Section 3 of the Cray Book

Return to Section 1

WMI's Solid Waste Dumps

Bakersfield, CA

Kirby Canyon, CA

Ft. Myers, FL

Hillsborough County, FL

Jacksonville, FL

Medley, FL

Pompano Beach, FL

Antioch, IL

East New Orleans, LA

Monroe,LA

Walker, LA

Other Problems With WMI Landfills in Louisiana

Canton, My

Bordentown, NJ

Parklands Landfill, NJ

Frankfort, NY

Northwood, OH

Spencerville, OH

Bucks County, PA

Pottstown, PA

Paris,WI

 

WMI Landfills in Canada

 

A Chronology of Problems At other WMI Landfalls

 

Solid Waste Incinerators

 

Wheelabrator: WMI’s Front Company

Recycle America: WMI's Recycling Operations

Medical Waste Incinerators

WMI's SOLID WASTE DUMPS

"Even the best liner and leachate collection systems will ultimately

fail due go natural deterioration, and recent improvements in MSWLF

(Municipal Solid Waste Landfill) containment technologies suggest that

releases may be delayed by many decades at some landfills.''

.U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

''Solid Waste Disposal Criteria''

Federal Register, August 30, 1988"

 

Burial of municipal wastes in land-ls lases is/cant risks to public

health and the environment. The EPA itself has wanted. that ''municipal

solid wasteland-ls have degraded and continue to degrade the environ-

Management'' (626) Contamination at over 200 municipal landfills has been

severe enough to warrant their inclusion on EPA'S National Priorities

List (NPL)....-the official list of Superfund sites requiring cleanup. ''To be

listed on the NPL,'' EPA explains, ''a site must present or be capable of

presenting significant environmental and/or human health impacts....''

(626) WMI has owned or operated a large number of landfills that are

now listed or proposed for lasting on the NPL.

As of December 30, 1989, WMI was listed as a potentially responsible

party for cleanup of 96 Superfund sites. (Sue Appendix E for a partial list

of Superfund sites where WMI has been a responsible party.)

Man! of cl's ''state-of-the-art'' land-landfill designs employ a double

layer, high-density polyethylene (HDPE) liner with leachate collection

pipes between the layers. In 1990 WMI purchased a minority interest in

National Smeal, a p 'rivately held Randall liner manufacturer. (670)

According to the Phillips Petroleum Company, a leading maker of

HDPE, a number of chemicals present in household garbage can degrade

and weaken polyethylene landfill liners. These chemicals are found in

common substances such as cider, lard, margarine, vinegar, vanilla ex-

tract, detergents, hair shampoos, hand creams, lighter fluid, nail polish,

shaving lotion, shoe polish, soap, wax, carbon hexachloride, chloroben-

zene, chloroform, cyclohexanol, iodine, toluene, and various alcohols and

oils. (628)

Liners made of clay also leak because organic chemicals permeate clay

and chemicals, seismological events, and weather conditions cause clay to

shrink and/or swell. (632)

In reviewing studies of 58 landfills, researchers at Texas AKM Univer-

sity have documented toxic and cancer-causing chemicals in the leachate

from both municipal and hazardous waste landfills. The study concluded

that the concentrations are such that the leachate from municipal

landfalls may cause health risks equal to those from industrial waste

landfills. (629)

In the short run, migration of land-landfill leachate and its chemical con-

taminants into groundwater can be reduced by a network of collection

pipes built into the land-ll. The pipes, which are perforated, collect

leachate for removal to a treatment system. Scientists studying the long-

term behavior of landfills have concluded that collection and treatment of

leachate from municipal waste landfills must be continued ''for at least

several centuries...in order to avoid a harmful environmental impact''

 

page 80

 

 

 

 

(630) It is clear that WMI and other operators cannot guarantee the

viability of a leachate collection system for that long. In this context, it is

worth remembering that the U.S. government is only 214 years old. Few

corporations have a history that extends 100 years.

Leachate collection systems can be dogged with mud, silt, refuse

debris, mineral accumulation, and mats of microorganisms. Collection

pipes are also weakened or destroyed by chemicals present in the refuse

and by the pressure of millions of tons of garbage. (631) The leachate it-

self requires treatment, which can shift contaminants out of the leachate

5.n% air, sludge, and water. Most municipal publicly owned treatment

works (POTWS or sewage plants) are wholly inappropriate for the at-

tempted detoxification of wastes containing the metals and synthetic or-

ganic chemicals found in landfall effluent.

Problems with landfalls increase when the closure caps (intended to

keep rainfall out) degrade or crack. Water erosion (from rainfall) can

erode the cap or sides of a landfall. L=JXII operators have suggested that

if it's true that alllandâlls will eventually leak, then the solution is to

maintain them in perpetuity. Obviously this is not a solution because

humans have no experience maintaining anything in perpetuity. Many

communities cannot even remember where their land-landfill was located 30

years ago.

Since they are legally accountable for a land-ll's post-closure main-

tenance for only a few years (usually a maximum of 30 Hearst, landfill

operator do not have to tie as concerned as the tax-paying public. WMI

and other companies claim that their landfalls are ''state-of-the-art''

facilities, built to exceed regulatory requirements. Unfortunately, this

doesn't mean cl's landfills won't leak; rather it means the regulatory

requirements aren't very stringent. It also means that, given the certain-

ty that all lanais will leak, the time when leaks will be detected is mere-

1! delayed, own to a time when the company +11 no longer be legally

liable for cleanup.

Stricter landfill regulations drive up the cost of landfills, in effect inten-

sifying the pressure for large, privately owned landfills run by giant com-

panies such as ti. While new regulations in the short ran may protect

a community from some environmental harm from the landfill, the com-

munity gives up control of what goes in, including receivables and waste

from outside the political region (town, county, or state. The incentive to

make landslide last b! intensifying recycling and waste reduction is lost

when a community gives up control of the landau. Communities do not

give up their potential liability for environmental damage from landfills

when the dumps are run by companies such as WMI; they can be sued

later for damages resulting from the wastes they contributed. Com-

munities should beware of leasing land to WMI and other companies for

use as landfills-the short-term gains III very likely be outweighed by

long-term cleanup costs and adverse health impacts. It is usually public

officials who view overs by companies such as WMI as a favorable means

to solving their short-term solid waste planning headaches. Citizens and

commumty leaders quickly realize that their elected officials think in

terms of re-election timetables rather than in terms of future economic

 

 

page 81

 

 

and environmental interests of the community. This is one reason why in-

creased public participation equals decreased pollution and corruption.

Other potential problems with landfills include the impacts of truck

and rail track; public nuisances such as stray litter; air emissions of toxic

hydrocarbons and other toxic chemicals such as asbestos and fiberglass,

all of which pose a potential health threat; adverse impacts on property

values; and loss of community control over solid waste planning with the

consequent corruption of the local democratic processes.

Given the certain failure of landfills and the health threats to nearby

communities, the ultimate answer to the land-landfill problem is to reduce the

quantity and toxicity of garbage generated and to recycle, compost, reuse,

and reduce waste as much as possible. But recycling xs hampered by the

construction of landaus, which compete for public funding commitments

and reduce incentives to use alternatives.

Control of a landfill is the key to business success in the solid waste

business. A company that owns a landfall can exclude competitors from

using it, thus requiring competitors to drive longer distances to other

landfills (forcing up the competitors' fuel costs). Or they can restrict ac-

cess; for example, they can provide one narrow road into a landfill for com-

petitors, where truck problems cause ccedil; serious delays, and another road

into the landau for their own trucks, avoiding delays.

A company that owns the local landfall has a stranglehold on local dis-

posal capacity and can charge inflated prices to customers, both

households and businesses. A handful is an oil well in reverse; the key to

monopolization in the industry is how much disposal capacity a company

controls. (see Antitrust section for examples.)

