations encourage continued expansion of the commercial waste disposal industry rather than focus attention on waste reduction. Some, like the National Wildlife Federation and the National Audubon Society, even have WMI executives

 

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on their boards of directors. WMI's corporate ''grants'' to environmental and conservation groups totaled at least $892,000 between 1987 and 1989 and $869,500 in 1990. (See Appendix A.) Such grants have immediately improved the company's public image and helped to disarm opponents.

 

o The greatest opposition to new WMI facilities comes from qrassroots organizations formed in communities where WMI and its subsidiaries operate or are attempting to open new facilities (see Appendix J for a list of some of these groups). In order to overcome local opposition, WMI uses every tactic available from its public relations experts: contributions to local civic groups, commercials in major media outlets, distribution of videos, etc. One particularly striking example of the lengths to which the company will go to outwit its opponents occurred in North Carolina where it was revealed that Chem-Nuclear paid $21,000 in state money to Epley Associates, Inc. for a 1989 political report, portions of which gauged potential opposition from politicians, media, and environmentalists in counties being considered for a ''low-level'' nuclear waste dump.

 

o WMI's corporate Political Action Committee (PAC), the WMI Employees' Better Government Fund, was the seventh largest corporate PAC in the U.S. as of June 30, 1988, and the largest of all PACs in the Chicago area as of 1990. Between 1987 and 1988 WMI's PAC contributed $430,994 to congressional candidates. (410) This amount does not include honoraria or PAC money given by individual employees, by their relatives, or by PACS formed by WMI subsidiaries.

 

o The location of major WMI/CWM waste disposal facilities exhibits a

clear pattern of environmental racism: host communities to major CWM

dumps such as Kettleman City, California; Emelle, Alabama; and the

Southeast Side of Chicago are comprised predominately of people of

color. WMI has also attempted to site solid waste dumps in Native

American communities such as the Moronga Indian reservation in Banning, California; the Borona reservation in San Diego, California; and a

reservation in Gila River, Arizona. In Kettleman City, the California Rural legal Assistance Center filed two lawsuits in behalf of a citizens organization, People for Clean Air and Water (PCAW), against CWM and the state of California. The suits allege civil rights violations and violation of due process in the attempted sitting of an incinerator in Kettleman City.

 

CONTAMINATED ENVIRONMENT

 

O WMI set the record for environmentally related penalties and settlements in the last decade, with over $45 million paid during the period 1980-1990.

 

o WMI employs three of the most environmentally destructive methods of waste disposal permitted today: incineration, deep well injection, and landfilling. At least 45 WMI sites have been found to be out of compliance with federal or state environmental regulations. At least 10 sites have contaminated groundwater nearby. (714)

 

o As of December 31, 1989, WMI was listed as a Potentially responsible Party at 96 sites on the Superfund National Priority List, the official list of sites requiring cleanup of serious chemical contamination. Al

 

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though this makes WMI potentially responsible for 12 percent of the sites on the U.S. EPA Superfund list, the agency maintains a cozy relationship with the company, allowing it to obtain cleanup contracts for hazardous waste sites, some (at least 4) of which the company itself contaminated in the first place. (134)

 

o WMI has operated for years without meaningful liability insurance to

cover the risk for damages from its hazardous waste sites.

 

o Although WMI promotes itself as the nation's leading recycler in glitzy public relations campaigns, in 1989 it recycled waste from less than 20 percent of the over 7 million American households from which it hauled garbage. Featured in the company's television and magazine advertisements, WMI's solid waste recycling operations have improved the company's image. Yet WMI's recycling division is run as a break-even operation that chiefly serves to deflect community opposition to the expansion of WMI dumps. The company's recycling services do little to reduce the volume or toxicity of household garbage. In states such as Arkansas, WMI lobbyists have worked to kil1 recycled legislation.

 

o CWM's hazardous waste reduction consulting division employs end- of-pipe ''solutions'' that take advantage of keyholes in waste reporting and disposal requirements. Instead of actually reducing waste, the result in many instances is a shift to different disposal methods; according to one analyst, CWM's waste reduction services ''tend on balance to result in more waste for CWM facilities.'' (755)

 

o WMI paid one of the highest class action civil suit settlements ($30 million) ever related to hazardous waste disposal violations at its Vickery, Ohio, deep well injection facility in 1990. The settlement included a "gag

clause'' that effectively forced plaintiffs and their property heirs to forfeit their freedom of speech in exchange for a modest proportion of the settlement. From the same facility WMI deliberately sold ''reclaimed'' oil (used oil collected and treated for reuse) contaminated with highly toxic PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) to unsuspecting customer in 1983.

 

o WMI is diversifying rapidly into other operations like asbestos removal (through its subsidiary, Brand Companies) and Superfund site remediation, operations whose profitability takes advantage of the historic failure of industry to initiate the use of safe materials and clean technologies. WMI's strategies of diversification includes going into such industries as lawn pesticides, a business whose existence is premised entirely on unnecessary and harmful chemical use.

 

page 13

 

Waste Disposal Methods Employed By WMI and Their Environmental Track Record

CHEMICAL WASTE MANAGEMENT'S OCEAN HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATION DIVISION

Chemical Waste Management (CWM) has not conducted ocean incineration operations in U.S. water since 1982, largely because of public opposition to inherent environmental hazards. CWM's incinerator ship, the Vulcanus II currently burns toxic waste in places such as the North Sea. Incineration of chlorinated wastes at sea is expected to end in 1994. (623)

The success of CWM's ocean incineration program is based on a lack of

significant environmental emissions controls. Although the operations of the Vulcanus I and Vulcanus II may be controlled by "highly sophisticated computer systems," as CWM claims, these systems are, at best, accident detection systems, not pollution prevention systems. Typically, environmental controls used in an. incinerator include scrubbers, electrostatic precipitately, or other devices that reduce pollutant emissions. No such controls exist on the Vulcanus I or II smokestacks. Nor would such controls halt emissions of toxic metals or products of incomplete combustion. CWM finds ocean incineration attractive because the cost of incinerating chlorinated chemical wastes aboard ships is about $100 per ton, whereas the cost of incineration at a conventional land-based facility ranges from $200 to $450 per ton. (623)

page 14

The following is a chronology of CWM's ocean incineration program,

which was managed by CWM subsidiary, Ocean Combustion Services.

