The Cray Book

Table of Contents - Section 2

Return to Section 1

CWM's Network of Hazardous Waste Landfills

Emelle, AL

Kettleman City, CA

Calumet City, IL

Wilsonville, IL

Fort Wayne, IN

Furley, KS

Carlyss, LA

Porter and Lewiston, NY

Arlington, OR

New Milford, PA

Port Arthur, TX

Omega Hills, WI

 

Deep Well Injection Facilities

 

Vickery OH

Corpus Christi, TX

Port Arthur, TX

 

CWM's Sham Hazardous Waste Recycling: "Fuel" Processing for Cement Kilns

CWM's Sham Waste Reduction Consulting Service

: CWM's Remedial Cleanup DivisionPork Barrel Politics

: The Last of the DOD/DOE Cleanups Scoundrels

"We Are a Hick Town in the Middle of Nowhere": Nuclear Waste Disposal operations

Barnwell, SC

Channahon, IL

Martinsville and Fairfield, IL

 

Other Proposed Low-level Radioactive Waste Landfills

Pennsylvania

North Carolina

Connecticut

CWMs NETWORK OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS

There is good theoretical and empirical evidence that the hazardous constituents that are placed in land disposal facilities into the broader environment. This may occur several years, even many decades, after placement of the waste in the facility, but data and scientific prediction indicate that, in most cases, even with the application of best available land disposal technology, it will occur eventually.'

U.S.EPA, 1981 (625)

They have become Supered sites because the biggest threat from hazardous waste landfalls is groundwater contamination. All landfills eventually leak, no matter what their design. Many CWM hazardous waste landfalls have begun to show signs of leakage. Although CWM has blamed prior operators in some cases, the company's pattern of acquiring old landfills and blaming violations on former owners merely highlights it's failure to take action to clean up existing problems before continuing operations.

In 1987, Geoservices, Inc. was hired by the EPA to study the performance of plastic liners used for landfalls. Geoservices concluded that all plastic liners will eventually leak. It is important to realize that all materials used as liners are at least slightly permeable to liquids or gases and a certain amount of permeation through liners should be expected. Additional leakage results from defects such as cracks, holes, and faulty seams."

Many of WMI's ''state-of-the-art" landfill designs employ a double-layer

high-density polyethylene (IOPE) liner with leachate collection piping be-

tween. In 1990 WMI purchased a minority interest in National Smeal, a

privately held landfill liner manufacturer. (670)

According to the Phillips Petroleum Company, a leading maker of

polyethylene, there are a number of chemicals that can weaken

polyethylene dandily liners. (6284 Linen made out of day also leak due to

the ability of organic chemicals to permeate clay and shrinkage and ex-

pansion from varying weather conditions. (632)

CWM has also sought to weaken regulations governing hazardous

waste landfalls. On April 24, 1989, CWM won a decision from the U.S. Ap-

pellate Court to drop a provision in regulations issued under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act's ''Erst-third' land-ban rule, a decision

that effectively weakened leachate treatment standards. (633)

CWM currently operates seven hazardous waste landfills in the US.,

including the nation's largest in Emerge, Alabama.

What follows is a chronology of problems at Cc's hazardous waste

landfills.

Emelle, Alabama

In 1978, the international waste disposal conglomerate Waste Management, Inc., decided to buy a small dump from Resource Industries (RI) in the village of Emelle in the center of Sumter. "It was clearly political ties that allowed RI to bring the plant into the community," one local official remarked. (520) Jim Parsons, one of the original owners of the dump and son-in-law of then Governor George Wallace sold the dump to CWM. "What they said locally was they had found a new use for the Selma chalk ... we had thought it was going to be some kind of liming operation. And lo and behold, the use they found for the Selma chalk was the holding of chemicals." (520) Since acquiring the landfill, WMI has dumped millions of tons of hazardous waste on what was once lush farmland, creating the largest hazardous waste landfill in the United States, and possibly the world. A local county official calls the 2,700-acre landfill (expanded from 340 acres since WMI acquired it) "America's largest pay toilet." The dump sits directly over the Eutaw Aquifer, which supplies water to a large part of Alabama. (509)

In 1989 the Emelle facility received 790,000 tons of waste, about 100 truckloads a day, up 30 percent from 1988. At least 775,000 tons of the waste went into the landfill. (552, 601) Nearly 40 percent of the toxic waste disposed of nationwide between 1984 and 1987 under the federal Superfund removal program ended up at CWM's Emelle landfill. (719) Among the landfill's customers are America's 10 largest companies, 159 military bases, and other federal agencies. Since the dump has begun operating, it has received an estimated total between 5 and 6 million tons of hazardous waste, according to local activist Kaye Kiker. (714)

The company is currently considering applying for a permit to construct a hazardous waste incinerator at Emelle, partially because of recent laws that prohibit landfilling various kinds of waste.

WMI's dump has experienced on-site fires, off-site water contamination, federal penalties for environmental violations, and more. Occasional reports about the unpermitted dumping of radioactive wastes at Emelle raise even more fears about the long-term impact of CWM's toxic waste dump. (441)

While CWM has an interim federal RCRA permit for its Emelle, Alabama, facility, the state permit has been withheld because of various violations, including the unauthorized acceptance of dioxins. (84)

What follows is a partial chronology of problems at WMI's Emelle hazardous waste dump.

Protesters gather at CWM.5 Emelle toxic waste dump-the largest hazardous waste landfill in the United States and possibly the world, Return to Table of Contents - Section 2

1977

A group of investors and engineers from Tennessee and Alabama acquires theoriginal tract of land and establishes Resource Industries of Alabama. The facility is permitted in April and receives its first load of waste in the summer.

1978 - 1986

The rate of unemployment in Sumter County rises from 5.8 percent in 1978 to 21.1 percent in 1986. (311)

Early 1980s

Alfred Chipley, director of the Alabama State Health Department's Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, who also made a $5,000 profit on WMI stock, honors CWM's request that waste manifests be kept confidential. The ruling is later overturned by the state's Attorney General. (520)

1982

According to the Fort Lauderdale Times- [Union, CWM's monthly and annual manifest shipment records for the year "show a baffling array of discrepancies." For example, the annual report is missing lists for Florida companies that sent 836 drums, 486,040 pounds, and 1,021 cubic feet of hazardous waste to Emelle. The annual report also lists manifest entries absent in the monthly reports to EPA. The puzzling records may have affected taxes paid to Sumter County. (520)

1982

Former technical manager Edward Brashier, 29, says he resigned piimarily because his superiors had ignored his complaints about inadequate sampling of wastes and other practices he thought were exposing Emelle workers to occupational health hazards. Brashier and another Emelle employee, who insisted on remaining anonymous, alleged that CWM officials were so preoccupied with attaining their sales objectives they frequently cut regulatory corners. "Their emphasis was to hurry up and get it in the hole and cover it up regardless of what it was." (666)

1983

In 1983, over 288,000 tons of hazardous waste were brought to Emelle from 42 states and from U.S.. military bases overseas. Only 25 percent of that waste originated in Alabama. (134)

March 1983

ACWM-leased barge containing 20,000 barrels of rainwater contaminated with hundreds of toxic chemicals strikes a bridge on the Tombigbee River in Alabama. The collision opens a gash in the barge, which was not certified to carry hazardous wastes, according to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard later penalizes CWM $2,000@ (414)

Return to Table of Contents - Section 2 March 1983

A former CWM site technical manager reveals a series of allegations about the Emelle facility, including charges of burying chemicals without adequate spacing, inadequate testing of wastes received before burying, waste handling procedures that endanger worker health, illegal handling of wastes including solidification of material having PCB concentrations in excess of 500 parts per million, and inadequate mapping of waste locations. (91)

May 1983

Tests on waste water pumped out of a trench at the facility shows levels of radioactivity above natural background levels. (667)

August 1983

An EPA inspection report alleges violations of PCB regulations, including 1) failure to have "organized inspection"; 2) cracks in storage floors; 3) dates missing from containers; and 4) spillage.. EPA later takes CWM's word that all violations have been corrected. (576)

October 1983

Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM) fines CWM $150,000 for failure to complete a leachate collection system on time. The failure resulted in illegal disposal of hazardous materials in an unsecured trench. This amount is later adjusted to $50,000 in penalties and a $100,000 settlement. (35)

April 1984

Alabama Secretary of State Don Siegelman calls on Governor George Wallace to investigate allegations of a conflict-of- interest, corruption, and dereliction of duty related to CWM's Emelle operations. (34) The Mobile Press Register reports that a memorandum submitted by Hugh Kaufman of EPA's Hazardous Site Control Division to Courtney Price, assistant administrator for EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring section, alleges, among other violations, that a company called Holley Electric Co. was found by EPA to be taking PCB- containing capacitors to Emelle for illegal disposal by hiding them in drums labeled dirt. Holley Electric pleaded guilty in a U.S. District Court in Jacksonville, Florida "However, nothing has happened to CWM, as usual .... Apparently CWM had not even conducted the most rudimentary step of opening the drums to be sure that what it was taking was legal .... flow many other companies illegally sent mislabeled drums to CWM that were not inspected?" (43)

June 1984

Cancer-causing PCBs are detected in a drainage ditch and swamp outside the Emelle landfill. (77)

June 1984

Tests of wells by the EPA find indications that chemicals have migrated from the landfill into water supplies. Contaminants migrating off site and into nearby Bodka Creek include PCBs. (57, 80)

July 1984

An Alabama environmental official states that runoff from the landfill is carrying contaminated soil into Bodka Creek, which runs into the Tombigbee River. (57, 80, 77)

October 1984

A memorandum written by an EPA official states, "the company itself had supplied information last spring to the agency's regional office that made it clear that the site was leaking." The EPA official charges that the agency's Southeastern Regional Director is hindering other EPA inspectors from checking groundwater below Emelle. (14, 44)

October 1984

An accident at Emelle produces a reddish- brown cloud of acidic vapor containing sodium hydroxide. The cloud floats a half mile off site. (125)

December 1984

EPA and ADEM enter into a consent agreement with CWM, which includes penalties of $600,000 for illegal storage of nearly 3,000,000 gallons of cancer- causing PCBs at Emelle. The consent agreement also revokes an earlier prohibition against PCB storage, a decision that two EPA officials claim could be worth "tens of millions of dollars to CWM." (414, 10, 44)

December 1984

Laboratory tests show presence of up to 52 parts per billion of the deadly chemical dioxin at Emelle. CWM officials claim they are "surprised." There are no facilities in the [U.S. permitted to receive dioxin at this time. (68) December 1984 EPA database figures show that CWM's Emelle site has received waste from 38 Superfund sites through the end of 1984. Between 1983 and 1984, six off-site spills occurred, including four involving PCBs, and 12 onsite spills occurred, including four involving PCBs. (640)

April 1985

A fire at Emelle prompts evacuation of 180 workers and visitors. (82)

June 1985

Workers at Emelle attempt to form a union after CWM asks them to endure 60-70 hour work weeks and begins to penalize those who are late for work. (217)

August 1985

A pipe bursts at Emelle, sending liquid waste onto adjacent property. Alabama charges CWM with failure to notify state officials of a hazardous waste spill and failure to implement a contingency plan. (414)

December 1985

CBS's 60 Minutes reports on the nearly $30 million likely to have been earned by James Parsons, son-in-law of George Wallace, for involvement in the original sale of the Emelle landfill property to CWM.

1986

The mayor of Emelle has his house appraised for the second time in three years and finds that it has depreciated to $15,000 from $50,000-$60,000 in 1984 because he lives near the landfill. (617)

Summer 1986

Two separate samples taken from a monitoring well below the Emelle landfill show presence of the cancer-causing solvent, dichloroethane. CWM attributes the solvent's presence to material used in the construction of the well. (382) November 1986 An EPA hearing is held in Livingston, Alabama, for one of the world's largest hazardous waste incinerators proposed by CWM for Emelle.

December 1986

Sumter County residents file a $150 million lawsuit against CWM, claiming that 10,000 residents in five Alabama counties have been contaminated by toxic materials leaking from the Emelle landfill. An independent lab finds PCBs substantially above normal background levels in 20 people living near the dump. The case is later dismissed by a judge for lack of evidence.