The value of WMI's l28-plus landfills was continually increasing because

of shrinking landfill space, the difficulty of siting new facilities, and the

failure of public officials to underwrite recycling, composting, and

material recovery facilities. Because of difficulty in sating new dumps,

WMI continues to explore alternative means to acquiring more disposal

facilities such as trying to expand existing landfills, privation municipal

dumps, and purchase landfills from other developed and operators short-

ly after the second party receives its of-rating permit

Financial pressures created by new regulations also help WMI and

other industry giants acquire small companies and privation regional

municipal solid waste collection services; ordinarily, this does not trans-

late into greater recycling and reduction programs or into economic

benefi-ts for local communities.

Because of its track record, cl's arrival in a town is often met with

citizen opposition. To counter this problem, ars landfill-siting strategy

in some instances has been to mask its identity by creating a subsidiary

comps! with no obvious ties to WMI. If the company unmasks itself m

attempting to site the facility it usually will offer a host-benefit agree

mend, a form of legalized bribery. Another strategy has been to try to gain

local control by reaching an agreement with an existing 1!! operator

who develops a new landfill and then hands it over to WMI for a fee. Old

land-ls are often relatively cheap because they are leaking or otherwise

in trouble and nobody else wants the associated liabilities. With its

 

page .82

 

 

economic power, WMI can promise environmental officials it will clean up

the mess often gets authority to reopen or keep a landfall open. The offi-

cials have little choice. If they! refuse, the subsidiary can (ne for

bankruptcy and the responsibility for cleanup would then fall upon the

public. After WMI acquires such a facility, it can use its significant legal

manpower to forestall enforcement of a cleanup. WMI's acquisition of leak-

ing landfalls from other private operators begs another question: if they

knew of the problem, why did they reward the former operator b! paying

for the dump unless they wanted to disguise their own contribution to the

mess? If the! were unaware of the problem when they bought the dump,

can the public believe they acted responsibly by not thoroughly investigat-

ing the sate? Can the company 1- trusted when it says other dumps won't

leak in the future? In either case, the result is often a delay in environ-

mental cleanup and escalated enforcement costs, while the only maple

who seem to benefit are lawyers.

When it comes to privatizing municipal garbage disposal services,

some orchis worry (as they should) that there m)1 be no way to control

prices on a long-term basis and control what gas into landfills. Local offi-

cials also have little or no say over who dumps waste once a landfill is

turned over to private operators.

Public officials sometimes fail to realize the key defenses between

publicly controlled landfalls and those in private hands. Public landfills

can be treated like capital, a rarity to be safeguarded and preserved.

Private landfalls, on the other hand, are only profable when they are

being felled as rapidly as passible every ton of trash coming through the

gate represents an increment of profit. Public control is the key to extend-

ing the life of a landfill.

Public control of landfalls is also the secret to control of out-cf-state

dumping. The interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution has

been interpreted in the courts to prevent a state from interfering with the

burial of out-of-state wastes in a local, privately held dump. But in the

case of a public dump, the issue disappears. In both cases, the owner of

the dump has complete control; the deference is that a private owner

wants out-of-state waste because it is as profitable as wasps from

anywhere else. On the other hand, public owners of a dump don't want

out-of-state waste because it depletes precious land-landfill capacity and brings

leal people closer to the day when they will have to expand their dump or

open a new one.

Public owners of a dump have absolute control over what comes

through the gate. They can, for example, forbid the burial of any

mate 'nals that could be combusted or recycled. They can also forbid the

burial of mixed wastes, requiring that all wastes be separated before they

are allowed to come through the gate. Such controls can go a long way

toward discouraging the dumping of valuable resources.

Municipal politicians considering prevarication are omen unaware of

how profitable garbage disposal really is. As John Calvert of the

Canadian Union of Public Employees explains, ''the reason that private

garbage conglomerates are so intent upon owning landfall is that these

disposal facilities are the key to capturing the principal source of revenue

 

page 83

 

 

in the waste stream: landfall tipping fees.'' Calvert calculates that be-

cause of the escalation in disposal fees during the past two decades the

costs of acquiring the land, obtaining permits, endearing, and operation

(including post-closure care) is but a fraction of the entire revenues

received from tipping fees. For instance, in 1989, Metro Toronto's total

landfall operating cost, including interest to pay for the original purchase

price, amounted to only 16 percent of the per ton disposal fee. (728) With

this motive in mind, WMI continues to invest in the kind of public rela-

tions campaigns and back room lobbying efforts that pay offal local offi-

cials allow expansions of old dumps and siting of new ones. As of early

1990, WMI was planning to expand more than 40 of its 128 landfills in

North America and open 60 new ones. (660)

People living near WMI landfills can also expect incinerator proposals

from Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., cl's strategic partner m con-

structing so-called 'waste-to-energy' facilities, better known as in-

cinerators. Some recent court decisions and legislation that reclassify

incinerator ash as non-hazardous allow it to be buried in regular solid

waste landfills or ash ''monofills.'' (486) This type of ''linguistic detoxifica-

tion'' does nothing to reduce the toxicity of incinerator ash; it merely sub-

sidizes the incinerator industry by making ash cheaper to landill. Ash

represents abut 30 percent by weight of the solid waste going into an in-

cinerator and it is more toxic than the original solid waste. Proponents of

legislation to reclassify ash as ''special waste'' have attempted to slip such

provisions into pieces of national legislation, such as the Clean Air Act in

1990 (where the e'ort failed). Attempts to reclassify incinerator ash also

leads to bizarre schemes for ash 'reutilization'' such as combining the ash

with cement for disposal in the ocean in the form of artificial reefs (as the

Wheelabrator incinerator in Pencillas County, Florida, is attempting to do)

or use as road-bed fill.

WMI currently operates at least 128 different solid waste landfills in

North America alone. It is not possible to list all the violations at each

WMI landfill so we have excerpted some to provide an idea of the

varieties of mismanagement that have occurred (442, 557). For further in-

formation, contact leal groups living near WMI landfalls (see partial list-

ing of these groups in Appendix J) or see the compliance mistunes filed

with states such as Pennsylvania and Indiana and other sources. (414)

 

Bakersfield, California

Chemical Waste Management buried chemicals for almost a year in this

dump before officials noticed that the dump had no wells to detect water

pollution. It takes the state nearly two years to get CWM to put in Wells

and run tests. (265)

April 1984

Goldwater tests show contamination. CWM blames the former owner of

the landfall. (265)

May 1985

CWM closes the Bakersfield dump air the county government rejects an

expansion permit request. (265)

page 84

June 1985

Runoff from the site continues to flow into a stream that feeds a

groundwater recharge zone and provides water for agriculture. (339) In-

spections reveal groundwater degradation from the facility' s south-

western area. (33$ CWM representative Paul Abernathy acknowledges

that its wastes commingled with the previous operators wastes in un-

lined ponds. 4341)

Kirby Canyon, California

The bitterly opposed Kirby Canyon land-landfill in Santa Clara County,

California, was leaking diclxloroethane, trichloroethane, and Freon 12. ''If

was predicted, and it happened/' says Bruce 'lkhinin, local attorney and

landfall opponent. The 'state of the art'' land-landfill was not supposed to leak,

and officials could not explain how the toxic chemicals had gotten 100 feet

past the earthen dam intended to stop leachate. Steven Ritchie, Execu-

tive Director of the state lagoon Water Quality Control Board, said ''If

appears as though leachate is leaking from the landfall into the

groundwater.' Pat Ferraro, a member of the Santa Clara Valley Water

District board of directors, said, ''If was the craziest thing in the world to

build near our largest reservoir and between two groundwater basins.

There Is no such thing as a landfall that doesn't leak.'' The leak threatens

the Santa Clara Valley Water District recharge area. (362, 363, 620)

1989

The potential listing of the Bay Checkerspot butterfly as an endangered

species threatens to block Mrs Kirby Canyon landfill expansion plans.