1980

CWM purchases the Dutch arm, Ocean Combustion Services (OCS). OCS

operates the incinerator ship Vulcanus.

March 23, 1981

Colorado-based CWM attorney James Sanderson begins employment as

Special Assistant to his friend, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Administrator Anne Gorsuch. (48)

June 1981

Authorities in the Netherlands withdraw certificate of approval from

CWM's incinerator ship, M/T Vu/Vulcanus, accuse of leaking cargo tanks.

OCS, a wholly owned CWM subsidiary, later reports that, era route to a

Spanish shipyard for repairs, the ship's crew cleaned the tanks at sea. Al

though OCS maintains that the tank was-washings were merely pumped into

a non-leaking tank, OCS officials refused to inform authorities and in-

instructed their crew not to mention the Vulcanus/whereabouts when the

washings occurred. (108)

July 10, 1981

CWM applies to U.S. EPA for permits to conduct commercial burning of

hazardous wastes at sea. (599)

July 25, 1981

Sanderson temporarily quits EPA position.

September 1981

According to CWM official Frank Krohn, he contacts Sanderson ''around

September'' to check the status of CWM's application to EPA to burn toxic

chemicals aboard Cc's M/T Vulcanus/ . Sanderson bills CWM for four

or Eve hours of service ill connection with this request. Although no

longer employed by EPA, Sanderson's action may have occurred before

the six-week conflict-of-interest limitations period expired. An EPA inves-

tigation later clears Sanderson of any charges. (48)

September 1981

Sanderson rejoins EPA as Special Assistant to Gorsuch.

October 23, 1981

EPA issues permit for series of ''research' burns aboard the Vulcanus/ 7.

These permits would allow the lucrative incineration of millions of gallons

of PCB-laced waste oil in the Gulf of Mexico.

It is later learned that CWM lobbyist Scott Clarkson helped formulate

the research permit. (13) One EPA official has said, ''CWM wrote the per-

mit. There was no research protocol.'' (96)

December 22, 1981 - January 2, 1982

CWM burns nearly 700,000 gallons of PCB-laden waste oil in the Gulf of

the /Vulcanus also burns 40,000 gallons of dioxin-contaminated leachate

from Hooker Chemical's Hyde Park bands in upstate New York. (10, 70

The EPA later reports that ''incinerator monitoring equipment became

so dogged with chemical residues no useful data was produced'' from the

test burns. (13)

Under the original research burn permit, Cc's incineration of dioxin

would have been illegal. However, the phrase ''and other organic com-

ponents'' was added to the list of chemical substances permitted in the re-

search burn. despite a full internal investigation, the EPA's Inspector

pale 15

General is unable to determine why or when the change was made, or

who made it. (10)

According to Hugh Kaufman, Assistant to the Director of the Federal

EPA'S Hazardous Site Control Division, CWM earned approximately a $3

million profit from this ''research'' burn. (48)

The arm hired by EPA to monitor this burn, TRW, Inc., also performed

consulting work on bean incineration for CWM. 442) The second firm

monitoring the trial burn, TNO Amsterdam, was hired by CWM. EPA

personnel served only as shipriders. (71)

The EPA investigation found that TNO had informed CWM on Novem-

ber 13, 1981, that the wastes ultimately burned on Vulcanus/ contained

levels of dibenzofurans that exceeded recommended safety levels by five

times. (168)

May 20, 1982

EPA calls for second series of test burns in the Gulf of Medico. Problems

with stack gas sapling by 'TNO and TRW are cited. EPA officials, not

CWM contractors, are to monitor the second trial burns. (71)

June 24, 1982

Sanderson quits EPA position amid an investigation of his role in influence-

an EPA decision affecting the Denver Water Board (see lows,

Colorado, Hazardous Waste Landfall Chronology). He had ken m line for

the number three position at EPA. (63, 96) The Wall Street Journal later

reports that senior White House officials had urged Gorsuch to fire

Sanderson for unethical conduct and potentially criminal conflict-of-inter-

est violations. (984

August 5, 1982

EPA engineer Donald Oberacker reports that CWM denies an EPA re-

quest to investigate unexplained vibrations aboard the Vulcanus during

the first ocean incineration trial. (85)

August 15 - 31, 1982

The Vulcanus incinerates an additional 300,000 gallons liquid PCB-

laden waste in the second series of Ell-sponsored trial burns in the Gulf

of Mexico, earning CWM approximately $3 million. (48)

1983

EPA allows CWM to sign a contract to send some of the waste from a Superfund-

site (Seymour, Indiana) to the Vulcanus/ , even though the l%b

coypus has no permit for waste disposal. one of the original parties

responsible for dumping at the Seymour site (Waste Resources of Ten.-

nessee) is a subsidiary of WMI. (502)

January 12, 1982

An EPA branch chief meets with a CWM vice president and denies

Cgs request to speed. the review process for a permanent operating per-

mit for the CWM incinerator ship A/cpus. (63)

January 20, 1983

According to the Washington Post, Sanderson meets with Gorsuch =4.

Frederic Eidsness, EPA Assistant Administrator for Water, to ''persuade

the agency to speed approval'' of a permanent Vulcanus permit. 696)

Soon after the meeting, biasness recommends olefin; consideration of

such a permit, reversing his stabs recommendation for a more thorough

evaluation. Through a spokesperson, Gorsuch later claims she ''could not

remember'' whether she 'instructed Eidsness to issue a permit as a result

of her meeting with Sanderson. (13, 63, 96)

page 16

March 1983

EPA decides to allow CWM to build two 800,000-gallon PCB storage

tanks in a loo-year floodplain in Port of Chickasaw, Alabama, despite

EPA regulations that specifically prohibit sitting hazardous waste treat-

ment facilities in flHtains. The tanks would store waste destined for

CWM's ocean incineration vessels. The Alabama Attorney General later

fees suit against the EPA, charging that CWM ''had cut a deal with EPA''

to ignore the regulations. The case is later dismissed by a judge who

rules that the agency used its ''regulatory discretion'' in making the

decision. (10, 67)

March 1983

The Mobile Press reports that WMI enlisted dp. Do èstenkowski (o-

IL) and several other politicians the previous spring in what Maritime Ad-

ministration officials described as an ''absolutely unprecedented'' effort to

kill a $55.8 million loan guarantee to a rival ocean incineration company.