March 27,1987

An Alabama state appeals court rules that CWM must pay property taxes on the Emelle landfill. The court rejected CWM claims that it qualified for tax-exempt status because the primary purpose of the Emelle landfill is pollution control, not profit. (257)

April 1987

The United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice releases a survey of toxic waste dump sites in the U.S. The Commission finds a pattern of environmental racism, i.e., toxic dump sites in areas populated by people of color, citing Emelle as an example. CWM rebuts the charge by claiming they picked the site for its "secure geology," not for its poor black population, although by this time EPA officials have stated that the site is leaking. (220)

May 1987

Alabamians for a Clean Environment, the Alabama chapter of the Sierra Club, the Alabama Conservancy and Greenpeace file a federal lawsuit to prevent state and federal agencies from permitting the construction of the world's largest hazardous waste incinerator at Emelle. The suit follows official U.S. EPA approval of the incinerator. (216)

July 1987

CWM is cited by ADEM for failing to properly analyze 14 drums of dioxin- contaminated herbicide wastes. CWM agrees to pay $20,000 in reimbursement and settlement costs. ADEM also orders CWM to ship the herbicides out of state within 20 days. ADEM reports that dioxin concentrations in the drums of wastes tested as high as 102 parts per billion. (245,414) The state of Alabama postpones any granting of a hazardous waste incinerator permit to CWM pending further results from this investigation.

September 27, 1987

The Birmingham News reports that CWM had stored seven barrels of dioxin-laced herbicidal wastes in a rental storage cubicle at a warehouse belonging to "David Min-U-Storage" in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. CWM stored the wastes in the warehouse for 17 months between 1985 and 1987. A Birmingham News article reports that "only a thin steel barrier separated the dioxin wastes from people who came to store household goods." CVVM later pays $20,000 in settlement costs to ADEM. (245, 472) After a warehouse employee discovered the barrels in the storage cubicle, she asked CWM officials if the barrels contained toxic wastes and reports "they told me no." (245)

October 1987

A state legislator calls for the removal of low-level radioactive waste from Emelle; earlier in 1987 three truckloads of furnace dust containing 137cesium were dumped. A radiological officer with the Public Heath Department said the company's tests of the dust were so inadequate that they were virtually meaningless. (239,441,447) CWM previously was also ordered to remove a drum of radioactive laboratory waste received from the University of Chicago.

November 1987

ADEM reports that several toxic chemicals were found in samples taken from monitoring wells. (246) An EPA official criticizes CWM's for repeated reports of contamination at Emelle, saying that the "persistent problem" of contamination cannot he explained as "random hits." (247)

November 1987

Hundreds of Alabamians and others join a funeral motorcade from the state capitol in Montgomery through Selma to Emelle in a two-day rally against the "Toxic Trail of Tears." Over a dozen people are arrested after blocking the entrance to the landfill for more than eight hours.

December 11, 1987

ADEM reports that soil samples taken from the landfill indicate toxicchemicals-including dichloroethane, dichloropropane, benzene, and toluene-in soils near older trenches on site at Emelle. (246,254)

December 16,1987

The Attorney General of Alabama, Don Siegelman, proposes legislation limiting the importation of hazardous wastes, The Attorney General would limit the flow of wastes into state hazardous waste facilities to 400,000 tons a year- Emelle's 1987 annual rate of waste disposal. (250)

December 20,1987

EPA announces that it will hire an independent testing firm to determine the source of contaminated samples taken at the Emelle landfill. The announcement comes after CWM claims samples indicating contamination in soil near the oldest disposal area resulted from accidental contamination and have nothing to do with leakage from the dump. (249)

December 21, 1987

Two Alabama state legislators announce that they will introduce legislation that would prohibit ADEM employees from working for companies they formerly regulated. (248) The legislation arises from reports that Russell Zora, a former ADEM official who oversaw inspections at Emelle, subsequently went to work for CWM in Carlyss, Louisiana. Similarly, Craig Brown, a former EPA official who led a review of CWM's Emelle landfill permit, began working for WMI's subsidiary Georgia Waste Systems in December 1987. (247)

April 1988

EPA orders CWM to submit a plan for expanding groundwater and soil testing around the oldest hazardous waste trenches at Emelle within 30 days. Since May 1987, repeated tests have found levels of toxic organic chemicals outside six trenches. None of the trenches are lined to prevent leakage, federal officials note. ADEM officials say no evidence of hazardous chemicals was found in the area's aquifer, 700 feet below the surface. But they say the state discontinued testing shallow wells in the area in 1982. (301) CWM estimates the order will cost the company up to $1,000,000. (308)

May 1988

Kaye Kiker, co-chair of Alabamians for a Clean Environment and longterm CWM opponent, is given a Presidential Medal for outstanding service to her country.

September 1988

Local papers report that CWM gave $2,500 to members of a state House Committee that killed toxic waste measures opposed by CWM. (366)

September 19,1988

CWM enters a Consent Agreement and Final Order with ADEM, settling alleged RCRA violations. As a result of the violations (disposal of unauthorized wastes, specifically acrylic fiber production wastes, in a landfill), CWM also agrees to pay a civil penalty of $150,000. In so doing, CWM avoids a ban on receiving Superfund wastes, as the EPA originally proposed. (320, 414)

July 1989

Seven hundred and forty safety violations are found during the inspection of 312 CWM waste-hauling trucks by state troopers, Eighty-three of the 312 trucks were transporting PCB-containing dirt. Fifty- one of the 312 were not allowed to continue their trip, (519)

December 1989

A federal court upholds Alabama's new law restricting out-of- state imports to the Emelle dump. CWM continues to appeal. CWM's southeast regional manager, Thomas Noel, says at a press conference that because of the ban, states in the southeast are under pressure to develop their own facilities. This is creating "tremendous long-term opportunities" for CWM, according to Noel. (552)

February 22,1990

CWM proposes building a plant in Mississippi to recycle toxic dust generated by arc furnaces in steel mills. By permitting the proposed facility, Mississippi, which has no other hazardous waste disposal capacity, should be able to escape Alabama's blacklist and continue sending waste to Emelle (552) The group Citizens for Clean Air and Water forms in response to the proposal (see Appendix J).

1990

Company officials are concerned about the impact of a new proposal to raise the Alabama state tax on waste disposal from $22 to $116 per ton for out-of-state wastes and $40 per ton for in-state wastes. The plan, sponsored by Governor Guy Hunt, becomes law in April. "Alabama has been the hazardous waste dumping ground of the nation," Hunt says. The tax hike comes after a state law blocking hazardous waste shipments from some states is ruled unconstitutional by the I 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. (552)

July 5,1990

'CWM pays $123,000 for five violations at Emelle related to land disposal of hazardous electroplating sludges without required treatment. (733)

July 19,1990

A truck carrying contaminated soil overturns 10 miles from the Emelle facility, spilling 20 tons of contaminated dirt. (734) (Also 10, 14, 17, 27, 28, 33, 40, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 57, 65, 67, 70, 77, 79, 80, 84, 102, 104,

Kettleman City, California

Return to Table of Contents - Section 2

At 210 acres, the CWM Kettleman City land-landfill is the fifth largest hazard-

ous waste dump in the U.S. Kettleman City also had one of the largest on-

vironmental penalties ever levied in the western U.S. The 2=<11 Aaa

leaked a plume of contaminants 111% local groundwater. Kettleman City

is a small community of farm workers, 90 percent of them are Spanish-

speaking. As of 1987, the CWM Kettleman City facility was accepting be-

tween 250 and 330 thousand tons of waste per year. CWM has also

applied for a permit to construct a hazardous waste incinerator at the Site.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the K-ttleman City facility

April 1979

CWM purchases the Kettleman City site from Enironmental Disposal

Services. (436)

November 1980

CWM opens Kettleman City without installing groundwater monitoring

wells.

1983

The town of Coalinga is devastated by an earthquake. The epicenter is

page 44

April 1983

An EPA investigation of the Kettleman City facility finds 46 violations of Cgs Interim Status permit. (436)

Summer 1983

An air-sampling investigation by the California Air 'sources Board finds elevated emissions of volatile organic compounds, including carcinogens, at Kettles; City. (436)

July 1984

EPA charges CWM with failure to monitor groundwater, failure to have a partial dacoity closure plan., and modifying the facility in violation of its state permit and other regulations. EPA also orders CWM to install groundwater monitoring webs. A $108,400 one is proposed. (265, 414)

September 13, 1984 Government sources report that federal environmental officials conduct- iug a nationwide investigation of WMI have found over 100 civil viola- tions and several passible criminal violations. Among the findings: CWM allegedly expanded operations illegally at Kettleman City and filed to provide adequate monitoring of groundwater around the facility. (113, 137)

October 1984 EPA bans use of Kettleman Cit! for Supered waste disposal due to serious RCRA violations. These include no groundwater monitoring sys- tem and disposal of PCBs in landfills not approved for PCB disposal. (115) October 15, 1984 A report by CWM's engineering consulate cites a total of 29 parts per m 'ill-on of total organic halocarbons in a monitoring well at the site. Con- taminants include dichloroethane, benzene, toluene, chlorobenzene, chloroform, methyl chloride, trichlorethylene, the herbicide 2,4-D, and others. The Erm says the contaminants are from wastes dumped on the site. (436)

May 1985 CWM buries one truckload of radioactive steel furnace dust at Kettleman City; the dust had failed to trigger a radiation monitor at Cc's gate. The dust contained radioactive cesiunbl3'/, which is not permitted in a hazardous waste dump. (283)

June 7, 1985

EPA announces that it willied the highest environmental fines ever as- sessed in the western U.S., a $7.3 million line against CWM for leakage and other environmental violations at Kettleman City. There are a total of 130 donations. (1074

Among the violations cited are storing prohibited wastes, failure to con- duct proper groundwater monitoring, modifying landfill without permis- sion, disregarding written plans for handling solid wastes, placing incompatible wastes in ponds, and illegally labeling liquid wastes. The penalty is later reduced to $4 million, mending $1.9 million for ongoing environmental auditing and monitoring costs over the next X0 years. (107, 414)

December 26, 1985 The U.S. General Accounting Once (GAO) reports that after the EPA

page 45

banned Kettleman Cit! as a Superfund site, other government agencies

continued to dump toxic wastes there. GAO fmt that from November

1984, when the EPA imposed the ban, to May 1985, other federal agencies

disposed of more than 8,300 tons of toxic waste, including 1,548 tons of

PCBS and Pcb-contaminated waste. (115)

GAO recommends that ''federal agencies should not dispose of hazard-

ous waste at disposal facilities EPA deems to be experienced significant

environmental problems; such as Kettleman Hills. (115)

March 27, 1986

EPA-ordered tests discover groundwater contaminated with cyanide and

2,4-1%a component of the herbicide Agent Orange beneath the CWM

Kettleman City facility. CWM failed to notify the Kings County Board of

Supervisors about the contamination afore receiving approval for a

facility expansion plan. (347)

April 10, 1986

After the herbicide 2,4-D is discovered in monitoring well tests, CWM in-

forms EPA that the herbicide migrated from an unlmed and underlain

by porous sandstone. (337)

May 13, 1986

The Central Valley Water Quality Control Board groundwater monitoring

review of Cgs 41 operating and observation wells Ends volatile com-

pounds in 18 welds, including chlorobenzene, phenols, cyanides, and alpha

and beta radioactivity. (3364

May 25, 1986

An EPA National Enforcement Investigations Center task force finds

traces of chemical pollutants in two webs that were previously unpol-

luted. One well contains toluene and carbon divide and the other con-

tains l,l,l-trichlor!thane. The contaminants are believed to come from

a pair of disposal ponds used for liquid hazardous wastes. The task force

also concludes that testing methods used by CWM and a private

laboratory contracted by the company could make samples appear less pol-

luted than they actually are. (346)

August 15, 1986

Kettleman City's Community Sêrvice District Board votes 2 to l to reduce

the amount of water sold to CWM to 100,000 gallons per month out of fear

the supply is being depleted and district pumps are wearing out. (345)

August 10, 1986

Kettleman and all of California's other operating hazardous waste

landfalls ''fail to meet state standards for natural geologic barriers to

prevent the leaking of toxic wastes into groundwater,'' according to a

report released by the Assembly Once of Asearch. (344)

August 12, 1987

The California Department of Health Services and EPA hold a hearing in

Kettleman City regarding Cc's application to double the size of the Ket-

tleman City dump. (260, 261) The publiç notice is not translated into

Spanish. The community of Kettleman City is 90 percent Spanish-speak-

ing. Only 15 members of the community attend the hearing. (262)

The Fresno lea reports that ''the gentleman. site has already con-

taminated groundwater in at least two locations, and it has been the tar-

get of complaints about noxious odors from Avenal, five mikes northwest

of the site'' (2624 Because of federal and state laws, CWM collects,

analyzes, and reports on air samples required under previous agreements

page 46

with county officials. ''As far as public trust is concerned, don't you see a flaw in that system?'' one citizen asks at the public hearing. (262) Residents form ''people for Clean Air and Water,'' a community or- ganization to educate and organize people against the proposed facility.