WMI invites a local biologist to the site. later, the ADA Journal reports

that WMI has ken debiting $50,000 annually in the Kirby Canyon

Habitat Test Fund. 'As a result, WMI of California has not only ken

able to proceed with its landfill operations in Kirby Canyon, but has

received considerable favorable publicity as an ecology-minded company

as we1l,'' including an Environmental Preservation Award from Stanford

University's Center for Conservation Biology ''for exceptional contribution

to biological diversity.'' (508)

WMI expansion covers 15 percent of the butterfly's habitat, despite

the prediction by Stanford scientists that ''the remaining San Mateo Bay

Checkerspot buttefly population has a doubtful prognosis for long-term

survival.'' The landfill also occupies the habitats of the imperiled red-

legged frog and the Mount Hampton thistle. WMI claims it has adopted a

corporate policy of ''no net loss'' of biological diversity. The Bay Check-

ersmt butterfly has 'come the local subsidiary's mascot. (508)

WMI also flew prominent citizens from Portland, Oregon, to San Jose

to showcase the Kirby Canyon landfall and win a $360 million, zn-year

Portland transfer station contract. (443)

In the winter 1988 issue of Wilderness magazine, WMI ran an adver-

tisement claiming ''we Profit By Protecting The Environment'' referring

to the Kirby Canyon landfill. By the time the advertisement ran, leaks

from the ''state-of-the-ad'' land-landfill had begun to contaminate groundwater

at the site, with waste escaping past the retaining wall that was supposed

to trap the leachate. The California Regional Water Quality Board

page 85

Fort Myers, Florida

1986

Cadmium is detected at levels five times over regulatory limits in groundwater beneath the WMI Gulf Coast Sanitary Landfill in Ft. Myers, Florida. (265)

1987

A study by WMI confirms possible contamination of groundwater beneath the landfill. l(265)

Hillsborough County, Florida

May 1988

WMI illegally disposes infectious waste in the Northwest Disposal landfill. (638)

1990

The Tampa Tribunereports that the law firm that recommended against Hillsborough County suing WMI, the designer and builder of Hillsborough Heights landfill, was representing WMI at the same time. County commissioners, who voted not to sue WMI in June of 1989, reportedly never were shown a memorandum by independent consultants hired by the county that gave strong evidence linking WMI and the landfill to contaminants found in nearly wells. David Dee, a lawyer for Carlton Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, was representing a WMI affiliate in Broward County in 2986 when Hillsborough County commissioners hired him to take their case. Jake Varn, now a partner in Carlton & Fields, was the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) secretary who approved the Hillsborough Heights landfill permit in 1980.

Dee said the county knew he was representing WMI when they hired him and that his original contract stipulated that he would represent the county before various state and federal agencies, but that he would take no part in litigation against WMI. A county commissioner who made the original motion to hire Dee said the county was not aware that it eventually might have to sue WMI when it hired Dee. (550)

Jacksonville, Florida

page 86

by WMI or the dumping. WMI later accepts responsibility for the

dumping and pays $530,000 to buy out and relocate six families. (439, 525)

1987

One hundred and forty-one Hipps bad neighbors file a $436 million law-

suit against WMI and other haulers for physical, financial, and emotional

damages. 4439)

1990

The dump remains closed.

Medley, Florida

1980

WMI buys the Medley garbage landfill. (265)

February 1981

WMX is cited for illegally dumping trash into a lake on the property. (265)

1984

Tests indicate the migration of pollutants into the groundwater. (265)

1987

A Florida state report claims that the Medley dump threatens the

community's water supply. WMI says the dump ''has a minor impact on

the environment.'' (265)

Pompano Beach, Florida

Pompano Beach is host to one of Mrs oldest landfalls. Groundwater

tests have detected pollution from the Broward County dump since 1981.

Tests taken in January 1986 detected pollutants 113 feet below the

landfall. The garbage dump remains open. (266)

1974

The Pompano Beach landfill is cited for operating a water pollution

source without a proper permit and for dumping rubbish improperly. (266)

1975

WMI is cited for improperly discharging polluted water into a canal.

WMI officials till a state insider that leaking Es of chemicals were

a ''common occurrence'' at the Pompano Beach site. (275)

1980

Inspectors are startled to discover bags of infectious hospital waste at the

landfall. The waste is supposed to be burned or sterilized before being

sent to a 1=+1. Alleging that WMI dumped the bags illegally, the state

ones %1 $2.2 million for improperly handling infectious hospital waste.

The annually is reduced to $423 two years later. (275)

1987

The state of Florida penalizes WMI $4,000 for numerous violations at

Pompano Beach, including improper handling of hic chemicals. (275)

1990

The Pompano Beach landfall remains open.

page 87

Antioch, Illinois

Antioch Village officials complain that WMI has refused to let the village test liquid samples from the bottom of its landfall. The village has success- fully blocked attempts by the company to expand the landfill. ''They make millions of dollars a year, and we're left with a bleeding sore,'' Ken- neth Clark, a pastime village attorney says. ''A local government can stop them bit's willing to pay a quarter of a million dollars.'' Witnesses, including a member of the local police department, come forward at one hearing to testify that they have seen trucks carrying 55-gallon drums enter aud leave the site in the middle of the night when the dump was unposed to be closed. (678)

February 1990

WMI's 52-acre landfill is declared a priority site by the EPA for cleanup under the Superfund program. EPA tests have found zinc, lead, and cad- mium in monitoring Wells near the dump. Wells as close as 600 feet from the dump supply people in Antioch with drinking water. (547)

East New Orleans, Louisiana

Monroe, Louisiana

Walker, Louisiana

Other Problems At WMI Landfills In Louisiana

WMI or its subsidiaries have been charged with violating numerous

regulations in the state, including discharging contaminated wastewater

from a track wash, having inadequate training and contingency plans,

beginning construction activities for a proposed expansion without prior

approval (Kelven landfall in Avondale and Woodside land-landfill in Walker),

inadequate soil covering, allowing contaminated water to Mofrinto a

buyer zone, and inadequate maintenance of rollofcurbs. (414)

Canton, Michigan

March 1983

Michigan Waste Systems, enc. (MSWO, a WMI subsidiary, closes its Wad-

land Meadows landfill under a consent judgment and order. (414)

July 1984

EPA charges MWSA with groundwater monitoring violations. (414) MWSI

failed to obtain samples from downgrading groundwater monitoring

wells after MWSI notified EPA that the landfill ''may be affecting

groundwater quality'' (713)

June 1987

EPA ands unapproved waste piles resulting from the installation of a gas

recovery system. MWSI agrees to pay a $27,000 civil annually. 6414)

Bordentown, New Jersey

WMI has been charged on numerous occasions with environmental viola-

tions at this site. According to the Philadelphia Zmgufrer, two workers

were killed at the landfill when the ls-foot-deep trench they were work-

ing in collapsed during construction. An OSHA area director said that

precautions OSHA had required for construction to continue after an in-

spection had not been taken, such as the use of lumber to reinforce the

s.des of the trench. (551)

Parklands Landfill, New Jersey

1985

A WMI subsidiary agrees to install an air conditioning unit at a local high

school in a $150,000 settlement over problems with odors. (414)

1988

A further settlement of $23,800 is reached for violations of odor regula-

tions. (414)

Frankfort, New York

May 1985

WMI's subsidiary SCA, owner of the Mohawk Valley landfill, pays a

$6,000 penalty for unpermitted discharging of leachate into a stream and

page 89

expanding without a liner. (414)

December 1985

WMI pays a $1,500 civil penalty for accepting unauthorized waste. (414)

1988 The state charges WMI/SCA with groundwater contamination. (414)

Northwood, Ohio

1983

Ohio Waste Systems, Inc. (0WS), a subsidiary ofMl, pays $3,000 for failure to adequately implement a groundwater monitored program and other violations. (414)

January 1988

OWS pays $6,000 for violating manifest regulations and failure to provide an adequate groundwater assessment plan. (414)

Spencerville, Ohio

Bucks County, Pennsylvania

WMI hopes to dump up to 2.9 million tons of garbage and ash each year in the expandedlaxdfm. Currently, nth landfalls take trash from Philadelphia. Hundreds of thousands of tons of incinerator ash from Philadelphia has been dumped in Bucks county. <1 also approached of- ficials in New Jersey about disposing their sewer sludge at GROWS. (3614 WMI would also like to build a Wheelabrator incinerator on the new property, which it expects to operate by January 1993. (289, 646)

page 90

1981- 1988

GROWS, Inc. is charged on several occasions with unlawful discharge of

liquid waste, including leachate, to a nearby stream. Other charges m-

dude violations of air quality regulations, failure to control dust from

truck traec, failure to control erosion, and improper manifests for hazard-

ous waste hauling. (414)

August 1989

To Philadelphia Inquirer reveals that cl's local payroll includes

several relatives of Falls and Tullytown offcials charged with overseeing

trash operations at the company s two landfalls. The payroll includes rela-

tives of town supervisors who participated in key votes regarding WMI.