The rival company was attempting to constrict two hazardous waste in-

cinerator ships. The Maritime Administration ( ) was swamped

with letters from Astenkowski, Rep. Henry Hyde (R4L), and con-

gressmen from South Carolina and Alabama after it awarded the guaran-

tee to the Apollo Cc., an ciliate of a firm called At-sea Incineration, Inc.

At At-sea's urging, hp. Harold Volkmer (D-MO) had the General Ac-

counting Once investigate the legality and soundness of the guarantee.

''Wu do 35 to 45 (10= guarantees) a yea' a source says.

''Noddy ever investigates them.v.ï was highly annoyed. It was dirty pal.

Obviously, it was a political ploy, basically to prevent competition'' (663)

May 9, 1983

The California legislature ales a joint resolution asking President Reagan

to encourage the U.S. EPA to stop considering burn proposals off the

California coast until further studies are conducted. Similar opposition

grows in Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana. (596)

October 21, 1983

EPA announces tentative permission for CWM to burn 79.7 million gab

loos of mixed liquid organic chemicals and 264,000 gallons of the banned

insecticide DDT in the Gulf of Mexico. The burns would occur on bard

the Vulcanus/ and Cgs recently built Vulcanus J/ over a three-year

peril. (13)

Critics charge that EPA rushed through permits without following

proper procedures and without assuring needed safeguards. For example,

the tentative permits were issued without performing a standard cancer

risk assessment for the ship's crew or Gulf Coast residents. (254

November 1983

More than 6,000 people attend at a hearing in Brownsville, Texas; the

vast majority oppose the burning proposed for a site 195 miles to the east.

(599)

Director of Water Resources Steven Schatzow and other senior EPA offi-

cials recommend rejection of long-term incineration permits in response

to Cc's application to bum approximately 80 million goons of PCBs

and other wastes at sea. Nevertheless, EPA officials recommend granting

federal permits for smaller-scale test burns air a few months. Mr.

Schatzow adds that the two additional test burn permits allowing CWM

to burn 3.3 million gallons of toxic wastes, including 2.5 million gallons of

April 24, 1984

Page 17

PCB-contaminated wastes already stored at the CWM Emelle landfill

(where they can't be legally buried), should be issued to further study the

effects of ocean incineration.

EPA officials say! the research permits should be granted only after the

agency issues detailed regulations on ocean incineration and after the

state of Alabama determines whether shipping chemical wastes through

the Port of Mobile is consistent with the state's Coastal Management

Plan. The New ForA Times rearms that ''critics and supporters of ocean.

burning both characterized the recommendations as an effort to postpone

a sensitive issue until air the November election.'' (597, 599)

May 23, 1984

The long-term ocean inspiration permit is denied amid extensive

protests by many Gulfcoast citizens, including Texas Governor Mark

White, who summed up major criticisms of the proposal as 1) EPA'S

failure to develop formal guidelines before issuing permits, making it dif-

ficult to measure, and therefore to challenge, abuses of the environment',

2) in the absence of tests on particulate emissions from the incinerator

stacks, the EPA simply assumed they would not present any hazard; 3)

EPA mischaracterized the ocean burn site as economically unproductive,

ignoring the fact that ash such as tuna, pompano, and bullish reproduce

thered 4) the plan for containing a spill-allowing the wastes to sink to the

ocean floor-is ''unacceptable and irresponsible.'' (13)

EPA decides to delay issuance of any ocean incineration permits until

new regulations are promulgated and a research strategy has been

developed. EPA Director of Water Resources Steven Schatzow, the hear-

ing omcer who recommended additional test burns, is overruled and trans-

ferred. (558, 598)

November 1984

EPA considers a proposal that would allow it to issue emergency per-

mits authorizing shipboard incineration of toxic wastes without telling

the public in advance. Critics see this as a way for EPA to bypass public

concerns and allow CWM to incinerate a growing stockpile of PCBS ac-

cumulating at its Emelle, Alabama, facility. (53)

January 1985

EPA promulgates new ocean incineration rules along with a research

strategy. At the urging of EPA personnel, (1WML applies for a research

permit. (558)

December 1985

Tentative approval is granted for Cc's research ocean incineration per-

mits. (558) The Wall/! Street Journal reports that CWM has conducted

nine test burns to date in the Gulf of Mexico and two others in the south-

west Pacify of leftover supplies of Agent Orange, a dioxin-contaminated,

chemical-biological warfare agent. (6714

January - March 1986

At a series of public hearings, thousands of U.S. Atlantic Coast residents

oppose Cc's plans to burn tonics aboard the Vulcanus ZZ of the New

Jersey coast. (714)

February 1986

Montgomery County, Alabama, District Attorney Jimmy Evans leads a

grand jury investigation of CWM attorney Sanderson's role in alteration

of the 1981-82 Vulcanus/ permit. (48) A grand jury later subpoenas

page 18

former EPA chief Gorsnch and former EPA o<cial Rita Lavelle. (103)

The investigation is later dropped.

May 1986

EPA rejects Cc's application to burn toxic chemicals births mid-Allan-

tic Coast, citing public opposition and unanswered environmental ques-

tions as reasons.

December 5, 1986

Frustrated by permitting delays, WMI files suit against the 'PA in U.S.

district court. WMI requests that the court order EPA to either consider

OCS's permit application in accordance with present Marine Protection,

Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) regulations or promulgate anal

URSA rules within 30 days of the court order. The court deles cl's

request, ruling that although EPA changed its procedures when it decided

to defer processing of ocean incineration permits and although this may

cause WMI some acuity, 'nothing in the record suggests that the defer-

ral itself will jeopardize plaintiffs ability to obtain ocean incineration per-

mits in. the future.'' (558)

1987

Public opposition blocks the construction of a CWM mrt storage facility in

North Shields, England. This facility would have served CWM ocean in-

cineration. operations in the North Sea.