March 19, 1988

A mysterious incident causes a landslide of toxic material) at Kettleman City. ''we encountered ax unfortunate incident in one section of our...Ket- tleman Hills facility'' a CWM spokesperson writes. ''For an as-yet-on- known reason, part of the land-ll's liner system pulled away from its anchor on March 19....We have stopped accepting waste in that section of the landfill.'' (302) According to a CWM spokesman, the landfill was about two-thirds &11 when the incident occurred. The accident caused ''ex- tensive damage'' to the land-ll's top liner and leachate collection system. (342)

April 14, 1989

California's Department of Health Services penalizes CWM $363,000 for 11 operational and procedural violations uncovered during a routine in- spect.on in late 1988. Violations include failure to report a fire, having ins operable Ere control equipment on site, ''discrepancies'' on written tracking records for weight and volume of wastes, and inadequate management of windblown material. (327)

Lowry, CO

The CWM-operated Lowry landfill, just outside Denver, has been closed

since 1982, when indictors discovered a CWM coverup of major environ-

mental problems at the landfall. CWM leased the property from the city

and county of Denver.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Lowry landfill.

1980

CWM leases a leaking sanitary landfill in Lowry, ado, from the city and county of Denver and announces plans to open up a massive new liq- uid hazardous waste trench on high ground, to avoid contact with groundwater. Alter investigating the site, the Washington Post reports that CWM had built their new trench ''in a natural drainage basin that dipped below the water table'' Two yea's later, barrels of toxic wastes dumped in Jewry sit in two to three feet of water. (10, 74)

March 9, 1981

EPA inspectors observe improper identification and disposal of hazardous waste at the land-ll. (94,715)

July 16, 1981

CWM notes liquids accumulating under a storage facility at awry, but the firm does not inform state officials about the leak. CWM consultants discover that the burial pit lies below the water table. (167)

August-December 1981

December 11, 1981 EPA allows expansion of liquid waste storage at the awry landfill from

35,000 to 525,000 gallons. (94)

February 18, 1982 EPA administrator Anne Gorsnch abruptly lifts an existing ban on dump-

page 47

ing liquid chemicals in hazardous waste land's across the country. (63)

San thereafter, CWM dumps 2,491 barrels of flammable solvents into

the Lowry landfall. (16, J9) A CWM attorney later admits that his firm

''stored'' 1,434 of the barrels of hazardous liquid waste in disposal pits at

Lowry in anticipation of Gorsuch's ruling. (63)

March 3, 1982

EPA drops a $20,000 fine levied earlier against CWM for improper iden-

tification of hazardous waste at its Lowry land-ll. (94, 715)

March 18, 1982

Under heavy criticism, Gorsuch reinstates the ban on dumping hazardous

liquid wastes into landfalls. (63)

May 21, 1982

CWM is cited for improperly disposing of contaminated standing water

from a drum disposal trench. (578)

July 12, 1982

The ado Supreme Court rules that the awry landfill does not hold

proper permits, so it is closed. (74) Between 1980 and 1982, CWM

dumped an estimated 100 million gallons of liquid chemical waste at

Lowry. 611)

September 9, 1982

ado state inspectors at the Lowry land-landfill find water standing in a

massive hazardous waste trench. lnspectors see barrels of toxic waste sub-

merged in two to three feet of water. (10)

September 16-17, 1982

EPA inspectors find numerous serious violations at the Lowry landfill.

Among the violations is the failure to stop and to disclose a hazardous

waste leak. No CWM employees fell EPA that Igowrf s former general

manager had instructed them to keep two sets of books: one of them a

black ed log to 1- shown to inspectors, which did not reveal the leak,

the other a yellow ed log that did record the leak but was not shown

to inspectors. (10, 148)

ado health inspectors claim they were repeatedly denied access to

the site to check for the leak. They bally gained access after one inspect-

tor stayed at the site for six hours. (17) Investigations reveal that CWM

personnel Erst detected the leak on July 16, 1981 and that both local and

corporate CWM offcials were aware of the problem. (73)

January, 21, 1983

EPA cites CWM for operating and record-keeping violations at its Lowry

1!4(1. Among the violations, failure to repay a leak in a hazardous

waste evaporation pond. CWM later pays $40,990 in penalties. 689, 414)

May 26, 1983

EPA proposes $193,640 in fines against CWM for allowing water to ac-

cumulate in a toxic waste burial pit at the Lowry landfill which has been

closed for almost a year. (924 An agreement between CWM and the EPA

later reduces the penalties to $70,000. In response to an inquiry,

ado Governor Richard Lamm says ''it is the state's position that

Cgs corporate management philosophy and attitude toward regulatory

attempts have not been m the best interests of ado.'' (414, 439)

March 30, 1984

EPA penalizes CWM $1,500 for failure to follow decontamination proce-

dures m their closure plan. (414)

Page 48

March 8, 1986

EPA cites CWM for illegal disposal of PCBS in a landfill not permitted to receive such wastes. CWM later pays a $15,000 penalty, while claiming that the generator failed to notify them that the drums contained PCBS. (414)

Calumet City, Illinois

CWM CID landfill complex is located in both Chicago and Calumet City, Illinois, close to the heavily industrialized South Side of Chicago and to Cc's toxic waste incinerator on Lake Calumet. (66, 209) Most of the 1,700 tons of waste dumped at CID on a daily basis up until 1989 were corrosive or aqueous. The facility Chicago area of the accepts garbage, though it received hazardous waste berate 1980. Areas of the landfill used before 1980 continue to leach into the Calumet River adjacent to the site. The Calumet River flows into Lake Michigan. (67, 518)

In March 1983, Illinois Attorney General Neil Hartigan Sled a $2.2 mil- lion suit against WMI and CWM for allegedly scheming to conceal ship- ments of 400,000 gallons of cancer-causing DCBS (dichlorobenzidenes) to Cgs Calumet City 1=45. Hartigan said WMI locked manifest record! of its shipments in a safe ''to make sure the Illinois ITA did not learn of the shipments.'' Hartigan was quoted as saying that ''this cover- up of illegal activities is a case of utter corporate i=espmsibility.'' (66, 67) The Calumet City landfill also received loads of the herbicide ingredient oryzalin acid without a permit. (66, 67)

CWM later admitted to withholding the shipping manifests, but has denied illegally receiving DCBS.

CWM received a lo-year operating permit for CAD in 1988. What follows is a chronology of problems at Cc's CID landfill.

1980

CWM fails to file approximately 50 manifests for DCB wastes disposed of at CID. (388)

July 29, 1982

CWM is cited for discharging excessive amounts of cyanide into the city sewers. The dump had ken hit with J5 citations in the previous four years, including building and operating a tank farm before receiving a per- mit. (668)

1983 to 1985

The state of Illinois reports 18 violations of groundwater regulations at CO, (264)

June 1984

William Savour, Program Analyst for EPA'S Once of Solid Waste, writes an internal memorandum Ijntmp to toxic waste leakage from CWM facilities in Chicago and Joliet, Illmois, and Vickery, Ohio, noting inade- quate groundwater monitoring systems. Sanjour mints out that due to these facts and a lack of reliable information, EPA cannot be satisfied that the Emelle and Model City landfalls are not leaking. (134)

1987

Page 49

July 19, 1987

The Chicago Sun-Times reports that ''Waste Management is funneling

money and time into improving its relationship with residents on every

front except the environment....Waste Management has overed money to

schools and civic organizations, while avoiding involvement in community

efforts to clean up the environment.'' (2594

page 50

July 29, 1987

Greenpeace joins several South Side Chicago and Calumet City com- munity groups in a zoo-person demonstration against the planned expan- sion of the CID hazardous waste landfall and the CWM/SCA incinerator. Finn protesters are arrested after blockading the gate to C1D for several hours. (386)

February 1988

Southeast Chicago residents protest a multimillion dollar cash-for- cooperation plan overed by WMI as a way to continue using landfills in the area. At issue in particular is O'Brien KL, a l4s-acre site next to CID. The plan included overs by WMI to spend millions of dollars on com- munity development projects, including job training, scholarships, hous- ing, health care, and day care. In return for the funds the company would receive neiyhterh-d cooperation for continued waste disposal m the region, which is highly polluted, has a higher percentage of people of than the national average, and has the highest concentration of landfalls in North America. (370)

February 1989

After WMI raises its fee for accepting local garbage from $3.25 per cubic

yard in 1988 to $6 per cubic yard, the Calumet City Council triples the fee

At charges the landfall for accepting hazardous waste. Alderman Joseph

Petmcci adds that ACID coûtmnes to raise its rates the city would look to

other garbage options, such as recycling. (355)

March 1989

CWM receives a 10-year permit for the 4o-acre hazardous waste landfill

section at the CID complex. (384)

October 1989

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers negotiates a trade cf its 134th Street right- of-way between two lanais at Mrs CID complex for a replacement road elsewhere. State àpresentative Clem Balauof says the proposed swap violates the intent of a five-year Chicago moratorium on building new or expanded land's. ''This gives Waste Management a possible op- portunity for an exp-sion,'' Balan of adds, calling for an extension of the five-year moratorium, which expires February 1, 1992. (383)

December 1989

CWM applies for a permit to build a $3 million pre-treatment facility at CID to treat wastes afore discharging them into the local sewage system, CWM must construct the facility or accept fewer hazardous waste ship- ments and lose prongs because of regulations banning the dumping of un- treated wastes. As a result of a new state law, company aerials mII preside over public meetings on the proposal. ''ifs the fox guarding the chicken coop again. It's outrageous'' one state aerial says. (389)

March 15, 1990

IEPA announces that it will delay granting a state permit for the $3 mil- lion treatment center for a month because CWM ''has not settled environ- mental questions about the facility'' EPA states that Mrs original design dad not adequately control air pollution from the facility, nor did it settle the number of times waste envenom the plant should be analyzed. The state later approves the treatment center, which would allow WMI to increase its current intake, about 70,000 tons a year, to its previous level, about 100,000 tons. In 1988 tougher federal laws deflating the disposal of hazardous waste were enacted and WMI lost the right to handle about

Page 51

one-third of the waste it had been accepting at CID. (546, 664)

Joliet, Illinois

In 1972, WMI transformed a municipal landfill into a hazardous waste

dump named the ESL site. Between 1972 and 1983, the company created

an. above-ground toxic dump accepting millions of gallons of waste on land

wedged between farms and the Des Plaints River, In 1983, tests revealed

that the site was leaking toxic chemicals into underlying groundwater.

The company continues to operate the site, even though pollutants con-

tinue to migrate from the site into the Goldwater, which was used by

local residents for well water.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the ESL landfill.

November 1, 1975- November 30, 1979 WMI begins ''sludge farming'' on land adjacent to the ESL dump. Sludge

farming is the application of sewage sludge or oily industrial residues on

farmland is fertilizer. Because of toxic residues that have been found in

many sludges, the practice has been restricted or prohibited in many

breast. The Illinois Pollution Control Board later rules that these opera-

tions created water pollution hazards, were not permitted, and ''caused

discharge of odors, unreasonably interfering with citizens' enjoyment of

life and property'' Over 25 residents testified to illnesses that the (EPA

linked to cl's sludge farming operations. (192)

1979 A WMI technical manager at the Joliet site writes to another WMI official

that disposal practices at Joliet were ''an open invitation to disaster'' Two

other employees warn that ''because the underlying bedrock is fissured

and creviced, any leakage from these trenches will directly enter an

aquifer that is used as a domestic water supply.'' (911

December 3, 1981 WMI and the EPA reach an agreement that penalizes WMI $7,000 for its

sludge farming operations and other unpermitted violations. (192)

1983 The ESL landfill is shut down because it is full. (10, 62)

April 1984 EPA denies kl's request to open a new section of the dump, citing the

company's failure to comply with groundwater monitoring requirements

and evidence of chemical contamination in groundwater near the landfill.