(469)

September 1989

Bucks County commissioners ask evertor libers Casey to declare a

moratorium on the permit process for a proposed lsjoo-ton-a-day ash

land-ll. While the county was aware that WMI had an application, they

were never informed that the land-landfill would serve as a regional

depository. '1 think we got snookered,'' says county commissioner Lucille

Trench, who found the discovery particularly disturbing because Frank Be

J. Branigan, who sits on the county's solid waste advisory committee,

never informed the committee or commissioners that he was a WMI con-

sultant. (460) Another committee member, Harry Fawkes, Jr., is the son

of a Republican Party county chairman who sold his trash company to

WMI ('ear' ago. (468)

April 1990

Falls Township orchis approve the landfill plan., despite questions by

one township supervisor abut siting the ash landfall m a wetlands area.

Allegations surface that the Falls Township chairwoman Holly Moyer,

who cast the deciding vote, has two brothers employed by WMI. (646, 469)

October 1990

In Bucks County, ''the writing's on the wal1,'' says Ed Vile, a small hauler

compting with !1 for business. ''You don't have to 1- very smart to

see what's happening. Once the mom and pop haulers are gone, you're

lea with these big companies. And the consumer will get raped with

higher rates.'' (759)

''The fee at waste management's GROWS landfill in Bucks County ex-

emplifies what is happening across the nation' the Philadelphia Inquirer

reads. ''in 1982, the dumping fee at the landing in Falls Township was

$6.30 a ton, according to the Bucks Count! plug commission. Today

it is $59, an increase of 937 percent over eight years''

'''dependents like Gibson am straggling to pay landfill owners. But

large companies such as Waste Management own both hauling companies

and landfalls, so the money changes hands but stays in the corporate fami-

ly.'' (759),

July 1991

The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources denies Mrs

application for a szb acre ash landfill in ('Falls a Township. The application

is denied because the site is located in a 100-year floodplain.

Wye 91

Pottstown, Pennsylvania

Paris, Wisconsin

WMI of Wisconsin acquires a landfill from Kenosha Trucking Co. for $1.4 million. (425)

March 1980

The town of Paris brings a lawsuit against the Wisconsin Department of Natural 'sources (WDNR) to prevent approval of an expansion proposal on the basis of the WDn's failure to properly notify residents. (422)

June 1980

PCBS at a concentration of 36 parts per million are detected in leachate at the site by an engineering consultant hired be the town. (423) Opponents to the expansion also claim the site is located m a wetland area that is home to muskrat, mink, and great blue herons. Surface water from the site runs officio the Des Plaines River. (424, 426)

1983

WMI agrees to pay the Q)R of Paris at least $80,000 annually to operate the landfall, in eject reducing the town's opposition to further expansion on the 500-p1us acre site. (427) Neighed consistently complain that odors aud dust harm their businesses and impact their health. (428)

1990 John Callahan, operator of a nearby body shop, tells a Chicago reporter that the stench in the area around the landfall can be so strong that ''at 6:30 in (hp morning it wakes you up.'' Owners of a nearby bar close their business and (ne suit against <1 for trespassing, nuisance, and negligence. Paris Township collected $220,000 in licensing fees from WMI m 1989. (660)

WMI LANDFILLS IN CANADA

Toronto, Canada

1972

Through royalty arrangements, WMI of Canada acquires Maple Pits page 92

landfill, an abandoned excavation site with the potential for becoming the

largest land-landfill in North America. (439)

1978

The Environmental Assessment Board rejects cl's application to

operate the Maple Pits landfall. The decision is overturned on appeal,

despite the Ministry of the Environment's doubts about site safety. (439)

1981

After the Canadian Union of Public Employees raises concerns about a

private garbage disposal monopoly, the Metropolitan Toronto councilor

vote to purchase the still-empty pats from Mrs subsidiary. (439)

1983

Purchase payments by Toronto to WMI are delayed when contamination

is discovered below the site and further testing reveals that it might be

impossible to seal the quarries. (439)

1990

The pits ultimately become a publicly controlled dump that has saved

Metropolitan Toronto taxpayers hundreds of million of dollars in tipping

fees. àgrettably, however, public bow control policy has yet to become a

sign-cant incentive for waste reduction.

Stouffville, Ontario

1963-1969

An estimated 60 million gallons of unknown liquid industrial wastes are

poured into the StouNlle Dump lagoons. (494)

1972

York Sanitation, a WMI subsidiary, buys the landfall, which has been

licensed to bury millions of tons of solid municipal waste. (494)

1975

The Whitechurch-Stouffville town council passes a bylaw prohibiting

dumping at the Stouffville site. WMI hurdles that obstacle through the

provincial government's hearing process, which overrides the local prohibi-

tion. WMI continues to bs one-third ofmeto Toronto's domestic com-

mercial and industrial solid waste in Stoufville until at least 1982. (494)

1982

WMI subsidiary York Sanitation applies to the Ministry of Environment

for thé right to expand the dump site by 54 acres. A local chemical en-

gineer says, ''the site leaks like a sieve.'' (494)

t982

York Sanitation is found guilty on 53 charges resulting from breaches of

environmental laws and falsifying documents to underestimate the

amount of garbage it was accepting. York is penalized $40,000. (494)

April 30, 1982

Environment Minister Keith Norton, under pressure from local activists,

announces that the dump will be closed within 14 months and that a

WMI expansion request was denied. The company is also ordered to provide

an alternate water supply to 12 homes near the dump. (494)

page 93

A CHRONOLOGY OF PROBLEMS AT OTHER WMI LANDFILLS Return to Table of Contents - Section 3

A South Carolina citizens group reaches an out-of-court settlement with WMI air suing the fem for aleakinglandll in Jasper, South Carolina. (188)

1982 - 1987

WMI is cited 31 times for allusion violations at its Manville, Indiana, landfall, particularly for fabling to prevent landfill constituents from run- ning ofrsxte during rainstorms. (264)

1982 - 1987

WMI is cited 22 times for water pollution violations at its Wheeler, In- diana, land-ll between 1982 and 1987. (264) In January of 1985, the state assessed a $4,250 penalty for failure to conduct proper inspections, release of hazardous waste, failure to comply with emergency require- page 94

1983

mendt of the landfill's contingency plan, and failure to contain runoff.

(414) WMI later purchases houses on a road adjacent to the landfill, in ef-

feet creating a buffer zone around the site. (see 1990 entry below.)

1983

WMI proposes building a new z8o-acre landfall that would partially cover

wetlands on the Southeast Side of Chicago in exchange for building a $2.5

million nature park in the suburbs. The proposal is eventually rejected.