CWM subsidiary OCS discusses the plan to burn toxic waste in the

South Panic with New Zealand government officials in 1987. (230)

June 1987

Nordic countries, including Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and

Iceland, Atriuce a resolution in the international governmental bot,

the Oslo Commission, that would phase out ocean incineration operations

Page 19

in the North Sea by 1991.

December 31, 1987 CWM announces that it is withdrawing plans to burn toxic waste in coas-

tal U.S. maters, citing less costly land-based incineration options and

lengthy delays in obtaining permits. (285)

February 1, 1988 EPA announces that it is cutting its bean incineration program from the

agency's 1988 budget, effectively shelving plans to allow experimental in-

emeration of toxic waste at sea. (286)

Early 1988

During a Greehpeace demonstration in the North Sea, a trawling line

snags in the Vulcanus' propeller, stopping a burn.. CWM threatens to sue

Greenpeace for the incident. (531)

The Greenback fat attempting to stop the Vucanus from incinerat-

ing toxic waste in the North Sea is forced to turn back after its raidar are

knocked out by a CWM water hose. (637)

February 6, 1989

Austria bans incineration at sea. (714)

August 1989

The Netherlands bans incineration at sea. (714)

October 3, 1989

Belgium closes the Port of Antwerp to foreign waste for incineration at

sea. (7149

October 6, 1989

The Barcelona Convention passes a resolution prohibiting ocean incinera-

tion in the Mediterranean and adjacent wagers. 6714)

page 20

November 1$ 1989 The Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) Federal Environment Agency

concludes that 7,800 metric tons of waste intended for incineration at sea

is contaminated with dioxin and that another 6,500 tons is expected to be

contaminated since it originated from the same source. The waste in

question is solvent waste from debasing and dry cleaning. (714)

November 22, 1989 In Lloyds Lists, OCS announces its intention to sell Vulcanus 1 and 2 be-

cause of a shrinking market for ocean incineration in Europe. (714)

November 24, 1989 The FRG announces plans to end ocean incineration in 1991 and to imme-

diately reduce the amount routinely burned from nearly 66,000 metric

tons per year to 25,000 tons in 1989 and 10,000 tons in 1990. (714)

December 1989 The Federal Republic of Germany and Norway end incineration at sea.

(714)

January 31, 1990 Due to plans by the North Sea states to cut waste incinerated at sea,

Spain announces a five- to sixfold increase in its contributions to the burn

ships. (714)

March 8, 1990 At the third North Sea Ministers' Conference, the North Sea states and

Switzerland agree to terminate incineration at sea by the close of 1991,

three years earlier than originally agreed at the second North Sea

Ministers' Conference. (7144

March 1990 Under international pressure and as per the London Dumping Conven-

tion (LDO, Spain retracts its decision to continue burning until the end of

1994 and agrees to end ocean incineration of-rations at the close of 1991.

(7144

June 1990 The Netherlands submits a resolution by the Oslo Commission calling for

closure of the North Sea burn zone b! December 31, 1991, in accordance

with agreements to terminate ocean incineration by the same date. (714)

..BURN AS MUCH

AS POSSIBLE''

CWM's Land-based

Hazardous Waste

Incinerators

''The company best-positioned to benefit from incineration, demand

upticks and able to weather a volatile marketplace is CWM, given its

breadth of treatment and processing as well as disposal capabilities''

Kidder, Peabody Equity Research Industry Comment, August 15, 1989.

Hazardous waste incinerators release toxic chemicals into the environ-

ment via stack emissions of pollutant vapors and particles, fugitive (un-

planned) emissions of unburned wastes, and discharge or disposal of

combustion residues. The U.S. EPA has noted that as much as one per-

cent of the waste mass entering an incinerator may be released incom-

pletely combusted. (685) Man! of the pollutants that hazardous waste

incinerators emit, such as dioxids and flans, are products of incomplete

combustion (PICs) and are often more dangerous than the original waste

At least 62 PiCs have been identified in incinerator stack gases (686), and

a significantly larger number is known to be present but has not been

pace 21

identified (685). Technologies to prevent formation and release of these

chemicals during incineration have not been developed.

The ash leftover from a bum is also extremely toxic. Hazardous waste

incinerators produce ash quantities ranging from 9 to 26 percent of the

volume of the original waste, depending on the waste type. (687) At least

45 different PICs - including dioxins and furans - have been identified in

incinerator ash. (688) leachate from ash residues, such as heavy metals

(cadmium, lead, mercury, chromium, and nickel) disposed of in landfills

poses a threat to groundwater and/or surface water.

Unknown threats from incinerators further undermine Cc's claims

about the safety of incineration technology. Only a fraction of the chemi-

cals known to be emitted from incinerators have been positively iden-

tified,. (691j Toxicity data on most of the known chemicals are lacking.

(691) Mechanisms of pollutant transit and fate have not been ado- ,

quavery identified (685), and available risk assessments have failed to ac-

count for all of the variables involved. (692) Despite the unknowns, EPA

is allowing companies such as CWM to experiment with their incinerators

on workers, local communities, and the environment.

Because hazardous waste incinerators are considered to be important

contributors of dioxids, brans, and heavy meals to local ai global en-

vironments, Greenpeace endorses a moratorium on new incinerator

facilities and a phase-out of existing incinerators. 4689, 690)

Insofar as CWM is concerned, its track record with toxic waste in-

cineration, at sea and land, Ls riddled with enough questions to cause

peacemakers to prohibit the firm from building any new burners.

page 22

Chicago, Illinois: CWM Hazardous Waste Incinerator

CWM has owned an incinerator in Chicago, IL, since A984 when WMI ac-

quired SCA Chemical Services, Inc. It is one of the largest commercial

hazardous waste incinerators in operation in the U.S. The facility burns

approximately 35,000 tons of toxic waste annually, including commercial

hazardous waste, PCBS, and waste from federal facility cleanup opera-

tions. (181, 309, 349)

The incinerator discharges its scrubber water into the metropolitan

Chicago sewer system. 4144) The company violated its sewer discharge

permit repeatedly from 1989 to 1990. (674)

CWM was snaked $3,750,000 in1990 by the U.S. EPA, the highest

penalty of its kmd ever levied by the EPA in the Midwest, for a variety of

operational violations that occurred while burning PCBS.