The agency recommends that the site be permanently closed ''and all was-

tes exhumed.'' (62, 204, 367)

July 21, 1986

U.S. EPA files a complaint and compliance order against WMI for its

operations at the ESL site, where continuing leaks have contaminated

groundwater below the landfall. Emulate penalizes CWM $37,250 for

repeated and continuing environmental violations at the site. Violations

include failure to properly monitor contamination that has entered the

groundwater below the facility. (767)

October 1986

Laboratory tests reveal high levels of methylene chloride, methyl ethyl

ketonqtenzene, and trichlorethylene beneath the ESL site. (170)

December 19, 1986

The Illinois Supreme Court orders the EPA to reverse its denial of a per-

gage 52

mit to WMI for a new dump section. EPA had denied the application,

citing groundwater contamination at and near the site. EPA complies

with the reversal order while limiting the material that the ESL site can

accept to toxic garbage incinerator ash. (171)

The ruling could lead to the disposal of 2.5 million cubic feet of hazard-

ous waste in a new trench. (171)

June 15, 1988

IEPA, acting in compliance with an Illinois Supreme Court order, issues a

new permit to the closed Joliet ESL land-landfill, which will allow it to reopen

to handle incinerator ash.

State's Attorney Edward Masters says he is considering further legal

action to prevent reopening of the facility based on the assertion that

water contamination from the dump, characterized as ''manageably'' is

worse than previously realized. (331)

1991

The ESL dump remains open.

Wilsonville, Illinois

1978

A court order closes a toxic waste dump in Wilsonville, Illinois, operated by Earthline Corp., a subsidiary of SCA Services; SCA becomes a partially owned subsidiary of WMI in 1984.

February 1982

The IEPA releases results of testing which show that high concentrations

of chemicals are rapidly migrating from the toxic waste dump. An EPA of-

ficial says, ''We really hadn't exacted any evidence to show up for quite

some lim: 50 years anyway'' (252)

1984

WMI acquires SCA Services, including Earthline Corp. and with it the

Wilsonville toxic waste dump.

June 26, 1988

WMI overs $2.5 million to settle a civil lawsuit over its leaking landfall in Wilsonville amputation 700). The leal residents who filed the class ac- ticn lawsuit charged that the Wilsonville toxic waste dump has caused health problems and devalued property.

The Wilsonville dump is the first state-permitted landfill in the U.S. that has been ordered to close and to exhume all its wastes. The cost of the cleanup is estimated at $50 million. (239 By 1987 all of the waste from the landfill-acre site had been removed to various Xxations. Under the

consent agreement the site is to be capped and the contaminated groundwater plume plumed out and treated.

Fort Wayne, Indiana

CWM has announced its intention to expand this commercial hazardous waste land-landfill by 9 1/2 acres. The company is also currently seeking a RCA Part B >permit. The Adms Center lands, which opened in 1975, is currently located on a iso-acre site, of which 43 acres are used for dis- posal. The company is also applying for a water pollution permit

page 53

(National Pollution Discharge Elimination System-NPDES permit)

for discharge of its treated leachate.

March 1984

Tests of groundwater below the Adams Center landfill indicate toxic

waste contamination.

September 1984

CWM purchases the Adams Center land-ll.

November 1985

EPA fines CWM $59,000 for improve pollution monitoring, failure to ing

stall monitoring sells in required locations, accepting special wastes after

the permit expiration date, accepting more wastes than specified, and

failure to obtain adequate liability coverage. CWM appeals the penalty,

and ends up paying $30,000. (414)

February 24, 1986

A CWM driver transporting waste to Adams Center is cited for violating

Illinois Department of Transportation regulations by transposing waste

without proper venting capac.ty, piping protection, or closure means.

CWM pays a $3,900 annually. (414)

April 1987

An EPA task force conducts on-site tests. However, EPA refuses to make

the test results public. (265)

September 1988

Indiana cites CWM for failing to properly install and operate

groundwave monitoring wells; financial assurance is also found deficient,

CWM pays $16,000. (414)

Furley, Kansas

In 1980, CWM purchased a hazardous waste landfill and storage facility

in burley, Kansas (near Wichita). In 1982, the state of Kansas closed the

site after tests revealed that the landfill was leaking contaminants into a

nearby creek and aquifer. WM1 won a $10.7 million settlement against

the former owner in 1985 to recover remedial costs and lost profits.

At least 134 chemicals, PCBS, 2,4,54, dioxin, pentachlorophenol, vinyl

chloride, and a multitude of other chemicals, were leaking from the site

and have been detected in the groundwater and in a spring halma mile

away that flows into Prairie Creek.

An EPA study of the fish in the contaminated creek revealed that the

ash contained carcinogenic chemicals. insults of a Kansas Newman

University test also revealed a 5048 percent modality in fish and mice ex-

posed to water from a spring emptying into the creek. (536)

Ct has attempted to reopen/n the site as a transfer and storage

facility, despite continued leakage of toxic chemicals into the groundwater.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Furley, Kansas, CWM

landfill.

February 1977

A hazardous waste dump is opened by National Industrial Environmental

Services (NOES) in Furley, about nine mikes northeast of Wichita, Kansas.

It is the Erst hazardous waste dump in the state. (1544

1978

State records indicate contamination of groundwater from the Furley site.

(152)

page 54

December 1980

CWM purchases the site from NIES without notifying the state, a viola- tion of Kansas law requiring the notification to the state 30 days prior to any change of ownership or operator. (152)

January 1981

The land-landfill site manager destines to the Kansas legislature that NIES, operator of the site, has no parent company. Several days later, CWM an- nounces that it took over NIES in December. (152)

September 1981

EPA and CWM enter into a consent agreement ahr EPA Eles a com- plaint alleging illegal storage of PCBS and improper record keeping at the Furley facility. CWM pays a penalty of $8,550 for violations, reduced from the $19,000 one sought by EPA under the original complaint. (67, 153)

January 18, 1982

The CWM Furley landfill is closed after the state ids hazardous waste leaking 1n% a creek a half mile downstream and also into an aquifer. The state closes Furley until leakage of carcinogens from the site is halted. (17, 46, 91, 154)

Late 1983

CWM stabilizes treatment ponds at burley using incinerator my ash (ash captured by pollution control devices) and lime. local residents see plumes of fly ash floating several miles from the site on windy days. Fly ash otn includes hazardous wastes such as furls, dioxids, PCBS and other organic carcinogens, and radioactive particles that were originally put in the incinerator to be burned. (152)

March 3, 1985

U.S. EPA states for the first time that operations at the Furley site may have created a substantial danger to pubic health. (155)

March 4, 1985

A federal judge orders the former owners of the Furley hazardous waste landfill to pay WMI over $10 million for lost pro-ts and cleanup costs in- curred by WMI or the site was closed. (14$

April 1986

WMI settles a $22 million lawsuit filed by 43 families living near the Furley facility. Terms of settlement include cl's demand that propers! be sold to the company as pad of the abutment, thus making the lawsuit settlement appear to be a land acquisition. WMI land in the Furley area has since increased from 160 to 1,240 acres. (152)

October 1989

EPA announces that the Furley dump will not be aahed to the Superfund priority list for cleanup, prompting the Wichita Eagle-Beacon to respond, ''The government sellout of the people living near the dump is nearly complete.'' (463)

Carlyss, Louisiana

CWM operates one of its largest hazardous waste dumps in the bayous of southern Louisiana near heavily industrialized Lake Charles. The facility is surrounded by agricultural land used primarily for soybeans and cattle. (134) Numerous violations of the facility's water discharge per- mits have occurred, although CWM has not been punished for them. Samples of groundwater taken from below Cgs Carlyss dump have in-

 

page 55

 

dicated the presence of pollutants six times between October 1984 and

September 1986.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Carlyss landfill.

1978

CWM acquires Carlyss landfill.

 

1982

Possible contamination is indicated by monitoring data from more than

six wens. The data indicate significant pil AeveA increases and increases

in total organic contaminant levels. (134)

 

October-March, 1984

Groundwater monitoring data from more than six welds indicates sig-

nificate increases in ph and in levels of total organic contaminants. 6134)

 

 

 

 

 

February 28, 1984

Three U.S. government smoke bombs blow up at the Carlyss 1=511, caus-

in! adjacent oily sludge to catch fire and burn for 20 minutes. Solvents,

pacts, and waste oils are spilled during the incident. (156)

August 27, 1984

A bulldozer accidentally cuts into a burial zone, releasing green ed

smoke. (156)

 

1985

Seventy-six neighbors of the CWM landfall ale suit against the company,

One of the plaintiffs, Marvin Harger, 68, says the stench from the landfill

sometimes wakes him from sound sleep. His Eve and seven-year-old

grandchildren next door have reactive airways disease, according to their

doctor. Harger says the chemicals caused it. '1 think I'd rather be in a

den of rattlesnakes. At least a rattlesnake will rattle. Hell give you an

honest warning. These people (CWM) don't'' (602)

February 27, 1985

CWM is cited by the state for improper disposal of PCBS. (581)

April 1985

State officials charge CWM with malodorous emissions. (583)

 

September 1985

State offcials charge CWM with failure to remove spilled liquid from leak-

ing drams and from the landfill, failure to obtain approval for under-

ground storage tanks at a track washout facility, and numerous other

violations. (414)

 

December 1985

Of-site wastewater discharges exceed limits for total suspended solids

and chemical oxygen demand. (2A0)

December 1986

CWM pays a $32,500 penalty for failure to notify state offcials when cer-

tain waste shipments were rejected for manifest discrepancies and

various drum handling and disposal deficiencies. (414)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

July 2, 1987

CWM is cited for failure to sign two asbestos disposal verification forms.

They pay a $2,500 penalty. (414)

 

April and May 1988

CWM pays $2,000 for delays in Groundwater Quality Assessment Plans

and $1,250 for vehicle marking deficiencies and use of a non-specification

cargo tank. (414)

 

January and June 1988

CWM is cited twice far storing hazardous waste in open containers. One

of the citations is for holding leachate longer than 90 days and storing

hazardous waste in several portions of the facility. The other is for receiv-

 

page 56

 

 

P>ing and landfilling wastes outside of specified hours, causing air odor violations. 6487, 521)

 

April 19 and June 22, 1988

Two fires in two months at the CWM 1=511 reveal that CWM operators ''did not have the proper knowledge of the wastes nor the equipment to combat the fxrq'' according to state offcials. After improperly using water and standard chemical fee extinguishers in the second fire, the waste finally burned itself out after 12 hours. The State Department of Environ- mental Quality (DEQ) proposes a $267,997 one. (488, 490)

September 27, 1988

An employee is hospitalized with first and second degree burns air a bash fee occurs when a track is being washed out. CWM fails to notify the Emergency dispense Division, Louisiana State Police Hazardous Materials Unit, and the Lake Charles Regional DEQ O<ce, as required in their Contingency Plan. (4899

 

December 8, 1988

During a state inspection, open hazardous waste containers are dis-

covered in the handful. (491)

 

 

 

 

January 11, 1989

 

A CWM truck containing contaminated soil overturns on a state highway. (522)

 

February 1989

A local paper reports that four CWM employees and one former employee have sued CWM over racial discrimination m hiring and promotion prac- tices. One employee claims he was harassed by CWM officials. Another worker claims his firing was racially motivated and that cc-workers ver-

bally abused him with racial slurs. As of July 1991, the lawsuit was still pending. (523)

 

April 1989

State inspectors find waste being stored in leaking and open containers.