(205)

March 1983

Tests of groundwater below cl's Sunbeam Road garbage landfall in

Jacksonville, Florida, detect contamination. 6264, 265)

1984

WMI of Colorado is cited by the state Department of Health for violating

open burning regulations at its County Line landfall in Littleton,

Colorado. (414)

November 1984

WMI pays $2,400 for unlawful discharge of leachate at its River Road

landfall m northeastern Pennsylvania. (414)

1985

Operators at cl's River bad handful in northeastern Pennsylvania ac-

cept waste dust and palish grinding sludge without authorization. (414)

May 1985

WMI pays a $41,740 forfeiture and a $6,260 civil /penalty for violations at

the Polk, Wisconsin, landfill. (414)

1986

Since 1986, the Lake View, Pennsylvania, WMI landfill has had

numerous problems, including acceptance of unauthorized wastes,

leachate discharge to groundwater, failure to prevent accelerated erosion,

and failure to properly cover. (414)

August 1986

WMI's Louisiana subsidiary, Recovery 1, Inc., is charged with violating en-

vironmental permit regulations for surface water and leachate mis-

management, litter, and other violations at their landfill in New Orleans.

bleater pays a $10.000 penalty. (414)

August 1986

A Regional Air Pollution Control Agency representative observes visible

emissions of asbestos particles in the air around the WMI owned Pinnacle

Road garbage dump in West Carrollton, Ohio. (414)

1988

WMI purchases an unused but permitted lankly site in Wheatland

Township in Illinois. WMJ bought the permit from the developers sen

after a permit was issued for the site. In April, an inspection by the 11-

linois EPA ands uncovered refuse and unconfined litter at the site.

WMI pays a $1,000 penalty. (414) Illinois attorney general Neil Hartigan

supports the Will County state's attorney in arguing that the Wheatland

Township landfall is not suitable for waste disposal. (A creek runs through

the site, and an aquifer used for ' ' g water lies beneath it) (660)

1988

WMI passes closure costs for its New Iberia, Louisiana, landfall to its cus-

tomers in the form of higher dumping charges. The site is being inves-

tigated for passible Superfund site status. (526)

March 1988

The New Hampshire state Department of Environmental Services cites

page 95

WMI of New Hampshire for failure to cover exposed refuse at its Chester landfall. No Ee is levied. (414)

August 1988

Gary, Indiana, city o!cials complain about a lawsuit bled by WMI that forces the city to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars to stop con- taminated water from flowing from its 1=4&1 into the J-pit, a loo-acre former sand mining operation just west of the site where WMI subsidiary Indiana WAG Systems, Inc. wants to operate a landfall. Gary officials claim the lawsuit is intended to create an undue ânancial hardship and force the city to start using the J-pit to dispose of its garbage. The proximity of the WMI landfill to the already-leaking sate would make cl's future potential liability for groundwater contamination difficult to prove. (636) The Gary landfall, which received 5 percent of the Chicago area's total garbage in 1989, or 1.5 million cubic yards annually, is later ordered closed by a Lake County Circuit Court judge. (696)

1990

WMI is planning a large landfall near Florence, Alabama. WMI had con- tracted with a local schul to charge $60 a month for their garbage cleanup, but is now charging $200 a month. The school had to dig into other funds to pay for this. (524)

1990

The WMI Trbcounty landill in South Elgin, Illinois, is listed as a target for Snperfund cleanup. Benzene and cyanide are found in nearby groundwater. (322)

1990

Failure of the Department cf Veterans fairs to approve a home koan for propers! near the WMI Wheeler dump in Indiana could be the first oili- cial action that points to the landfill as an economic detriment to this rural community. sports of well water contamination are delivered to members of the local community. WMI offers to tie local homeowners who rely on groundwater wens into municipal water lines. (729)

SOLID WASTE INCINERATORS

incinerator convert wastes into gases and ash. Between 20 and 40 percent by wei ht of the waste that goes into an incinerator comes oat as highly consummated ash that perpetuates the need for landfills. Because of the high levels of heavy metals and organic chemicals typically found in municipal solid waste incinerator ash, it is a dangerous waste and should legally be classified as hazardous waste but is often reclassified as ''spe- cial waste,'' making it cheaper for incinerator operators to dispose of At in ash morxcfnls rather than commercial hazardous waste landaus. An ash monomial is a dump create only for incinerator ash.

Incinerator gases include heavy metals such as lead, mercury, cad- pagê 96

mium, and chromium. These metals (espeeially mercury, which escapes

conventional pollution control devices) pee a variety of health threats to

people living near the facility and to people eating ash and other foods in

which pollutants accumulate. Incinerator gases also include acid gases

that contribute to acid rain and are respiratory irritants, such as

hydrogen chloride. The stack gases also include highly toxic products of

incomplete combustion (PICs) such as the family of chemicals known as

dioxids and flans, which can be formed as furnace gases col down even

ahr passing through pollution control devices. (607)

As ls the case with landfills, incinerators hinder recycling programs.

Incinerators require highly combustible wastes such as paper, which

should be recycled (or, preferably, its use reduced). Long-term ''put or

pay'' contracts force communities to either burn their trash or nsk law-

suits and huge expenses if they wish to change to recycling.

Incinerators often overburden their host communities financially by

committing them to 20- to (do-year multimillion dollar bond commitments

which, because of cost overruns in construction or ash disposal, can be dif-

ficult to honor. Additional costs. such as contamination of agricultural

products and adverse impacts on property values are rarely, fever, fac-

tored into the cost of building an incinerator.

Even incinerator advocates admit that incineration is not a anal dis-

posal method: the primary waste (garbage) is converted into secondary

wastes (gases and ashes). Additionally, the liquid and solid residues of

pollution control devices require further treatment and fmt disposal.

Reducing and recycling soled waste not only reduces air pollution but

saves in overall energy consumption, mining wastes, water use, and

water pollution.

Incineration and recycling directly compete with each other. 'In-

tegrated waste management'' plans, as promoted by WMI and other, are

really only attempts at limiting the success of recycling/compost

programs. Paper, plastics, and yard waste 70 percent of the waste

stream by weight and 90 percent by ener!y vale: should be recycled or

composted (or, as in the case of plastics, simply not used in the first

place). Little of the remaining waste stream burns well, which means

that successful recycling programs eliminate the need for incinerators.

By renaming garbage incinerators an.? promoting them as ''resource

recovery'' or ''waste-to-energy'' facilities that generate steam and/or

electricity, the industry and its promotes attempt to use energy utility

laws to their own financial benefit and to give the false impression of

greater efficiency with the Orwellian insinuation that materials destruc-

tion is a form of ''resource recovery.''

Wheelabrator: WMI's Front Company

In 1988, WMI acquired 23 percent ownership of Wheelabrator Tech-

oologies, Inc. (Wheelabrator) by merging with Wheelabrator's corporate

predecessor, the Wheelabrator Group, to form the nation's largest

developer and operator of waste-to-energy incinerators. Wheelabrator is

also involved in construction and operation of sewage sludge incinerators

page 97

Wheelabrator has a history of environmental law violations and broken promises of its own. Close analysis of Wheelabrator incinerator operations has been conducted by both Work On Waste USA, Inc. and the Clean Water Action Fund's Research aud Technical Center. (406) In. Clean Water Action's Executive Summary of their read on Wheelabrator they revealed that most of the communities they surveyed that host a Wheelabrator incinerator experienced the following:

- payments or subsidies to the communities were far less than original ly projected by Wheelabrator or city planners; several communities experienced serious revenue losses;

- fees (principally tipping fees) for garbage disposal were far higher than promised;

- contracts with Wheelabrator frequently force the host municipality to absorb very high capital costs not confined in the original con- tract;

- incinerators and ash handfuls owned and/or or-rated by Wheelabrator or associated with these projects have led to numerous environmental problems and public complaints. These include ash disposal, air emissions, and other citizen complaints like truck traf- fic, odors, and trash accumulation.