Currently, CWM is applying for a new resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B lo-year operating permit for the Chicago in-

cinerator. Illinois EPA issued a denial of the facility's Part B permit am

placation in September 1989. (349) The company is appealing the decision

to the Illinois Pollution Control Board. (350)

The following is a chronology of problems at the SCA Chicago In-

cinerator.

1979

The incinerator, operated by Hyon, Inc., is cited by the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration ' (OSHA) for violations of respiratory

protection and sanitation requirements. (1444

1980

An EPA inspection finds insurgent empty space in surface impound-

ments near the incinerator. EPA cites the faulty with violating RCRA

regulations for these and other inadequacies. (144)

1981

SCA Chemical Services purchases the facility and completely rebuilds it.

SCA calls its southeast Chicago location ideal because At is surrounded by

a ''buyer zone'' of garbage dumps and heavy industry. Others note that

the buyer zone contains a residential neighborhood one-half mile from the

SCA smoke stacks. The incinerator also operates upwind of an elemen-

tary school. (208, 753)

1982

SCA conducts test burns for an incinerator permit. Tests of kiln ash show

levels of PCBS ranging from 16 pads or melton to 7,600 parts per mil-

lion. (144) According to federal law, levels of PCBS must be below 50

parts per million before being sandalled. SCA rebus En ash that does

not reach permitted ''safe' levels.

January 1983

The SCA incinerator begins burning hazardous waste under an interim

EPA permit. (214)

1983

On two separate occasions, drums fed into the incinerator ''nash,'' creat-

ing explosions of flames that reach beyond the En dors. (144)

1984

Three Illinois EPA (KPA) inspections End insufficient freeboard (vertical

distance between the lowest elevation of a dike or berm and elevation of

the highest surface of the waste contained in the impoundment) in sur-

face impoundments on facility grounds. (144)

page 23

January 1984

Air lines freeze and fans fail, causing the facility s emergency stack to

remix open for 20 minutes, possibly releasing partially combusted

wastes. (144)

Summer 1984

WMI acquires most of SCA Chimical Services, thereby allowing CWM to

gain control of the Chicago incinerator.

November 1985

The U.S. EPA charges that constipated materials at an abandoned site

in Hillsboro, Ohio, may have been generated by SCA through operations

involving its Chicago incinerator. CWM later negotiates a cleanup con.-

sent order with the U.S. EPA. (414)

December 1985

The state of Illinois charges CWM with reckless conduct, including failure

to provide workers with necessary information for working with PCBS

and failure to properly store and disuse of PCBS. The charge is later dis-

missed. (414)

November 12, 1986 EPA tests show ''normal'' PCB levels around 'rs Chicago hazardous

waste incinerator. One local toxicologist, however, disputes the Ending,

minting to technical problems in the EPA sampling program. (109 Pre-

wously, the Wall Street Journal reported that at an elementary school 1.4

mites downwind of the incinerator, PCBS were found at a peak level 16

times higher than at another school two mikes upwind. (76)

May 9, 1987 Greenpeace members investigating the CWM/SCA incinerator observe

several bursts of black smoke from stack, possibly containing high

volumes of Pics including dioxin and uncontested PCBS.

August 17, 1987

EPA proposes a $22,800 fine against CWM for operations at its

CWM/SCA Chicago incinerator. The agency cites CWM with refusing to

implement a comprehensive program to monitor groundwater surround-

ing the four waste pends on site. According to EPA, ''samples from

monitoring welds indicated that the ponds could be affecting ground water

quality.'' (303)

EPA bars the CWM incinerator from obtaining further federal con-

tracts until it complies with monitoring regulations. (304)

March 4, 1988

CWM discloses that a carbon monoxide monitoring device at its Chicago

incinerator had been bypassed at least four times since 1986. CWM ad-

mits that the monitor, which measures the destruction efficiency of the in-

cinerator, was deliberately shut off by CWM employees. CWM ires the

facility's general manager and its operations manager. (309) (see also:

May 1989, entrap

CWM also discloses that PCB wastes were fed into the incinerator at

rates 30 percent higher than the facility s permit allows. (309)

March 7, 1988

EPA says that revelations about the deliberate shutdown of the facility's

monitoring devices will affect a anal environmental operating permit now

under consideration. (305)

April 21, 1988

The director of the EPA, Richard Carlson, reportedly calls for temporary

closure of the incinerator. Carlson asks the llinois Attorney General to

page 24

file suit against CWM. Carlson seeks to shut down the plant until

modifications can be made to ensure that its monitoring devices cannot

be disconnected. Carlson threatens to shut the facility down permanently

if violations reoccur.

Carlson says, '''the shutdown is a harsh remedy but is appropriate in

this instance...., dealing with a hazardous waste and a PCB incinerator,

there is no room for error and deânitely no room for production demands

to outweigh safety concerns for neighboring citizens.'' Despite Carlson's

recommendations, the incinerator was not shut down. (309)

June 5, 1988

In a settlement with the Illinois Attorney General, WMI is forced to pay

$300,000 for full-time oversight of the CWM/SCA incinerator. An addi-

tional $53,000 in penalties are levied for the violations disclosed earlier in

1988. WMI +11 have to pay $300,000 every year for eve years into a state

hazardous waste trust fund, which pays for monitoring the facility. (332,

3514

July 1988

CWM is penalized $18,240 for groundwater contamination and monitor-

ing problems. (352)