(492)

 

 

 

September 1989

 

State inspectors again find hazardous waste being stored in an open con- tainer and also find other violations of storage regulations. The state penalizes CWM a total of $18,250. (493)

 

Porter and Lewiston New York

CWM acquired the Model City hazardous waste landfall facility from SCA Chemical Services in 1984. CWM currently has a permit for their twelfth landfall cell at the site for disposal of a variety of hazardous wastes. The company also blends chlorinated wastes that are shipped to a cement kiln in Missisauga, Canada, where it is used as fuel to make cement. Other wastes are blended and used to nm the CWM incinerator in Chicago. The company is currently attempting to receive permits for two on-site rotary kiln hazardous waste incinerators.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Model City land-ll.

December 18, 1984 CWM pays a $300 civil penalty to settle charges raised be the New York

Department of Environmental Conservation that allege discrepancies on

manifest entries for disposal of contaminated soil. (4144

page 57

1986

1985

CWM is penalized $367,500 for disusing of PCB sludge without a permit. (482)

1985

EPA inspectors penalizes CWM $35,000 and orders them to stop filtering water samples before testing at this hazardous waste dump. (267, 414) CWM pays $105,000 for exceeding allowed leachate levels and four other violations. (414)

August 27, 1987

CWM pays $7,500 for failing to comply with their permit regarding daily covering of wastes. (414)

January 1988

A high-temperature electric arc PCB incinerator constructed at Model City is turned off after the exterior heats up and apparently causes its lining to erode. CWM later scraps plans for the incinerator and files a lawsuit against the designer and manufacturer, reported to be the Electro-Melt company of Pittsburgh. (586) CWM and Electro-Pyrolysis had reportedly formed a joint venture called Arc Technologies Co.; the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reportedly paid over two-thirds of the $9 million costs of the demonstration project. (756)

July 1988

CWM pays the state a penalty of $1,000 for shipping wastes without manifests, (4144

November 1988

EPA announces it is seeking $1.3 million in fines against CWM for failing to check shipments of Pcb-contaminated sludge in 1985. Only 3 of 100 truckloads entering the plant were tested in violation of CWM's permit, which requires testing of every truckload. (587)

After a local CWM public relations director says, ''We recognized that we screwed up,'' Donald Addcliffe, vice president of Communications for CWM in their Oakbrook, Illinois, headquarters says the statement was incorrect and that CWM met all federal regulations and 'expects to be fully exonerated.'' (588) EPA is also seeking a second round of fines totaling $85,000 because of allegations of operating violations. The PCB-related offenses include:

- allowing PCB-contaminated dust to blow into the air on three occasions m December of 1985 and January of 1986;

- burying transformers on three occasions that had not been properly drained and cleansed of PCBs;

- illegal disposal of 94,000 pounds of material, some of which included material contaminated with more than 500 parts per million of PCBS. (58$

The complaints come at a time when CWM is seeking state approval to expand its landfill. (587)

1989

The state is considering permits for two new Model City incinerators as part of New York's Capacity Assurance Plan. One of the incinerators would be used to destroy 400,000 tons of pcb-contaminated soil, includ- ing 300,000 cubic yards stored on site. The second would burn commer- cially generated toxic wastes. As pad of the requirements of the revised Superfund law, the state is required to submit a Capacity Assurance Plan

page 58

(CAP), ensuring adequate treatment, storage, and disposal capacity for New York-generated hazardous waste for the next 20 years. Failure to submit an EPA-approved CAP could result in a loss of federal Superfund cleanup monies. The effort to site the incinerators in the Niagara Falls area potentially pits communities like Forest Glen (where residents are pressed for relocation from near a Superfund dump site) against resi- dents who do not want the new incinerators.

The state is also being pushed by the EPA to permit the incinerator to handle pcb-contaminated soils from other states. EPA has suggested that it might not approve a proposed multimillion dollar landfill expan- sion plan if CWM does not agree to build the incinerator. (590) The State Department of Environmental Conservation Commissioner Thomas Jorliny said he would approve of the landfall application fit is ap- proved by a siting bard composed of area residents and state officials. But members of a citizens committee that negotiated terms for the CWM expansion were never advised by CWM that commercial waste would be enumerated. (591, 592)

March1989

Porter, New York, Councilman William Hastings admits he has mixed emotions abut making money ova facility (the CWM Model Cit! landfill) he calls ''a deterrent'' to development in Porter. '1 don't like the idea that hazardous waste money is building the %q up.'' Because of a 1986 state law, Porter, New York, received $786,557 in 1989 from a a-percent tax on the annual gross receipts at Model City. (611)

November 1989

The state approves the landfill expansion plan despite objections from citizen mimers of the local siting bard. (612)

January 3, 1990

A 90-ton ''state-of-the-art high-strength'' polyester dome covering 14.1

acres over the Model City dump collapses a day after it is inflated. The

dome, which was described as the world's largest air-supported structure,

was intended to provide round-the-clock shelter for workers and equip-

Management as they construct the company s tenth (and newest) land-landfill at the

site (476)

July 1990

EPA fines CWM $1.32 million for violations in the operation of a mobile PCB dechlorination unit, which it had purchased in 1985. CWM allegedly operated the unit without prior agency approval. The proposed fine comes at a time when the comps! is investigating the feasibility of con- stmcting two PCB incinerators at its Model City facility. (724)

March 1991

Arlington, Oregon

CWM operates an enormous hazardous waste landfall in rural Gilliam County m northern Oregon, near the Columbia River, Gilliam County is

page 59

also the target of a WMI proposed 700 acre solid waste landfill. WMI took over the site when it acquired Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. in 1982. The landfall has been operated by CWM since 1986, when WMI spun off CWM as a separate corporation.

October 1983

EPA charges CWM with illegal solidification and burial of PCBS. Chem- Security Systems, Inc., a CWM subsidiary, pays a $3,500 penalty. (414)

July 6, 1984

EPA charges CWM $25,000 for failing to submit a complete Part B ap-

plication. CWM later pays $15,000 to resolve the issue. (721)

Early 1985

CWM refuses to continue removing dioxin from a hazardous waste site in

Kent, Washington, as it was hired to do by the EPA because it is reluctant

to bring dioxin to its Arlington toxic dump where the company is applying

to build an incinerator. (78)

March 13, 1985

At a public hearing on Cc's application to burn toxic waste at their Ar- lington, Oregon, landfill, local residents note a history of environmental' problems at the site. One local veterinarian said that in July 1983 br princes of a ''blow-out'' explosion reached a ranch adjacent to the 1=51). Five days later, six cows and six calves were dead, the doctor testified. (14.91

July 1985

EPA fines CWM $700,000 for hundreds of violations related to defective controls and record keeping at the Arlington dump. (1, 17, 23) The fine is later reduced to a $375,000 penalty, including a $250,000 payment to a state environmental trust fund. (721)

June 1987

CWM pays a $15,000 penalty for maintaining faulty records, failure to cor-

rect deficiencies identified during inspections, failure to maintain

manifest copies, failure to properly store reactive waste, failure to record

waste disposal locations in a land-landfill, and improperly managing water-

reactive wastes. (414, 721)

CWM is granted a Part B RCRA operating permit for its Arlington

landfill, allowing them to dump hazardous wastes there for years. (302)

1987

August 27, 1987

CWM is cited for failure to follow a Waste Analysis Plan, including failure to follow approved sampling procedures and failure to modify groundwater monitoring network to address deficiencies. (721)

February 10, 1989

CWM is penalized $19,400 by' the state DEQ for failure to identify dis-

crepancies between the manifest and actual waste received, failure to ob-

tain a representative sample from an incoming waste load, failure to

cover hazardous waste containers, failure to follow operation procedures

specified in the company's permit, and failure to accurately record the (dis-

posal location of hazardous waste within the landau. (721) CWM pays a

$14,050 civil penalty to the state. (721)

December 22, 1989

CWM is cited for disposal of free liquids in a 1=+1, failure to resolve

manifest discrepancies, failure to visually inspect containerized waste

prior to land-landfill disposal, and other violations. (721)

page 60

May 19, 1990

CWM is cited by the state DEQ for failing to properly store hazardous

waste contained and to follow its groundwater sampling plan. The com-

pany pays a $3,500 penalty. (721)

1991

The CWM Arlington landfill remains open. (714)

New Milford, Pennsylvania

WMI purchased this handful from Stabatrol Corp. in the early 1980s. Fob

lowing a state investigation, WMI was ordered to close the land-landfill and ex-

home the wasps, much of which gas to another landfall.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Lyncott landfill in New

Milford Pennsylvania.

March 31, 1981

After a five-month investigation, the state of Pennsylvania charges WMI with eve violations of environmental regulations. The state suspends operations at the Lyncott landfall and two other sites, Elwin Farms and Sunny Farms, which are based on the Lyncott design. An investigator found that the land-ll's plastic ground sealer was the equivalent of a household garbage bag. (91) A suit brought by WMI against the former owners is settled with a cancellation of the acquisition agreement. An internal WMI investigation later states that ''had a thorough technical and hydrogeologic investigation taken place prior to acquisition, these defects would have lien discovered.'' (67)

May 29, 1981

According to an internal WMI memo, the Lyncott landfall's only liner is a ''polyethylene sheet anal its effectiveness is negligible since it is probably punctured throughout with all of the sharp shale rocks present.'' The memo also notes that ''a failure of a cell or the liner in the base of the cell could result in waste almost immediately showing up in the monitoring well or in the sur wafers at the site's bound-is.'' (191)

1990

Port Arthur, Texas

CWM opened a hazardous waste land-landfill next to a swamp in Port Arthur

in 1977. CWM has been penalized $1 million for inadequate groundwater

monitoring at the site. CWM has also constructed and begun operating a

hazardous waste incinerator at the site.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Port Arthur landfill.

The Port Arthur landfill opens adjacent to a swamp.

October 1977-1980

The Port Arthur landfill receives 86 drums of 2,4-D, chlorinated benzene, and chlorinated phenol wastes with possible dioxin contamination. (183)

May 20, 1983

CWM and the state of Texas settle an. Environmental Ablations com-

pliançe agreement. (183)

December 1983

Federal investigators note noxious green water bubbling up from a well

page 61

July and September 1984

on site (265)

Federal laboratory tests reveal groundwater pollution beneath the Port

Arthur landfill. (265)

1985

The state of Texas ones CWM $1 million for operations at the Port Arthur

landfall. Violations include improper leachate collection systems and in-

adequate groundwater monitoring welds. (1934

July 1985

CWM agrees to pay the $1 million penalty. (265)

A state enforcement official reveals that there have been two known areas of hazardous waste releases into the groundwater beneath the Port Ar- thur 1!511. The groundwater is known to migrate into the adjacent swamp. (193)

January 1990

CWM has an application pending with the Texas Water Commission to open an aboveground commercial lankly on 60 acres next to its newly constructed incinerator for disposal of hazardous waste, including in- cinerator ash. The proposed land-landfill would sit on a floodplain. (548)

March 1991

CWM's permit for a hazardous waste incinerator is turned down by a Texas Court of Appeals. The permit was challenged by the Coalition Ad- vocating a Safe Environment, which claimed CWM had improperly talked with an engineer with the Texas Air Control Board which gives initial

permit approval before they reach the final permitting agency, the Texas Water Commission, in violation of the Texas Administrative Procedure Act. The Texas Waste Commission announces it will appeal the court's ruling. (768)

Omega Hills, Wisconsin (closed)

WMI owns the Omega Hills landfill in Germantown, Wisconsin, which, before it closed, received 2,000 tons of waste per day. From 1977 to 1982, the site was licensed to dispose of hazardous wastes, including liquids. Over 72 million gallons of liquid hazardous wastes were dumped in Omega Hills prior to April 1983. EPA has charged that the disposal of these liquids, along with the effects of precipitation and Mrs failure to remove and treat adequate mounts of leachate, have resulted in the ac- cumulation of more than 200 million gallons of liquid waste beneath and around the landfall. Monitoring welds around the landfall show that the groundwater is contaminated. EPA has placed this site on its National Priorities List for Supered cleanup. (175)

January 1983

More than 11,000 gallons of contaminated water is spilled at Omega Hills.

The state of Wisconsin sues WMI for failing to install a proper groundwater monitoring system, calling the landfill a ''continuing public nuisance'' The suit filed by the state's Attorney General charges that leachate contaminated nearby groundwater. (265, 482)

page 62

September 1986

WMI pays a $8,500 civil penalty for emissions violations from its landfill.