WMI's contribution to Wheelabrator includes established trash collec- tion contracts and access to landfall sites across the U.S., which it intends to make available for new ''waste-to-energy'' incinerates and for ash dis- msal. (420) WMI has had plans to open as many as 80 waste-to-energy facilities at its laudes. (307) Air the merger, Wheelabrator continued operating a total of nine U.S. ''waste%energf' plants, with more than a dozen additional new plants in various stages of development. cl's par- ticipation ensures a greater push for ''waste-to-energy'' plants. Wheelabrator will absorb 'rs Tampa incinerator and projects develop- ing in Broward County, Florida; Dakota County, Minnesota; aud Falls Township, Pennsylvania. (420)

Broward County, Florida

Return to Table of Contents - Section 3 February 1989

County officials report that the cost of building two garbage incinerators for the county has increased $66 million since <1 first estimated the facility construction costs to a total of $439.9 million. The increased costs cover the need for an interim land-ll and an incinerator retrofit with an acid gas scrubber. The incinerator was turned over by WMI before con- page 98

struction to Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc.

Homeowners are expected to pay collection fees of twice what was

originally estimated in order to foot the bill. ''people are just going to

have to belly up to the bar and pay the price,'' says Harvey Bush, cl's

Environmental Engineering Manager. Another estimate places the cost

at $700 million. Pompano Beach and two other Broward communities

III take no part in the project. The two plants are expected to generate

14,000 tons of toxic ash per year. (281)

In 1987, the WY. Lauderdale Sun-sentinel reported that Robert Kauth,

an Assistant Broward County Administrator, now a WMI lobbyist in

Florida, reportedly knew before he berme a <1 lobbyist that WMI had

overcharged Broward County homeowners an estimated $1,000,000 be-

tweenlg77 =4 1980. (274)

Kauth and other county officials reportedly admitted publicly that they

had known abut the overcharges for at least a year. The money was

never repaid. Kauth left the county in April J98l. He joined Waste

Management that summer to become a vice president in the firm's Pom-

pano Beach once.

Tampa, Florida

WMI points to its Tampa incinerator as la piece de resistance of the gar-

bage incinerator industry. However, since opening in 1986, the garbage

burner has faced problems with air emissions, ash runoff, and financial

disappointment.

According to a Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun.-Sentinel investigation, runoff

from the incinerator's toxic ash was directed into a ditch that flows to a

nearby bay. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulations or-

dered WMI to prevent the ash run off from going into the ditch. (280)

For 17 months, WMI (lid not turn on pollution control equipment when

turning on the furnace, causing the potential emission of large volumes of

air pollutants. (280) Furthermore, the Tampa incinerator was built on

the hope of generating substantial revenue for the city. Electricity sales

generated by the incinerator, however, have raised just half of what was

anticipated. (280) In fact, the incinerator is losing money. According to

Tampa's Internal Audit Department, the trash burner which cost $100

million to build, lost $6 million in J986 and $1.5 million in 1987. (310)

The Paellas County, Florida, Wheelabrator incinerator is planning to

dispose of its highly contaminated ash in the ocean in the form of artifi-

cial reefs once it has the necessary state permits. The incinerator plans

to double its capacity to 6,000 tons per day, which would make it the

largest in the world. (714) The Pinellas County incinerator is permitted

to emit thousands of pounds of mercury annually. (714) The nearby

Florida Everglades are already highly contaminated with mercury-fish

consumption advisories exist for the largemouth bass and other fish. In

1989, one of less than 50 remaining Florida panthers was found dead in

the Everglades with what state officials concluded was mercury poisoning.

Offcials of the town of Pinellas, dissatisfied with the plant, decided to

divert their trash away from the incinerator and initiate a recycling pro-

page 99

gram instead. Unfortunately, the company they went with to start that

recycling program was another WMI subsidiary, 'cycle America. (714)

New York, New York

1991

After reveling a campaign promise to support recycling and institute a

moratorium on incinerator construction, Mayor David Dinkins is moving

the city toward incineration. Dies' deputy mayor, Norman Steisel, is at

the center of the push, which includes plans for a Wheelabrator facility in

the Br-klyn Navy Yard. The incinerators are to be financed with the

help of Lazare Freres, an investment house (and former Steisel employer)

that is working to arrange the adding for the incinerators. A 1985 con-

tract signed by Steisel when he was former Mayor Koch's sanitation com-

missioner guarantees the delivery of 3,000 tons of garbage to the

Brooklyn incinerator. The contract's inflation clause and added costs have

raised the planned incinerators price from $290 million to at least $559

million.. (774)

Bucks County, Pennsylvania

1988

WMI buys 180 acres offend in Falls Township on which it would like to

build a l00-ton-per-day garbage incinerator by 1994. (289)

Epping, New Hampshire

4-1989

Permits are pending for a proposed l,000-ton-per-day waste-to-energy

trash incinerator in Epping, New Hampshire. It is reported that if

Wheelabrator receives its permits, it well control at least 60 percent of the

garbage disposal market in New Hampshire. (407)

Citizens for Responsible Waste Management, a grassroots citizens'

poop based in New Hampshire, requests that the state attorney's office

investigate possible antitrust law violations by WMI and Wheelabrator

Technologies, Inc. (407)

page 100

RECYCLE AMERICA: WMI'S RECYCLING OPERATIONS

Televisions across America have been filled with advertisements market-

ing an image of <1 leading the country's recycling efforts. Yet very lit-

tle waste handled by WMI is ever recycled. In fact, in 1989 WMI only

recycled waste from less than 20 percent of the homes from which they

hauled garbage. While that 'pre ls increasing every year, what remains

to be seen is whether higher recycling rates will translate into economic

behests for the communities that recycle and compost, or whether higher

material recovery rates will translate into greater profits for <1 as At

controls how those recovered materials are marketed.

Until now, WMI has benefited from its recycling program principally

as a means of improving its image, acquiring dominant market share, and

diffusing opposition to the disposal of increasing volumes of waste of all

types. 'rs entire existence ls based on their increased control of all

kinds of waste. The company therefore offers recycling as a token to

recent environmental awareness, while doing nothing to promote the over-

all reduction of wastes generated to begin with.

'rs recycling program barely breaks even. In March of 1990, Am,sf-

oess Wee! reported that ''even though recycling has yet to turn a profit,

it's working as a sort of loss leader to pull zn business for cl's landfill

operations, which boast a pretor profit margin of 20%.** (608) Where

Recycle America (WMI's recycling division) and Recycle First

(Wheelabrator's recycling division) operate extensive curbside recycling

programs, the company has not eliminated the use of landfills or m-

cinerators, which make up for the failure of its recycling program.

page 101

Because it wishes to maintain its dominant position in the garbage-

hauling industry while facing public pressure to increase recycling

proems, '1 has begun to include recycling as a small component of

an ''migrated waste management strategy.'' Yet there is a convict be-

tween elective reduction and recycling programs and sandalling or in-

cineration. Truly successful reduction and recycling proems threaten

cl's bottom line by reducing reliance on fandoms and incinerators. As

long as the company makes money from waste disposal rather than recy-

cling, composting, or reduction, it will get in the we! of true solutions and

III run recycling programs with an eye toward minimizing their success

and directing the waste stream toward a disposal facility. Many towns

under contract to <1 are bound by ''flow control'' clauses (also called

''put or pay'' provisions) that electively commit the trash to an incinerator

often because of the financial commitments that must be met once an. in-

cinerator is built.