January, 11, 1989

The CWM facility is cited for 27 violations of an Illinois court order under

which it Ls o,ratmg, prompting State Representative Clem Balanofto

call for the closing of the CWM incinerator in his district. Violations in-

clude bad record keeping and several instances where hourly monitoring

forms were filled out m advance. The violations lead CWM, EPA, and

State Attorney General Neil Harridan to negotiate an amendment to the

June 1988 consent decree and a penalty of up to $270,000. (354)

May 1989

EPA proposes $4.47 million in Enes for the facility, one of the largest flues

of its E4. ever levied in the Midwest, for six violations. The fine includes

$2.25 million for failure to use water not acidic enough to scrub emissions

from the smokestack when PCBS were burned; $1.17 million for improper

record keeping; $525,000 for burning PCBS when scrubbers were not

operating; $250,000 for failure to monitor emissions; $250,000 for failure

to halt PCB waste feed when stack monitors failed. (351) Curiously, the

EPA Once of Criminal Investigations never interviews five ex-employees

turned whistleblowers, one of whom said the EPA ''missed the fact that

breaking regulations was more the routine than the exceptiom'' (349, 660)

That employee, Jack Tursman, 34, a shim supervisor at the plant until

late 1987, dims there were other violations that were never made public.

He alleges that in 1987 he was ordered to clean up a spill of 200 to 300 gab

loos of pcb-contaminated sludge, an amount that should have been

reported. Tarsman says his boss, Operations Manager Iliad Alkhatib, or-

dered him Q) fill out a bops form that put the! spill adjust one gallon, the

threshold for required notification. Failure to report major PCB spills can

carry a jail %1. (660)

''Alkhatib didn't know what the reportable quantity wasp'' another

former member of the incinerator's professional sufflates tells a Chicago

magazine reporter: ''But the first thing out of his mouth was, it's not

remrtable...matantliesa..My opinion is that Ray Alkhatib was good for

rgeneral manager Donald J Brady's bottom line'' (660) Tursman and

page 25

others allege Alkhatib ordered monitors turned off so burning could con-

tinue even at reduced eminency. Although federal fines are parading

against the company for eight alleged incidents, Tursman claims he did it

on the midnight shim alee 12 times: ''l've seen that thing turned off for

days on end.'' Tursman also alleges he exceeded the maximum incinera-

tion rate for PCB-contaminated solids by as much as 60 percent. 'my's

favorite phrase was 'bum as much as possible,' regardless that there was

a permit limit.'' (660)

'man claims he contacted David Blomirg, a member of his church

and former assistant to '1 chairman Dean Buntrock, after he filled out

the %- spill report. Tursman says that in snbscxqnent meetings Blom-

berg assured him an investigation was under way and that the allega-

tions were correct. Tursman later decided that the internal investigation

would not result in any chances. He informed Blomberg that he would go

public with the alleged violations. CWM shortly thereafter announced

the violations to (EPA and U.S. EPA, in eject limiting the scope of an ex-

ternal investigation. Alkhatib is transferred to another facility and later

fared, along with Brady. (660)

June 1989

IEPA announces a preliminary intent to approve CR's new operating

permit in exchange for a $j.75 million settlement to pay for increased

monitoring over a Eve-year period. The nasty relates to earlier charges

m

that CWM violated the 1988 settlement with the state (see January 11,

1989, entry above) . The proposal includes stricter control of hydrogen

chloride and toxic metals emissions, stronger storage regulations, faster

investigation of groundwater contamination, and the listing of the Illinois

international Port District, which leases the site to CWM, as a potentially

responsible party for future cleanups. 'EPA also announces its intent to

monitor the facility by remote computerized access and video cameras.

6352)

August 5, 1989

Abut 200 citizens from People for Community àcovery, Citizens United

to eclair the Environment, and other Southeast Side Chicago groups

are joined by members of Greenpeace to protest continued operations at

the facility. (532)

September 29, 1989 The IEPA issues a denial of CWM Part B permit application because it

contains 96 tendencies, including major safety issues, such as the serious

risk ofleakirkg drums, an inadequate waste sampling program, and in-

Skration of toxins into the sewers. 4349) CWM III resubmit the anal

Pt B application. In the meantime, they continue operating.

April 17, 1990 IEPA issues a denial of Cc's application to construct a storage con-

tainer area and modify its Part A permit because of obvious deficiencies

in the application. (64$ This demo comes alter CWM officials told EPA

representatives that they would submit a revised Part B application in

good faith. 'PA officials told CWM officials they would not look at the

revised PM B application until current problems with the company were

corrected. The Part A modification, supposedly intended to address the

correct problems, failed to address Crucial) issues like the company's in-

adequate waste analysis plan.

page 26

Greenware and Southeast Side Chicago residents call on EPA direc-

tor Bernard KAF and State Attorney General Neb Hadigan to immedi-

ately issue a cease and desist order to the company, given that it is

currently in violation of environmental regulations and apparently in-

tends to make no good faith effort to remedy the situation. (643)

May 24, 1990

The Metropolitan Water lacrimation District of Greater Chicago reveals

that CWM has repeatedly violated its water discharge permit at the

facility between 1989 and 1990. Noncompliance citations are repetitive

for extent concentrations of metals such as mercury, lead, copper, and

zinc as well as PCBs. (641, 674)

September 1990

EPA and CWM agree to a $3.75 million penalty for the SCA incinerator in

chat EPA calls the ''largest administrative penalty ever imposed on a

shale facility in U.S. EPA hists'' (741) The penalty is reduced from the

original $4.47 million fine (see May 1989 entry). According to SQ'AQ rep-

resentative Clem Balance, the consent decree that resulted in the $3.75

million (ne also included an admission by CWM that they were guilty of

two of the violations with which they were charged. (754) In addition, the

state of Illinois settles 34 charges of allusion N.d record-keeping viola-

tions in a $2.1 million settlement with CWM, including $1.75 million for a

facility monitoring program.

*1 III never be satisfied until this toxic incinerator is shut down

forever,'' says Illinois State Rep. Balancer.