February 1989

June 19, 1989

Sources in the Milwaukee city government and private industry indicate that a permit for Thermal Processing Corp. to build a medical waste in- cinerator is denied by the city Board of Zoning Appeals because of opposi- tion from the mayor's once and from WMI subsidiary Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. 4538) WMI plans to have its own medical waste incinerator fully operational at Omega Hills, about one-half mile from the sit! of Thermal Processing's proposed incinerator. Thermal Processing claims that WMI sent representatives to public hearings to ex- press opposition to their incinerator project. (538)

1990

CWM applies for a permit Q) operate a waste storage and treatment

facility at its Omega Hills facility. (714)

DEEP WELL INJECTION FACILITIES

Loopholes in federal hazardous waste law have made deep well injection the cheapest and one of the most poorly regulated waste disposal methods. The full environmental implications of creating a giant pres- surized reservoir of hazardous waste under the earth's sur are uncer- tain. Based on a meager understanding of the long-term behavior of chemicals in underground geological formations, operators of deep welds inject huge quantities of pressurized waste into underground layers of

E

rock and rely upon overlong rock strata to contain the wastes forever. Present research methods cannot characterize the details of deep geologi- cal formations, the potential reactions of waste chemicals with under- ground rocks and quids, and the potential of such reactions to speed waste migration, increase chemical toxicity, or dissolve or plug rock forma- tions. Injunction wells are known to have caused groundwater contamina- tion, well blow-outs, damage to underground geology, and earthquakes. Contamination may occur with greater frequency as time passes, pres- sures increase, -4 injected wastes migrate eer from injection Wells. The fundamental problem with deep well injection is that it creates a Cached dilemma. If enough geologic exploratory work is done to be able to claim an understanding of the subsur, by that act of exploration the site has ken turned into something resembling Swiss cheese: thus com- promising its usefulness as a waste repository. Therefore, deep well injec- tion is always occurring into geologic strata that are not well understood.

page 63

Vickery, Ohio

Near the shore of Lake Erie, CWM operates a waste storage, treatment, and disposal facility known was Ohio Liquid Disposal (0LD). OLD'S primary feature is a deep well injection facility.

Vickery has entered environmental history b-ks alongside such toxic disaster areas as love Canal and Tides Beach. In 1985, CWM was fined what was at that time the highest federal environmental penalty in U.S. history for mixing PCBS with waste oil at the OLD facility. The company sold over 6 million gallons of the toxic concoction to unsuspecting mid- western oil customers. It is estimated that WMI saved over $20 million by selling PCBS instead of dealing with them. William Savour, program analyst in the U.S. EPA'S Office of Solid Waste and Emergency espouse, says the agency ''never really made a strong effort to find out where (the oil) went. By doing so, they saved Waste Management a hell of a lot of money. <1 of those buyer coned have sued.'' (6604

In 1990 CWM settled what may be the largest toxic waste-related class action lawsuit in history over its operations in Vickery. At least one party to the suit refused to sign the settlement because it includes a ''gag clause'' that forbids signers from protesting the company's operations in the future.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the Vickery site.

1968

Don's Oil Service begins recycling used oils into industrial fuel; later Don's sells the facility to Ohio Liquid Disposal.

1978

WMI purchases Ohio Liquid Disposal.

An EPA inspection notes an explosion in a site reactor vessel. Other viola-

tions include inadequate advance notice to EPA of waste shipment, inade-

quate record keeping of manifest copies, and uncovered waste piles. (577)

1983

CWM pumps more than 450 million gallons of industrial wastes into their deep well injection shafts in Victory, Ohio. An. estimated 8 to 12 percent (36 million to 54 million gallons) of the wastes leak out of injection welds at depths of 2,500 to 2,700 feet, where waste disposal is prohibited by law. The Ohio EPA blames the incident on faulty design, of the injection wells but does not fine CWM. (9, 10, 17)

March 21, 1983

CWM's hazardous waste facility in Vickery is temporarily closed after it is discovered to be improperly storing 135,000 gallons of contaminated waste. In addition, waste oil stored on site is found to contain PCBS at higher levels than allowed. A chemist at the site charges that the com- pal is disposing of wastes received from Canada, sending arsenic-con- tamminated wasps into the deep well, illegally disposing of highly concentrated PCBS, and destroying test results that revealed high levels of toxic chemicals. The chemist, Dr. Peter Phung, was fared by CWM after making his allegations public. 62, 87, 481)

May 2, 1984

Ohio EPA and WMI! reach a consent agreement that includes $10 million in penalty payments and $10 million in regulation compliance measure costs for illegal disposal of PCBS in Vickery lagoons and deep wells. (118)

page 64

September 1984

CWM is cited twice for mixing incompatible wastes in lagoons. (580)

January, 1985

April 5, 1985

EPA announces that the $2.5 million penalty is the final settlement. CWM is banned from accepting waste at Mickey for 10 months while it cleans up two open lagoons containing 120 million gallons of PCB-con- tamminated waste. Cleanup costs plus fines are estimated at $20 to $25 million. (75)

August 25, 1986

CWM pays $28,000 to the Ohio EPA to settle charges that an employee

had allowed a rainwater release of reactive hazardous wastes and fabled

to report this in a timely manner by the Ohio EPA. (482)

October 17, 1986

In a civil suit brought against CWM by William Warner and other 10c+ residents, Dr. Moid Up Ahmad, a professor of geology and hydrology at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio, testifies that contused deep well injec- tion at Vickery ''will, within the next decade, cause the migration of haz- ardous waste into strata below property around the Vickery site'' and that ''continued deep well injection will to a reasonable degree of profes- sional certainty cause an earthquake within the area of the leaking site.'' 6479)

March 5, 1988

A transfer pipe ruptures, leaking about 12,000 gallons of sulfuric acid and water. Between 400 and 1,000 gallons enter a nearby creek. (478)

April 4, 1988

EPA'S Once of Criminal Investigations ales charges against Ronald Shaw, Cc's Director of Removal Actions at Hickey. The U.S. govern- Management charges Shaw with failure to establish and maintain records regard- ing Cc's acquisition, storage, and disposal of pcb-laced oil in Victory between 1981 and 1983. Shaw, if convicted, could a (me of up to $25,000 for each day of the violation and a year in prison. (298)

September 1988

EPA files a civil complaint against the Vickery facility, charging CWM with failure to submit groundwater monitoring reports in a timely man- ner, as required under a previous consent agreement, and for operating a sur impoundment after the unit had lost interim status. EPA is- timates the fines +11 lxy $1 to $2 million. (482)

page 65

October 26, 1988

The case against Ronald Shaw is dismissed by a federal magistrate of the U.S. District Court in Toledo, Ohio, and the charges are dropped.

1989

CWM pays $19,000 to settle claims by the Ohio EPA and U.S. EPA charg- ing CWM with violations of waste storage tank operation. (482)

May24 and June 7, 1989

Two accidental releases of nitrogen dioxide create ''an orange cloud' at the CWM Vickery plant. (480)

The Sixth U.S. District Court of Appeals returns a $3 billion class action lawsuit against CWM to a lower cot for trial, ruling that the lower court acted properly when it refused to break up the suit. The suit, Sled in 1982, xs estimated to represent between 3,500 and 7,000 people. (3874

1990

The Vickery class action lawsuit is pare! settled out of court before it gas to trial. an what is described by plan-fs' attorneys as the largest civil settlement ever awarded in the U.S. related to a hazardous waste dis- posal site, CWM agrees to pay $15,000,000 to property owners and their attorneys. plaint's are also suing Cc's insurers for $30 million. The settlement agreement stipulates that the $30 million is to be divided equally between the plenties and CWM. If the second part of the case is fully successful, CWM will, in eject, be fully reimbursed for the payments they made to the lawsuit plaintiffs. 4585)

The class action relieves CWM of ''any claims relating to any future subsur, ob-site migration of injected waste material from permitted deep wells into geological formations below the Big Lime aquifer ideate plenties' pro/my.'' The settlement also releases CWM from claims by heirs and other future property owners.

Of questionable morality is a clause in the settlement that restricts the plaintiffs, their heirs and successors from impeding the deep well injec- tion operation and from even ''objecting to such migration in any fonmuwjhe N.O.P.E. (Northern Ohioans to Protect the Environment, a local grassroots group) organization and its directors and owners will not opmse or in. any way object to pending or future requests for approval, petitions or permit applications of the defendants required by any governmental commission, department or alency..provided there is no fundamental change in the nature of operations at the Site'' William Wader, one of the original plaintiff in the case, refuses to sign the agree- Management, stating that he refuses to give away his rights against the company. (585, 613)

March 1990

After a call from a local citizen, the Ohio EPA is noticed by local Alice of a spiel of hydrochloric acid from one of Cc's trucks en route to Vickery. (614)

Corpus Christi, Texas

This facility is located in a very or minority community.

What follows is a chronology of problems at the CWM Corpus Christi

deep well facility.

gage 66

1983

The state of Texas cites CWM for violation of environmental regulations at its deep well injection facility 5.u Corpus Christi, Texas. A wellhead at the facility indicates possible leakage com injection shafts. CWM is also cited for maintaining inadequate pressure on the injection shaft. (194)

1987

EPA declares Cc's Corpus Christi ejection well unfit to receive wastes removed from Surround sites. Officials of EPA àgion VI say they deter- mined that remedial action taken by the facility in response to a 1980 Texas action did not satisfy requirements of the Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act (Sm).

1989

A state inspector says records show violations have been found in 10 of 18 inspections of the well since it began of-ration in 1982. (356)

Port Arthur, Texas

CWM operates a deep well injection facility at its landfill/incineration complex in Port Arthur.

March 1989

The Coalition Advocating a Safe Environment (CASE), a citizens' group, indicates its intention to sue CWM over continuing violations of regula- tions. CASE alleges that the Port Arthur facility is handling extremely acidic wastes for which the well was not designed and that corrosion is probably occurring. In addition, CASE alleges state inspections show the well is rarely pressurized properly to contain leaking waste, and the ce- Management encasement is cracked and has never been repaired, posing a poten- tial threat to ' ' g water. The suit is later dismissed. 4354)

CWM'S SHAM HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING: 'FUEL'' PROCESSING FOR CEMENT KILNS

As it is currently written and interpreted, the Superfund Amendments and 'authorization Act (SARA) allows waste generators to reclassify sob vent wastes as ''recycled'' when they are part of a process that blends them for use as a supplemental fuel in idlers, kilns, and even commercial hazardous waste enumerators. CWM pro-ts from this loophole by blend- ing wastes for use as fuels cement Ens and other kinds of burners. By accepting wastes into their fuel-blending program, CWM provides a way for waste generators under pressure to claim they have reduced the amount of waste they create. A company cam without instituting a single process change, claim waste reduction gains by sending waste to a cement

kiln.

In 1988, CWM facilities processed over 80 percent more waste solvents for sale to cement kilns and other industrial boilers and furnaces than in 1987. (484) Cc's West Carrollton Solvent & Recovery Services facility in Ohio, for instance, received 54,932 tons of chlorinated solvents from 26 states. (534) Other CWM blending facilities exist in Newark, New Jersey; Azusa, California; Henderson, ado; and Tijuana, Mexico.

CWM also stores solvent-based wastes for use as fuels in cement kilns and boilers at some of its hazardous waste landfalls, including the landfills in Emelle and Chicago's Southeast Side, both of which ship sol-

page 67

vents to cement kilns. (600)

Problems with spills and fugitive emissions occur at waste-blending facilities. In 1988 CWM paid a $5,000 civil snaky for discharging treated waste into the sewer from its fuel blending facility in Newark, New Jersey. The discharge was not permitted by the company's NPDES (waste water discharge) permit. (414)

U.S. cement and aggregate manufacturers are burning hazardous waste as fuel at the rate of If billion bunds per year. (506) Heavy metals and other toxic chemicals released from waste-burning Ens and boilers pose the immediate and long-arm threats to public health and the en- vironment. Emissions from waste-burning Eus include lead, mercury, dioxids, furls, and PCBS. (693) The possible contamination of cement has not been adequately monitored, leaving the possibility of toxic con- struction materials and exposure of construction workers. Is your house or water main made of toxic cement? The possibility certainly exists.