Currently, the U.S. recycled abut 13 percent of its solid waste. The

EPA has set a national goal of 25 percent reduction in the waste stream

through recycling, a token percentage that groped for areas stuck with

incinerators. WMI oaters such as William Hulhgam President of WMI of

North America, claim onlylo to 20 percent of the waste stream can be

recycled, while failing to emphasize the need for reduction of the volume

and toxicity of waste. (575) Studies such as the programs conducted by

the Center for Biology of Natural Systems have shown between 70 and 90

percent of the solid waste strep can be diverted from disposal facilities

through comprehensive recycling and waste reduction programs. (607)

One of the major obstacles to reaching high recycling rates is the

ability of recallers to find markets for recovered materials. This is espe-

cially true with its-consumer paper and cardboard. In 1990, WMJ

withdrew from a planned joint venture with the Jefferson Summit County,

a major recycled newsprint reclamation company. The deal would have

guaranteed WMI a market for collected recyclable paper and would have

guaranteed Jefferson Smurks a supply. Months lair, WMI entered into

a similar agreement with Stone Container Corp. and bought U.S. icy

cling, one of the world's largest processors of waste pair. Meanwhile,

residents of Camden, Arkansas, witnessed WMI dumping newspapers it

had picked up for ''recycing'' (712) With the new markets in place, will

the communities that maximize recycling rates obtain an economic payoff

for their efforts or will it only be the company that benefits?

Land use siting experts at Carrell Associates wrote a study analyzing

the demographic characteristics of communities least likely to resist ''local-

ly undesirable land uses'' such as incinerators. (485) The authors of the

study conclude the public is more likely to accept new incinerators if the

projects are presented with a recycling component. (485) ''integrated

solid waste management'' is a term commonly used by operators of

land-ls and garbage incinerators who have proposed weak recycling and

composting programs as an afterthought to solid waste plans in order to

soon up opposition to new or expanded disuse operations. In Carson-

vine, Michigan, for instance, WMI officials intent on obtaining a landfill

expansion permit decided to distribute hundreds of plastic bags to be used

page 102

for receivables, which they hoped would ''keep these yah yds (recycling

advocated odour backs.'' (515)

In eject, Recycle America, Mrs recycling subsidiaries is ''a minor com-

ponent of 'rs waste hauling and landfilling business,'' a front opera-

tion which, while is beings in little revenue, attracts the lion's share of

public relations' attention while most of the waste the company handles is

dumped or burned. (515) In 1990, for instance. <1 incinerated five

times the amount of garbage it recycled. (767) cl's recycling program

also maintains the company's ability to squeeze out local non-profit and

small for-profit readers, in effect ensuring that environmental progress

does not translate into economic benefi-ts for a local community.

Complaints are frequent from communities where Recycle America has

obtained local contracts. The variety of problems range from Prince Geor-

ges County, Maryland, where the recycling bidding process was set up to

exclude smaller non-profit companies, to Camden and Fayetteville, Arkan-

sas, where residents have tailed WMI recycling vehicles to one of its

dumps. In Seattle, a city that has set a 60 ardent recycling goal, Recycle

America won city recycling contracts by omitting the cost of local utility

taxes, coming in with a bid lower than leal independents who did include

the taxes in their bias. (7234

WMI has also used recycling programs as a ''bait and switch'' tactic. An

Lima, Ohio, for instance, where the company ran into strong opposition to

a new Randall proposal, WMI came back and won the city's contract for its

mandatory recycling program. Yet the way WMI has run the recycling

program has resulted m falling participation rates, so that county officials

began to plan for a new incinerator (see Lima, Ohio, chronology below).

In Illinois, <1 has taken over the city of Chicago's ward Qop-off recy-

cling program. As of the fall of 1991, WMI was collecting a tenth of the

receivables projected in their bid. WMI is also a major player in the city's

effort to set up a ''blue bag'' recycling program, ax effort opposed by all the

city's major environmental and non-pros! recycling organizations, (see

Chicago, Illinois, entry below.)

A new law enacted m Illinois is 1990 forbids yard waste from being

land-led. The law was enacted after WMI invested in equipment to

generate electricity from methane recovered from some of the landfills.

WMI later supported attempts in the state legislature to backtrack on the

composting lep station by exempting yard waste going to such landfills.

Perhaps in an effort to bolster this effort, in July 1990, WMJ temporari-

ly shot down the yard waste processing operation at its Settler's Hill

landfall in. Kane County, Illinois, when neighbors began to complain about

odors (the company has rarely, if ever, closed a landfill or incinerator for

the same reasons. (737)

WMI and overlarge garbage haulers are using their slick bidding

strategies to squeeze out local non-profits on recycling contracts. In local

solid waste planning struggles, bidding requirements are often used to ex-

clude smaller operators or community-based programs that don't have the

same clinical influence. Performance ands, biding bonds, and a-year

eminence requirements can kill innovative community-based recycling

programs. The solution is to make the bidding requirements equitable.

page 103

Aware of WMI's motivations and history of oblations, communities

such as Oak Park, Illinois, have chosen alternative contractors over WMI,

although WMI initially submitted a lower bid for the city's recycling con-

tract in 1989. (530) The city of Tamarac, Florida, also turned down cl's

offer to handle residential recycling '''cause of uncertainty of the fair-

ness of a proposed pact.' (460 ''Recycle America'' WMI's subsidiary was

also blocked m its attempt to take over a Montevallo, Alabama, church-

based recycling program and was forced to withdraw from a proposed recy-

cling program in Tucson, Arizona. (723) In 1990, Vancouver, Canada,

also turned down WMI's bid for the local recycling contract, though initial

ly WMI was the front-runner in the bidding process. (714)

In spite of repeated problems with its Recycle America division, WMI

still calls itself the nation's leading recycles without revealing the criteria

upon which the claim is based and trumpets this ''fact'' everywhere from

corporate report covers to advertising campaigns that include commer-

cials on Public Broadcasting System stations (PBS), advertisements in

leading environmental magazines such as the WfHervess Safety

mafo,zzrt,e and Garble magazine and the magazine of the waste hauling

industry, Waste Age.

WMI's campaign to clean up its image has been somewhat successful.

The company has received numerous awards from such groups as Keep

America Beautiful (a group they helped subsidize at its creation) for their

recycling program.

In 1989, WMI hosted a congressional reception no-sponsored by 70 con-

gressmen for the National bicycling Coalition (NRCX The NRC is the

largest alliance of individuals, companies, non-profit organizations, and

government officials dedicated to promoting recycling. (432) NRC gave

WMI awards in 1987 and 1988 for its corporate leadership in recycling.

cl's recent effort to join with Dugout to build the biggest plastics

recycling plant in the U.S. avoids the ultimate answer to the solid waste

crises: reduction. Plastics production and consumption are increasing

every year. The plastics industry estimates that consumption of plastics

rests AII grow from 48 billion bunds a year in 1985 to 76 billion pounds

by the year 2002 a 36 ardent acreage. 6709) Over 12 billion pounds are

now used for packaging alone. In another decade, the volume of plastics

packing III also double, consuming 23 billion pounds of resins by the

turn of the century. (709)

Because most plastic food packaging cannot be recycled into original

products (Food and Drug Administration regulations do not permit the

recycling of packaging that comes in contact with fad), plastics recycling

does not reduce many kinds of plastics production and associated environ-

mental damage, such as generation of toxic wastes in plastics production

and depletion of non-renewable resources, With the addition of plastics

recycling plants, WMI and DuPont encourage continued reliance on toxic,

nondegradable, non-recyclable materials. (WMI pulled out of the joint ven-

ture in 1991 because it wasn't profitable. WMI continued to collect and

supply plastics to Dupont.)

Waste Management's self-promoted image as a recycled should not,

therefore, be confused with sincere waste prevention efforts, WMI's inter-

page 104

est in maximizing their control over the waste stream works against true

solutions such as waste reduction and minimization, efforts which, if im-

plemented, reduce the need for cl's waste disposal services. For a pack-

et of model ordinances, write to the Greenpeace Garbage Prevention Plan,

1436 U St., N.W., Washington., DC 20009.

The following are some examples of WMI's recycling practices.