A Chicago Sun-Times reporter says, ''since at least 1986, cancer-cans-

in! PCBS have ken found m run off from the Edrum) storage area when it

rains or when crews clean up a spill, according to Metropolitan Water

Animation District records. The PCBS end up in waste water dis-

öharged into sewers from the incinerator, the district says....PCBs end up

in the district's sewage sludge, which is spread on farmland in Fulton

Count ILL and open gelds m the Chicago area, rising concerns that the

poison is entering the food chain or seeping into groundwater.'' (753)

An EPA spokeperson tells the reporter, the regulatory agency would

''rather try to make the incinerator safer than shut it down.'' (753)

By not forcing CWM to admit guilt as it is paying penalties, both the

state and federal environmental agencies have traditionally allowed the

incinerator to continue operating without losing its lease from the local In-

ternational Port Authority. (741) However, this situation may have

changed, since CWM reputedly admitted two violations when it paid the

$3.75 million fine descried above. (754)

February 1991

An explosion at the SCA incinerator blows a door off the machine and

starts a ''small fire' releasing an unknown quantity of hazardous waste

into the outside air. (747) According to local newspaper accounts, a ''thick

plume of chemicals'' (also descried as ''a cloud of dark smoke'') blows out

of the incinerator for ''as long as two minutes.'' (740 State Representative

Clem Balanofrsays, ''This place is just an accident waiting to happen.

There is going to be a major accident there some day, and it should be

shut dowm'' (748)

In a letter to WMI, the EPA says it has ''serious concerns'' about con-

page 27

tinned operation of the SCA incinerator: ''The waste analysis plan for the

Chicago Incinerator (the SCA incinerators is inadequate. Such inade-

quacy appears to have been a direct factor in the occurrence of the precept

explosion.J'' (745)

Even more importantly, EPA says that on ''several occasions'' EPA of-

ficials investigated the explosion were ''refused information'' about what

chemicals were being bused at the time of the explosion and where those

chemicals came from. Furthermore, the 'EPA charges that WMI had

made an ''inaccurate statement'' when WMI said they had reported the ex-

plosion to the Illinois Attorney General's once.

A letter from U.S. EPA is even more blunt, saying, ''If is apparent that

the lab-pack in question contained a chemical about which the incinerator

operator had limited information. It is also apparent that the operator

proceeded to feed that chemical into the kiln before adequately determine-

mg its properties or suitability for incineration,'' resulting in the ex-

plosion (7444

Sauget, Illinois, Hazardous Waste Incinerator

CWM acquired the Trade Waste Incineration facility in Sauget, Illinois,

in 1983. Currently, the company has permits for three fixed-hearth in-

cinerators and one rotary HI,n incinerator. The facility discharges its ef-

fluent into the Sauget American Bottoms sewage treatment' plant.

1983 - 1987

CWM is cited twice for emitting pollutants in excess of permitted levels.

(279)

March 14, 1989

CWM is in the process of constructing a fourth hazardous waste in-

page 28

January 1990

A plume of organic acid vapers, including octanoyl chloride, blows off site when chemicals mixed in a 5,000-gallon holding tank react violently. The release continues for hours. When mixed with water or moisture, octanoyl chloride forms hydrochloric acid, an eye, nose, and skin irritant. (473)

February 16, 1990

WMI agrees to pay a $250,000 penalty to the state and make a payment of $30,000 to the state's hazardous waste fund for environmental viola-

page 29

cions. The charges include:

- operating the unit J incinerator without the stack gas hydrocarbon

monitor between January 21 and 24, 1989;

- exceeding waste chlorine content limitations for unit 1 on August 16

and 17, 1989;

- operation failure of the automatic waste feed cutoff unit 2 on

April 17, 1989;

- operating at improper waste feed rates for unit 2 on six days in 1988.

The state EPA is moving to install computers to monitor the facility. The

state intends to issue new operating permits that would extend to August

1, 1992. (533)

Port Arthur, Texas, Hazardous Waste Incinerator

CWM dedicated a new lsojoo-tonrper-year incinerator at this facility in

January of 1990. The plant III eventually be three times bigger than

Cc's other existing incinerator facilities, and the rotary Hn in-

cinerator is the nation's largest. The Port Arthur facility's landfill is leak-

ing contaminants into underlying groundwater, and CWM has been

levied enormous environmental penalties for inadequate groundwater

monitoring. (326, 548, 552)

Emelle, Alabama, Proposed Hazardous Waste Incinerator

In 1986, CWM applied for a permit to build one of the world's largest haz-

ardous waste incinerators in smells, Alabama. The incinerator would be

built next to the largest toxic waste dump in the U.S.

State and federal officials were expected to decide on the permit before

July 1987, but because hundreds of residents in this poor, rural area mobi-

lized against it, the decision was delayed. CWM is currently reconsider-

ing whether to apply for a RCRA Part B operating permit to construct

and operate a hazardous waste incinerator at Emelle.

Arlington, Oregon, Proposed Incinerator

In 1984, its subsidiary, Chem-Security, applied to burn J.2 million gab

loos of PCBs per year at their proposed hazardous waste incinerator in Ar-

lington, Oregon. 'rs Arlington land-landfill had lien penalized for

hundreds of environmental law violations. (Sea Arlington landfill section).

In early 1985, local residents overwhelmingly opposed its plan to

construct a hazardous waste incinerator at active permit application hear-

ings in the state. WMI has since put its plan to burn hazardous waste at

Arlington on hold. (149, 196)

page 30

Kettleman City, California, Proposed Hazardous Waste Incinerator

February 1989

People for Clean Air and Water, a local group of Kettleman City residents, leads hundreds of people by motorcade to the site, where a rally is held to oppose the Kettleman incinerator. (467)

April 1989

The 1977 Clean Air Act amendments allow an industry to shut down and sell its ''historical right to pollute'' to another company in the form of ''emission cre-ts.'' To pave the way for their proposed incinerator, CWM buys an ''historical right to pollute'' from Ultimar Limited, which recently closed its Beacon Oil refinery. (466)

1990

The California Rural Legal Assistance Center files two lawsuits on behalf of People for Clean Air and Water against CWM and the state of California. The suits allege civil rights violations and violation of due process in the siting of an incinerator in Kettleman City. Luke Cole, an at-

page 31

torney with CRLAC, says the fact that each of the three existing and two

proposed WMI hazardous waste incinerators are in a neighborhood company-

posed largely of people of color shows a clear pattern of targeting minority

communities.