In 1991 CWM formed Cemtech, a joint venture with Holnam, Inc. (a ce- Management company) to burn hazardous waste at Holnam's facilities. (772)

CWM'S SHAM HAZARDOUS WASTE REDUCTION CONSULTING SERVICE

A 1990 study conducted for the U.S. EPA states that U.S. industry generates at least one trillion pounds of hazardous waste each year, over two tons or person in the U.S. each year. (7084 Unfortunately, govern- Management aid industry efforts have focused on managing waste streams once they are generated rather than changing the technologies and materials that produce this almost inconceivable amount of waste in the first place. Despite its name, Cc's Waste Reduction Consulting Services division is not an exception to this end-of-pipe focus on waste reduction. Even a cursory examination of the Waste Reduction division's services reveals that, m some instances, they encourage farther waste disposal rather than maximizing prevention.

'he toxics reduction requires eliminating the use of hazardous chemi- cals which reduces the discharge of wastes to the environment without shifting toxic exposure burdens to workers, other parts of the environment, or to consumers via marketed frauds. Methods of achieving toxics reduction include:

- redesigning end products and modifying production methods so that there is not a reliance on hazardous materials in production;

- substituting non-toxic or less toxic input materials;

- recycling materials within the production process and improving production leniency and housekeeping.

page 68

Like its solid waste receding service, Cc's hazardous waste consult- ing branch is a recent addition to Mrs variety of services. Otn Cgs waste reduction consultations shift the burden of waste generation from one medium to another.

CWM's Waste Reduction Services has, for instance, advised companies to divert deionized regenerates directly to the sewer instead of to a Waste Water Treatment Plant, a transfer from one environmental medium to another. (622)

CWM has also advised clients to put injection molding wastes, solvent- based inks, paint wastes, and other spent solvents in a fuel-blending pre gram for cement kilns and coal-bred plants. (622) Companies can better reduce wastes by substituting safer materials such as water-based inks and non-toxic solvents and mechanical processes for other solvent uses.)

The kinds of ''waste-reduction'' consulting services overed by waste (dis- posal companies such as CWM pervert the definition of ''wash minimiza- tion'' and forestall implementation of methods that get to the heart of the problem. Citizens should be encouraged to do their own audits and in- spections of waste-generating facilities to determine how a company can improve its processes and reduce its use of toxic chemicals. This is now being done by many citizens in many communities. Tor further informa- tion on how to conduct your own audit see The Greenpeace ''citizen's Toxic Waste Audit Manual,'' a guide for citizens interested in conducting such audits-see endnote 736.)

Page 69

PORK BARREL POLITICS: CWM'S REMEDIAL CLEANUP DIVISION

CWM is ideally positioned to gain many Superfund site and federal facility cleanup contracts. It is a leading hazardous waste incinerator com- pany; CWM owns the Emelle, Alabama landfill (which receives more Superfund waste than any other landfill and, in the case of radioactive wastes, it has control over the county's sole licensed low-level radioactive waste dump east of the Mississippi River (with federal contracts to develop at least three more).

CWM's Environmental Remedial Action Division (ENLC) completed more than 314 projects in 1989 and won 23 major contracts with a sten- tial total revenue over the lives of the projects (which continue into the early 1990s) of more than $230 million. In addition to the company' s major incinerators and land-ls, the ENIM.C division utilizes mobile in- cineration and other technologies. (6184 Cgs revenues from ENRAC rose by about 40-50 percent in 1989 to almost $300 million. (670) The remedial cleanup sector of Cgs business depends on continued environmental contamination for future business. The mom secure regulators and industry become with cleanup Elans, no matter how inade- quate their results, the less likely they are to view prevention of further contamination as a pressing national emergency. Cleanup methods them- selves involve the use of dirty technologies such as incineration and land-ling and, consequently, can shift the burden of contamination from one commit! to another or from one medium to another. Although it is already leaking, Cgs hazardous waste landfill in Emelle, Alabama, continues to receive more Surround site cleanup waste than any other dump in the country. Pressure from community groups and public orchis to dean up Supered, clomps deemed highly hazardous by the EPA places political pressure on the agency to go easy on CWM commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities that receive Superfund site wastes (such as the smells dump and the Chicago incinerator), despite the enormous problems and threat to public health ànd the environment.

CWM has on atheist four occasions been paid by U.S. EPA to move waste from a Superfund site where WMI was a potentially responsible pad! (i.e., deemed by the U.S. EPA as partially responsible for the ordinal dumping) to another one of the company's facilities. (134) For instance, in 1983, CWM removed Superfund sate wastes from a dump at Barker Chemical of Texas, where WMI was listed by the EPA as a poten- tially responsible party, to its Corpus Christi, Texas, facility. (134) Transmrtmg the wastes can also create additional problems.

DOE/DOD Cleanups: The Last Refuge of the Scoundrels

Attention is being given to massive contamination and uncontrolled dumps at federal weapons pràucticn facilities. Pressure is increasing to clean up these sites, and most likely contracts III be given to civilian teams. With its position as the leading civilian hazardous waste and radioactive waste disposal company m the U.S. CWM is ideally positioned to take advantage, with over $50 billion m potential revenues over 10 years. (670) In 1989 CWM specifically targeted the Department of

page 70

Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) facility cleanup market with

the creation of Chem-Nuclear Environmental Services, Inc. (CNEO,

CNES was built by taking the government services division of Chem-

Nuclea Systems, Inc. (the radioactive waste handling and disposal sub-

sidiary of CWM) and adding four acquisitions: Sirrine Environmental

Consultants, Enwright Environmental Laboratories (renamed Chem-

Nuclear Laboratory Services), UNC lamentation, and UNC Geotech (a

ado-based relegation company). (755, 764)

In. 1991, CWM subsumed all of its federal facility work under a new

''umbrella environmental services'' arm, Waste Management Environment-

tal services, enc. One of the first federal facilities targeted by the com-

pany was the Department of Energy' s Hanford, Washington, reservation,

where they intend to build a hazardous/radioactive waste incinerator for

on-site waste streams as well as waste generated off-site by the state's

commercial industries. Because commercial hazardous waste incinerators

have become increasingly difficult to site in recent years one has to ask, is

this a thinly disguised stratas to use federal agencies for cover and

remove the process from public scrutiny?

In 1985, WMI subsidiary Georgia Waste Systems and three other

waste disposal companies agreed to pay $130,000 to settle a 1984 Depart-

Management of Justice civil suit alleging price-mg of waste removal contracts

for federal facilities in the Atlanta area. The companies allegedly over-

charged the government by 45 percent and at least 10 federal agencies

and military installations between 1974 and 1979. (41, 141, 439, 482)

The U.S. Once of Management and Budget (Ob) has drawn up

broad criteria for debarment of companies convicted of criminal antitrust

charges that wish to receive federal contracts, but OMB issued them mere-

ly as non-binding guidelines for federal agencies. The DOD and DOE have

weak positions on doing business with companies that have a history of

criminal and environmental violations. (669)

"WE ARE A HICK TOWN IN THE MIDDLE OF NOWHERE'': NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS

WMI, through its CWM subsidiary, Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., is also

capitalizing on the growing and lucrative ''low-level'' radioactive waste dis-

posal market. ''low-level'' radioactive waste includes extremely toxic

waste generated by commercial nuclear power reactors, industry, and re-

search and medical institutions. The waste covers a broad spectrum rang-

ing from radioactive hardware and pits, solvents, resins, and sludges

from the interior of nuclear reactors to radiated animal carcasses and

contaminated clothing. The hazardous life of ''low-level'' radioactive waste

ranges from hours to hundreds of thousands of years. (706)

In December 1980, the U.S. Congress passed the Low level Radioac-

tive Waste Policy Act (LLRWPA) which ordered that each state be respon-

sible for the so-called ''low-level'' radioactive waste generated within its

orders. The Act strongly encourages the states to form regional group-

ings or compacts when deciding where to locate ''low-level'' dumps. In

1985, Congress passed amendments to the act which require that all

states have in place by 1993 a method for disposal of the ''low-level'

page 71

radioactive waste and assume liability for the commercially generated

waste by 1996 ifno facility has fen, established. (707)

The LLRWPA electively excludes citizens living near the 'low-level''

radioactive waste dumps from control of màjor decisions regarding the

dump sites. Rural communities-financially stressed and politically iso-

lated-are targeted to accept the dumps. Administration of the siting law

is carried out by offcials appointed by a host state's governor. These ap-

pointees are not elected and therefore not directly accountable to citizens.

Dump owners and nearby homeowners/farmowners find property in-

surance against damage from radioactive waste unavailable or expensive.

Potential hazards from ''low-level'' radioactive waste dumps include

shipping accidents, security problems, worker safety problems, leakage of

radioactivity to the environment, difficulties related to access for inspec-

tion and maintenance, and restricted ability to monitor or retrieve waste

in the event of a failure.

The largest ''low-level'' radioactive waste service company in the

country, cl's Chemical Waste Management subsidiary Chem-Nuclear

Systems, Inc. (CNSI) operates one of three licensed commercial ''low-

level'' radioactive waste dumps in the U.S., in Barnwell South Carolina.

page 72

CNSI exacts to operas four more dumps under multi-state ''low-level''

radioactive waste disposal compacts created under the 1980 low level

Radioactive Waste Po 'hc! Act. No other company has obtained a contract

to build a ''low-level'' radioactive waste dump east of the Mississippi. (764)

Other services overed by CNSI are decommissioning nuclear facilities,

radioactive waste transport contamination removal services (superfund

contracting), and management of spent nuclear fuel storage 'ls. Since

1983, CNSI has also ken involved in the Uranium MEII Tailings

Remedial Action (UMTM) project of the Department of Energy. (764)

Barnwell, South Carolina

CNSI'S Barnwell facility receives the majority of 'low-level'' radioactive

waste generated commercially in states east of the Mississippi River. The

facility also receives waste from the U.S. Army and Air Force. More than

23 million cubic feet of radioactive waste have bee dumped at the

Barnwell site. The dump is expected to receive waste at least through

1992.

1969

Nuclear waste entrepreneur Fred Beierle forms intercontinental Nuclear,

Inc. and changes its name to Chem-Nuclear Services a few months later.

The company's starting assets total $150,138. (300)

November 4, 1969

Beierle applies to build and manage a radioactive waste dump in South

Carolina. (300)

April 13, 1971

The state of South Carolina grants Chem-Nuclear permission to build a

radioactive waste dump in Barnwell. Beierle had already sold Chem-

Nuclear Services to a small Erm, Great Columbia Corporation, which sub-

sequently changed its name to Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (CNSI) (300)

1971

Chem-Nuclear opens a radioactive waste dump in Barnwell adjacent to

the U.S. Savannah River nuclear fuel plant.

1973

Chem-Nuclear's Barnwell site ranks as the U.S.'S largest commercial

radioactive waste dump, taking in 604,000 cubic feet of radioactive waste

in one year. (186)

August 1974

CNSI is cited by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environ-

mental Control for failure to notify the state that CNSI found elevated

levels of tritium in monitoring welds. The U.S. Geological Survey finds

that tritium was released a short distance from the disposal cells. (472)

1982

A U.S. Geological Survey report ands that radioactive waste is leaking

from the maxwell dump. The survey ads that ''tritium has migrated

downward, outward and upward from the buried waste''

The surge! reports contamination of water beneath the buried waste,

including tritium levels 100 times higher than background levels.

Analyses also find radioactive cobalt-6o beneath one trench. (187)

October 1982

WMI acquires CNSI. (97)

page 73

1986

Chem-Nuclear Transportation of Barnwell, a WMI subsidiary, is iden-

tifed as a potentially responsible party (individual or company potential-

ly responsible for contamination) at the Maxey Flats, Kentucky,

Superfund Site. (414)

April 23, 1986

Chem-Nuclear Transportation pays a $12,000 one to settle charges that

truck drivers were permitted to make improve entries on their record-of-

duty status. (414)

1991

The Barbwell dump is expected to close by the end of 1992 when other

''low-level'' radioactive waste dumps are expected to be opened.