Little Rock, Arkansas

March 1991

The Arkansas Gazette reports that heavy lobbying by WMI and Browning-

Ferris Industries (BFI) derailed part of Governor Bill Clinton's package of

garbage and recycling bills in a Senate Committee. The paper quoted

Rep. Bonum Gibson of Dermott (sponsor of the bills) as saying, ''We all

know what III happen impose bills don't pass. BFI and Waste Manage-

Management will lie the two czars of the state in five years, and we'll pay

whatever garbage fees they want us to pay.'' (750)

Oceanside, California

1989

Grassroots leader Charisse Krieger blows the whistle on Mrs ''recycling

centerp'' for operating as an unpermitted transfer station. The protest

prompts the county to order city officials to either shut the facility down

or require <1 to go through a formal permitting process. (621)

San Jose, California

1987

Waste Management, Inc. wins a battle with BFI for the San Jose garbage

contracts by offering cheaper service and a recycling program. <1

receives an award from the city for its recycling program and wins a $360

minion zn-yea' contract in Portland, Oregon, after flying prominent

citizens to San Jose Nevertheless, WMI continues to dump most of the

waste it collects in So Jose in a landfall in Santa Clara County. (290)

The landfill began leaking in the winter of 1988. (362, 363)

Southern Alameda County, California

1987

A citizens' committee and the Fremont City Council reject plans by WMI

subsidiary, Oakland Scavenger, to build a garbage incinerator. Instead,

page 105

the region calls for a comprehensive curbside recycling program, operated

by Oakland Scavenger. It takes Oakland Scavenger eight months to

agree to begin planning such a program.

One county politician, Gerald Abelson, says 'The/re moving a hell of

a lot slower than they should be.' Oakland Scavenger is only targeting a

10 percent reduction of the waste stream going to the local landfill. (291)

Broward County, Florida

February 1989

Because of a state law, municipalities in Florida are required to consider

recycling proposals from trash pickup contractors before they consider

other waste disposal methods. The Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel reports

that WMI has 'discouraged such programs by claiming that start-up costs

are prohibitively high. (501) At the same time, garbage disposal fees for

home owners in Broward County are expected to double between 1989

and 1992 accuse of cost overruns associated with development of an in-

cinerator/landfill complex involving WMI and Wheelabrator Technologies,

Inc. The added costs are due to use of an interim landfill and the addition

of an acid gas scrubber on the incinerator. (502)

Tamarac, Florida

October 1988

City officials negotiate with Waste Management, loc. to set up a multi-

material recycling program. The program is stalled by lengthy negotia-

tion between WMI and the city. ''I'm really sick of talking about this''

says Mayor Norman Abramowitz. ''It's get a contract from Waste

Management, Inc. that is satisfactory or go elsewhere''. (3334

Chicago, Illinois

1991

WMI is one of several companies submitting bids to operate the city's

''blue bag'' recycling program. The program, criticized by local environmen-

talists and non-profit reorders, is likely to develop into a costly fiasco. Ap-

plying unproven collection methods (commingling and collection of

receivables thrown into compactor trucks and sorted out at material

recovery facilities), the program sews the seeds of its own failure and

clears the path for continued landholding and expanded incineration.

According to a leal pair, an anonymous ''reliable source'' reported

that ''a representative of Waste Management approached top mayoral

sides sometime early in 1990 with a proposal very much like the one the

mayor later announced. According to is source, the figures used to jus-

tify the city' s claims for dramatic cost savings, which have never been ex-

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placed or documented, are derived mainly from Waste Management's

secret proposal. City officials reportedly concluded that as Waste Manage-

Management is not in the business of losing money, its propose must be a sound

one'' 4773)

The soundness of the prop-am has been called into question by just

a%ut everyone except the city, WMI, and its trade association, the Na-

tional Solid Waste Management Association, which gave the city an ''inde-

pendent'' assessment of (hp plan. The secrecy of the bidding and proposal

development process, the lack of attention to neighborhood diversity, and

the certainty that commingling processes GZI damage and contaminate a

large percentage of the materials collected are just a few aspects of the

arousal criticized by the city's major recycling advocates. (Sue 773 =4

contact the Chicago Recycling Coalition-see Appendix J for a detailed

description of problems with the city's program.)

Carsonville, Michigan

1988

WMI uses a recycling program to try to diffuse local opposition from a

group of residents, the Citizens Against Rural Exploitation (CAREX and

obtain a permit to expand its Tri-city landfill. WMI changes the name of

its landfill to the Tri-city Recycling and Disposal Facility to reflect what

it calls a ''recycling drop off center.'' The name change occurs within

weeks of WMI application for a 15-acre landfill expansion permit. War

on Waste, a book about the solid waste crisis, later reveals how WMI offi-

cials used the proposed recycling program to attempt to diffuse opposition

from CARE:

One day, a Waste Management secretary, who later would quit the copany and join the CARE group, overheart these (WMI) officials complaining about their problems. The company had decided to develop its own "recycling program," which consisted of ditributing hundreds of plastic bags to be used for recyclables. On the bags, the name of Waste Management would displayed, along with a picture of Iron Eyes Cody, the Los Angels-based Indian (sic) who had been widely seen in advertisements promoting anti-litter campaigns. The company executives were hopeful that this effort would be sufficient, as one official remarked, to "keep these yah yahs (recycling advocates) off our backs." ... It wasn't long after that episode that (WMI) officials showed up at a county meeting to discuss the five-year update of the County Solid Waste Management Plan, required by Michigan solid waste laws. "They came in with their three piece suits, their attorneys, and all their falsh and glitter," recalled CARE activist Renee O'Connell. "All through the meeting they talked about how they recycled. When we asked them why they didn't have anything more to show for all their talk about a big recycling push, they exclaimed, 'Oh, don't worry, we're just beginning to set it all up.' In fact it seemed clear to us they just wanted to distract attention from theri expansion plans." (515)

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Lima, Ohio

1989

WMI makes a successful bid to take over the city's mandatory recycling

program, although its local representatives know very little about how to

run such a program. Jack de Witt, the loca! WMI executive, claims that

cl's recycling efforts are a ''fully operational, viable enterprise,'' though

in an interview a few days after his presentation de Witt admits that he is

''not familiar with Recycle America/' and doesn't know how to operate a

curbside recycling program. He ''wasn't even clear just what 'cycle

America did m the first place'' (515)

After a WMI landfill proposal was defeated in nearby Spencerville,

Lima was under pressure to find a solution to its landfill crisis. Lima con-

tracted with WMI to run its recycling program. WMI began charging

households $2 per month, no matter how much residents put on the curb

and how much they already paid to the city for garbage hauling. People

who did not properly separate their receivables received one warning

before the company would no longer pick up both receivables and non-

recyclable waste. Participation rates plummeted and the county began

planning for a new incinerator. (mall organizer Sally Teats says, ''I'm

really upset with this whole situation. I know they're going to blame the

people for the failure of the recycling program. Boot it's not their fault.

It's Waste Management's fault because of the way they set the recycling

program up. It was destined to fail from the beginning.'' (7234

Seattle, Washington

WMI has touted its Recycle America program in Seattle as a model. But

city officials have also charged WMI's local subsidiary with dodging

$400,000 in local taxes. Art Dudzinski, WMI regional chief, says the sub-

sidiary ''apparently on its own, just decided not to pay'' the tax. Other

haulers complain they lost out on contracts accuse they included the

taxes in their bids, but WMI did not. (621)

MEDICAL WASTE INCINERATORS

Medical waste incinerators are a source of toxic air emissions, especially

dioxids and cadmium. (673) Other emissions include brans, mercury,

lead, and low-level radioactivity. (673) Emissions can also include ben-

zene and a variety of organochlorines. (673)

Infectious waste makes up about 15 percent of the waste stream in a

typical hospital. Plastics make up a high perrcentage of infectious waste

(14 to 30 percent by weight compared with 3 to 7 percent in municipal

waste, which, when incinerated results in emissions of metals and

chlorinated compounds like dioxins and furons. (673) Instead of incinera-

tion, many hospitals are looking into steam sterilization (autoclaving) and

other methods of handling their waste coupled with programs to keep inw

factious waste separate from other hospital waste streams that are recycl-

able. Hospitals are also examining the supplies they use in order to phase

out the use of materials that are unsafe when disused.

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