Taylor County, Georgia, Proposed Hazardous Waste Incinerator

Strong local opposition has stalled a decision by the state to site a hazard-

ous waste incinerator facility in this southern Georgia county. The state

Hazardous Waste Management Authority committee recommended P.E.

LaMoreaux & Assuages of Tuscalusa, Alabama, to advise the state

whether the Taylor land would be a safe site. Opponents of the facility

have pointed out Lmoreaux's ties to the Environmental Institute for

Waste Studies at the University of Alabama, which was established with

money from <1, a potential bidder for Georgia's $52 million facility.

(461) Through 1989 the Institute for Waste Management Studies

received over 51 percent of its budget from <1 ($1,505,000). (Sue ''Dona-

tions' section) (698)

September 8, 1990

Abut 200 people, some of whom walked abut 100 males to a rally at the

state Capitol, protest a plan advocated by Gov. Joe Frank Harris to put

the state incinerator in Taylor County.

Porter, New York (Model City)

CWM is developing plans to build two rotary En hazardous waste in-

cinerators at its Model City facility, which already has 10 toxic waste

dumps on site. (315) (Sea Model City Landfill section for more details).

East Liverpool, Ohio

1987

WMI buys a site and a permit for an incinerator in Fast Liverpool, Ohio,

from Waste Technologies, Inc. <1) in early 1987. (236) Ohio Attorney

General Anthony Celebrezze joins the appeal of Save Our County, a 10c!

environmental group, against the transfer of ownership of the incinerator

to WMI, which would burn approximately 230,000 tons of toxic waste a

year at the facility. (235) According to Celebrezze, ''the decision (allowing

transfer of ownership of the incinerator! in this case did not follow Ohio

law governing the transfer of ownership of a hazardous waste facility.

The decision also denied local citizens the right to comment on the trans-

fer.' (236)

The new director of the Ohio state EPA, Allan Franks, rules in the

summer of 1988 that CWM cannot build the incinerator in East Liverpool

without submitting a new permit application, which would require public

hearts. (313)

age 32

April 1989

Hundreds of citizens march along the bands of the Ohio River to the proposed incinerator site, affixing signs to the fence around the site as testament to their opposition.

June 8, 1989

After intense community opposition, CWM withdraws its proposal to purchase WtTI and its incinerator permit. (359) Nevertheless, the WTI proposal continues, with CWM playing several key roles. (1) CWM is the principal supplier of waste to the facility. (2) Ash from the facility would be sent to CWM's Model City dump in Niagara County, NY. (3) Von Roll, whose design is being used to build the enumerator, has licensed its tech- technology to Wheelabrator, a subsidiary of WMI. (4) Rust engineering, the company contructing the WTI facility, is a WMI subsidiary.

Calvert City, Kentucky

page 33

duly 28, 1989

CWM President Jerry Dempsey admits to a reporter that CWM has an in-

terest in purchasing LWD. (393) CWM already has loaned LWD $6 mil-

lion. (394).

1988-89

States are required by federal law to submit Capacity Assurance Plans

(CAPs) to the U.S. EPA by October 17, 1989. Cps outline how states

will manage hazardous wastes generated within their boundaries in the

next 20 years. To meet projected capacity needs, states are allowed to

form interstate agreements. States failing to submit Cps risk losing Su-

erfund cleanup money. in order to meet the deadline for submittal of

Cts, many states are choosing to site new dispose) facilities rather than

establish comprehensive waste reduction programs. (683)

CWM is represented in EPA legion W roundtable discussions on the

region's CAP interstate agreement. Environmental groups such as the

Georgia Conservancy, which has received <1 funding, are also repre-

sented, but the discussions exclude other environmental groups. The

regional interstate agreement calls for Kentucky to grant a permit to the

LWD facility under its current owner or another operator, presumably

CWM. (392) (he Kentucky state official complains that, by c-coordinating

the interstate agreement in such a fashion, the U.S. EPA is forcing the

state to grant a permit to the 1.WD incinerator or lose its Superfund

cleanup monies. (682)

The state environmental cabinet, the agency responsible for deciding

on La's permit, is in conflict-of-interest by entering into the regional in-

terstate agreement with other EPA Region IV states. The agreement,

which assumes LWD will receive its Part B commercial operating permit,

is made before the state has made a fine decision on the permit itself.

The interstate agreement all but guarantees Cc's profit m acquiring

LWD The a cement also allows LWD and facilities An other states to

' g5

continue sending incinerator ash and other hazardous wastes to the

CWM landfall in smells, Alabama. LWD sends its ash to Emelle. (392)

November 1989

Kentucky Natural Resources Secretary Carl Bradley fires the Director of

the state's Division of WMI, Don Harker. Among the reasons for Harker's

cuing, state activists cite industry pressures on the cabinet to overturn

his recommendation that the state deny LWD a RCRA Plan B permit, a

move that could have shut down the incinerator, thrown a wrench in the

state's role in an interstate regional hazardous waste capacity assurance

agreement and made the sale to CWM more ('cult. (395) After the

fag, Kentucky, La's owned, and CWM begin negotiating the CWM

purchase of LWD. Discussions revolve around cleanup of the site. 6584)

Memphis, Tennessee

CWM has applied to build and operate a hazardous waste incinerator in

Memphis, a city with the largest inlier of uncontrolled toxic waste sites

in the nation 1173 sites). The population of Memphis is 43.3 percent black

and according to the United Church of Christ's Commission on Racial Jus-

tice, this is related to the numir of waste sites in Memphis. The report,

Toxic W&sre <H Apce, concludes that the location of commercial hazard-

page 34

North Carolina

CWM intends to bid for a contract to build an incinerator and landfill in North Carolina, according to Southeast Regional Manager Thomas Noel. A social session of the state legislature authorized it in December 1989 so it would be off Alabama's blacklist of states barred from sending wastes to the Emelle landfall because they do not have waste facilities. 4552)