Channahon, Illinois

January 1987

WMI subsidiary CNSI begins operating a nuclear waste compacting sta-

tion in Channahon, Illinois, without informing local residents, including

the mayor. ''be thing that is upsetting to us here is that we are a hick

town in the middle of nowhere, and they IXiA they can dump on us,''

Mayor Caisson says. ''If stinla'' (373) David Ebenhack, ice president of

regulatory affairs for CNSI, claims that the lack of notification is an over-

sight. (373) àpresentatives from the Illinois Citizens Advisory Commit-

tee on low level Waste bereaved to advise the Illinois Department of

Nuclear Safety how to manage nuclear waste in Illinois) are also furious

they were not noticed. ''Chem-Nuclear attends !1 of our meetings and

has not said a word/' says Joanna H-lseher of Citizens for a Better En-

vironment, who serves on the committee, ''somebody is trying to keep this

UA&T wraps.'' (3734 State Senator Jerome Joyce (Dlssexl accuses the Il-

linois Department of Nuclea Safety (IDNS) of ''attempts to mislead'' in

failing to alert the public. (374) County and town officials also accused

IDNS and its director, Terry ash, of covering up the compactor plans by

screening out the public. IDNS issued a permit to CNSI for the ''super

compactor'' on December 6, 1986. (374) The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion also states that the company may not have adequately informed the

Channahon police and Ere departments of the possible presence of ''low-

)ever' radioactive waste as required for licensing. (375)

February 8, 1987

Will County, Illinois, fees suit against Chem-Nuclear to halt operation of

the nuclear waste compactor in Channahon until the company acquires

an air pollution control permit from the EPA. The suit is initially sup-

mrted by Illinois Attorney General Neil Hartigam (J77) The suit is later

dropped and use of the compactor is granted under a permit to remodel

the ''low-lever' radioactive waste transfer station.

September 1989

IDNS chief Terr! Lash is dismissed air accusations sur over his han-

dling of the Madmsville and Fairseld ''low-level'' radioactive waste dump

siting procedure (see chronology below).

1990

TLe compactor remains open in, Channahon.

page 74

Martinsville and Fairfield, Illinois

Illinois is mandated by the Low level Radioactive Waste Policy Act to

come up with a site for a ''low-level'' radioactive waste dump as part of the

Central Midwest Compact on Igow-lzvel Radioactive Waste. Kentucky is

the other member state in the compact. CNSI has proposed building a

''low-level'' radioactive waste dump near either Fairfield (Wayne County)

or Martinsville (Clark County), Illinois, as part of the compact. The Mar-

tinsville tract is the preferred site. Data from state-run tests show a

direct connection between groundwater beneath the site and welds provid-

ing Martinsille's water supply. (703) The fir-field site is also over an

aquifer and supports 14 active oil welds. (376, 377)

A three-person committee appointed by the governor is currently in the

process of the sites to degerm inating the sites suitability to safely contain

radioactive waste for the full duration of their toxicity ('low-level'' radioac-

tive waste can be expected to contain cesium, strontium, and many other

substances whose hazardous lives extend for hundreds of years).

An Illinois Senate Executive subcommittee accused state officials in

1990 of trying to rig the site selection process in favor of Martinsville be-

cause the six-person city council of the town of 1,300 voted to welcome the

dump. The subcommittee also accused IDNS aerials of manipulating

hydrogeological studies of the potential dump sites and arranging a secret

agreement with Chem-Nuclear to relocate the company's supercomputer

from Channahon, in northern Illinois, to the dump site. (703) The agree-

Management, which was made without approval of the state General Assembly,

as required, is in violation of the current Central Midwest Compact

Aviations. The dump is scheduled to be open by January of 1993.

page 75

Citizens of both Wayne and Clark authorities have organized and voted

in opposition to the dump.

July 1989

The Clark County Supervisory Board votes against the project, as do

voters in a countywide advisory referendum. Sixty-eight percent of voters

in Wayne County also reject the proposal, alone with a county-appointed

citizens review group, while the Martinsville city council supports the

project. The Department of Nuclear Safety Director, Terry Lash, initially

announced in 1987 that the state would not put the dump anywhere it

was not wanted, but reversed himself after the referendum, saying it

would 1:- placed in any good location where local officials want it. Both

Fairfield and Martinsville received over $550,000 in state grants to con-

sider the proposal. Michael Podolsky of fair-field, a critic of the dump and

cochairman of Wayne County's state-funded Citizens Review Committee

on the dump, calls the payout ''community bribery'' Expenditures in-

cluded an all-expense-paid two-week trip to France for 17 supporters of

the dump project and trips to Barnwell, South Carolina, for over a

hundred residents to view Chem-Nuclear's dump there. Most of the

visitor to Barnwell are not told about the leaks there. It is later reveled

that Lash secretly arranged with the mayor of Martinsville and other offi-

cials to silence a prominent Florida legislator who urged residents of his

hometown of Martinsville to demand more state benefits if the dump were

to (me located there. (376, 380, 6034

July 19, 1989

Illinois signs a $50 million contract with CNSI for a ''low- level'' radioac-

tive waste dump in one of two sites. (372)

August 1989

The former manager of Chem-Nuclear's Barnwell dump is paid $1,000 a

dam plus expanses by the state for a lg-day stint in Wayne County. His

assignment vs to ''talk to people, to help educate them.'' (380)

September 1989

An industrial geologist questions the state's assessment of the Mar-

tinsville site, citing correlations between pressure drops in water-bearing

strata beneath the site and heavy water usage in the city as evidence that

they are connected. Lash says the water beneath the proposed site is not

connected to the welds. (377).

October 1989

State officials announce at a Martinsville community meeting that the

hydrogeological site study was cawed because the wording of the report

had been ''tampered with'' by state consultants to make it sound as if

there were no problems with the site. (3784 It is later revealed that the

state's chief consultant in the site search, the Battelle Institute, had sup-

pressed and altered memoranda from another consultant warning of

dangers at the Martinsville site. (603) Representatives of the Better

Government Association (BGA) can for the dismissal of Terry Lash, who

told the state senate and a state advisory committee that no aquifer ex-

isted at the site. (379) The BGA is later joined by many state officials in

its demand for Lash's dismissal. (381)

November 30, 1989 A former top aide to Lash reveals he left Lash's department in a dispute

over the state's tactics in pushing for creation of a downstate nuclear

page 76

dump site. Rich Walker, Lash's former senior policy analyst and research

associate, says he and 30 ides were forbidden to use the words ''radioac-

tive'' and ''dump' in preparing a critique of the department's report on the

probable social and economic impact of the proposed dump. (390)

December 1989

The Wayne County Board votes to abolish the county's Citizen levies

Committee accuse it criticizes the proposed dump. (438) The Wayne

County site is later dropped airlock residents twice reject the facility

in referenda. (703)

March 15, 1990

The Chicago Sun-Times reveals that a secret contract exists between

CNSI and the state allowing for expanded dump operations, despite pre-

vious assurances from the state that no such action was planned. The

''confidential side agreement'' gives Illinois officials the right Q) transfer a

nuclear waste supercomputer from Channahon to the future dump site,

which would allow the dump to receive wastes from outside the two states

controlling the facility, Illinois and Kentucky. CNSI denies the agree-

Management exists, but the state later acknowledges the existence of the agree-

Management. Lash is later fired over the incident. (543, 603)

June 1990

TAP Chicago Sun-Times and the BGA1em that state offcials and offi-

cials from Battelle, the chief site selection consultant, agreed between

themselves that state geological and water survey officials will ''voluntari-

ly refrain'' from reviewing Battelle's final summary and conclusion to

avoid giving water and geological survey offcials a role as ''re/ah-rs.''

(703) The review of the site by state water and geological survey serials

had been promised previously by Governor James Thompson. (703)

Charles Norris, a University of Illinois industrial geologist critical of

the Martensite site, contends that data from state-run tests show a

direct connection between groundwater beneath the site and wells provid-

ing Martinsville water supply. (703) State Water Survey scientists say

an initial examination of normal' conclusions disclose ''nothing inconsis-

tent'' with state-generated test data. The state's geological and water sur-

vey scientists also discover that leakage from the dump would have a

''travel time'' of only 20 years to the nearest groundwater beneath the site.

State site safety standards bar the choice of a location with a leakage

travel time of less than 500 years. (703)

In a move that the BGA calls a ''gross convict of interest'' the state in,-

tends to permit Chem-Nuclear to perform other site suitability tests in,-

stead of using disinterested outside scientists. (703)

A new opposition coup, Martinsville Against the Dump (MAD),

promises to use civil disobedience to stop the selection of the Martinsville

site A new local ordinance prohibits picketing in Martingale, prompting

a reaction from the American Civil Liberties Union. (763)

State water and geologic survey offcials begin working with Illinois

Department of Natural Resources (IDNR) and its contractor on the site

(763)

A $400,000 grant from IDNS brings the total of unrestricted grants

received by Martinsville to $1.2 million. Martinsville city officials and

Chem-Nuclear put on a jobs fair for the town. (763)

page 77

A November referendum indicates declining support for the dump in

M-insville. Three-quarters of the voters in Clark County vote against

the site in a local referendum. (763)

March 1991

The Chicago Sun-Times reports that the special siting commission

created in the wake of the IDNS scandals the previous year reveals that

pad of the proposed Martinsville dump site lies in a floodplain. The com-

mission panel says it will hold hearings on whether the violation dis-

qualms the proposed dump location. The new IDNS director Thomas

Obliger says the site does not violate siting law criteria. (762)

OTHER PROPOSED LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE LANDFILLS

Pennsylvania

Spring 1989

CNSI is selected to design, site, build, and operate a ''low- level' radioac-

tive waste dump in Pennsylvania, as part of the Appalachian states'

regional compact. in, spite of a one-half-inch-thick compliance history of

violations submitted by CNSI'S parent company, CWM. (414) Other mem-

ber states in the compact include Mallard, Delaware, and West Virginia.

The company is expected to identify potential sites by late 1990. (358)

North Carolina

July 1989

CNSI wins a $40 minion contract for a son-acre 'low-lever' nuclear waste

dump to be operated as part of the southeastern states' regional compact

at an undetermined site m North Carolina (other member states in the

regional compact include Virginia, Mississippi, Tennessee, South

Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama). SEQ officials claim that CNSI

is a suitable company despite a long history of violations of environmental

relations by its grandparent company, <1, and parent company,

CWM. Numerous WMI and CWM environmental law violations are

omitted from the compliance history bed. (472) The site is to be selected

by November 15, 1990. The dump was intended to be open after the

Be-well, South Carolina, dump closes in 1993. The two proposed sits

are in Richmond County and on the Wake-chatham county line. (372)

July1989

Janet Hoyle, spokesperson for the North Carolina Radioactive Waste

page 78

Roundtable who served on the state's Proposed Review Committee elected

by the North Carolina low-level Radioactive Waste Authority, says her

group introduced the ''bad-boy amendment'' through District 40 Rep.

Judy Hunt, to prevent any company from bidding on potential waste

facilities in the state whose subsidiary, parent company, or grandparent

company had been convicted of felonious environmental crimes within the

past three years. ''lo the first session we got a three to one margin vote in

favor of the bill,'' Hoyle says. However, the July 5, 1989, vote is over-

turned one week after the Authority votes unanimously to hire Chem-

Nuclear, who would have been ineligible for bidding as a result of the

bad-boy amendment. (731)

In an interview with Greed Air/a magazine, Hoyle criticizes the close-

ness of Chem-Nuclear and the Authority who hired them. She notes that

the Chem-Nuclear company logo and the Authority logo have appeared

together in local newspaper ads for the new facility. Chem-Nuclear and

Authority representatives ''even come together to our meetings,'' she

added. This cozy relationship will not lead to regulation in the state of

North Carolina.'' (731)

May 1991

A disputed political report prepared for Chem-Nuclear by Epley and As-

sociates, Inc. of Raleigh is revealed. The report, portions of which gauge

potential opposition from politicians, media and environmentalists in the

counties being considered for the low-level nuclear dump, is partially

funded with state money. Joe Epley, president of Epley and Associates,

also serves as president of the Public Relations Society of America. The

report prompts many to conclude that clinics and public relations, rather

than science, have guided the dump siting process.

Connecticut

1991

CNSI is the chosen contractor to build a 'low-level'' radioactive waste

dump in Connecticut. (136)

page 79

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